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China in Global Climate Politics
The aim of this thesis is to examine the dynamics of China’s engagement with global 
climate change. After critically reviewing mainstream neo-realist and neo-liberal 
institutionalist approaches to International Relations and climate change, the thesis 
develops a revised governmentality framework based on a critical engagement with 
critical IPE and Foucauldian approaches. This provides the basis for an analytical 
framework focusing on four distinct ‘rationalities of government’ in China’s climate 
change politics and governance, which are sovereignty, development, market and the 
environment. The genealogical examination of these four governmental rationalities has 
demonstrated the dynamics among them and the relations of state/society/party in 
China. By applying this analytical framework, the thesis critically examines two 
distinctive fields of China’s climate change politics: international politics and the Clean 
Development Mechanism in China. The thesis argues that although neo-liberal 
governmentality appears dominant in global climate politics, the case study of China 
reveals different dynamics in which the rationalities of sovereignty and development 
have played the more influential roles. By contrast, the market rationality has been 
instrumentalised in China for the pursuit of economic growth and the environmental 
rationality has been marginalised. The thesis contends that the uneven relations among 
these rationalities have to be grasped through historical and contextual exploration. 
Different paths and mentalities of state formation and modernisation have had 
significant influences on China’s politics and governance of climate change in both 
international and domestic levels. The findings from this research help to explain the 
changes and continuities in China’s positions in international climate negotiations, in its 
regulation of the carbon market, and in the formation of climate knowledge and 
mentalities under the rule of the Communist Party. 
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51. Introduction: Rethinking China in Global Climate Politics
Since the Rio Summit in 1992, the international politics of climate change has gone 
through cheerful Kyoto, promising Bali, disappointing Copenhagen and hopeful Cancun 
at the end of 2010. This long and intricate journey has demonstrated to the world how 
difficult  it  is  and will  be  to  reach an international  agreement  that  aims  to  tackle  a 
common  threat  to  human  beings.  It  has  also  shown  various  possibilities  in  the 
international  arena,  including  cooperation,  conflict,  competition,  compliance, 
concessions,  convergences  and  confrontations.  How  to  grasp  the  dynamics  of  this 
process  has  become  a  challenge  to  researchers  from  various  different  disciplines, 
including International Relations (IR). Is it merely a product of power politics? Have 
established  institutions  fostered  cooperation  and compliance?  Who suffers  and who 
benefits  from  the  governance  of  climate  change?  To  what  extent  can  market 
mechanisms be the solution to tackling climate change? What knowledge is needed to 
govern climate change? What is to be governed and how? Who should be blamed and 
who should take the responsibility for tackling this challenge? It is clear that global 
climate change not only poses a threat to the survival of human beings but also emerges 
as a specific research ‘object’ for the intellectual world.
    Within these controversies, the various roles China plays and the strategies China 
deploys  have  gained  international  attention.  China  is  crucial  for  the  research  into 
international climate politics for several reasons. First, the simple fact is that, in 2007, 
China surpassed the US as the biggest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter in the world. As 
the threat of climate change to human society and the desperate need to tackle it have 
been  widely  recognised,  China’s  role  has  become more  important,  since  it  will  be 
meaningless to try to pursue an international climate change agreement without China’s 
6participation, no matter to what extent. Since adopting its ‘reform and openness’ policy 
from the late 1970s, China has experienced high economic growth which, together with 
its increasing needs of energy consumption, especially from coal and fossil fuels has 
generated huge amounts of GHGs. It is widely accepted that the whole world needs to 
take collective action to tackle climate change. However, how to attribute the causes, 
responsibilities  and  the  ensuing  mitigation  measures  remains  controversial  in 
international negotiations. During this tough process, the disputes between China and 
developed countries in particular have demonstrated the different concerns and forces in 
global climate change politics.
    Second, China’s influence rests not only on its huge emissions but also on its role in 
international politics as a rising developing country. Although benefiting greatly from 
fast economic growth in the last three decades, the per capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) in China is still relatively low1 and the per capita emissions just reach the world 
average. As a result, China is still on the way to fulfilling its development goals through 
economic growth. Meanwhile,  China has been an informal leader in the developing 
world, especially through  cooperation with the Group of 77 (G-77). From Kyoto to 
Copenhagen, the North-South confrontation has formed one of the basic frameworks of 
international politics of climate change. Yet China’s interactions with other G-77 states 
are complex. On the one hand, current developments, during and after Copenhagen, 
have demonstrated an emerging diversification within the G-77, as well  as amongst 
Northern parties. On the other hand, the North-South distinction is a crucial reference 
point  for  understanding  China’s  self-identification  in  international  climate  change 
politics. 
    Third, China is a key player in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Since 
1 The per capita GDP in China in 2005 was 1,714 US dollars, which is about a quarter of the world 
average. A huge domestic gap also exists, as over 20 million agricultural workers remain in a state of 
poverty (NDRC 2007). 
7developing countries were not required to bear reduction obligations under the  Kyoto 
Protocol (hereafter referred to as the  Protocol), the CDM was introduced as the only 
Kyoto mechanism to bring together industrialised and developing worlds in terms of 
tackling  climate  change.  The  CDM also  constitutes  a  crucial  part  of  global  carbon 
markets. Since adopting the CDM in 2005, China has taken the largest portion of the 
CDM market. The aggressive performance of the CDM has also provided China with a 
chance to demonstrate its ambition and contribution towards tackling climate change. 
How a self-proclaimed socialist state encounters a market-based mechanism, in which a 
neo-liberalist  apparatus  and  mentality  are  applied,  provides  space  for  further 
explorations into the dynamics of global climate change politics. 
    In short, China is a multi-faceted actor in global climate politics. It has become the 
biggest CO2 emitter since 2007 (Reuters 2007), the biggest energy consumer since 2010 
(International Energy Agency 2010), the most active state in the CDM market since 
2005 (Efstathiou Jr. and Carr 2010) and also the biggest investor in clean energy since 
2009 (Friedman 2010). Meanwhile, rapid and constant economic growth over the last 
three decades has made China the second largest economy in the world since 2010 
(Barboza 2010). China has often been treated as a selfish obstructer of climate change 
negotiations since the failure of the Copenhagen Summit (Lynas 2009, Miliband 2009, 
Spiegel Online 2009). However, China also demonstrates to the world its enthusiastic 
participation in the fields of renewable energy and the CDM market, which are crucial 
parts of climate change governance. The coexistence of positive and negative images of 
China in global climate politics has shown the difficulty in analysing the dynamics of 
global climate change politics.2 Moreover, treating China either as an obstructer or a 
cooperator  cannot  provide  a  comprehensive  understanding  of  China’s  roles  and 
2 When I use the term ‘global climate change politics’, it refers to a broader picture in which non-state 
actors and forces are taken into account. Nevertheless, the aim of this thesis is not to analyse the agents 
and structures of global climate change politics, but to explore how China interacts with state and non-
state actors based on different governmental rationalities. 
8strategies in the international politics of climate change. This ‘good or bad’ question 
also has its own theoretical bias, which focuses on the institutional side of international 
climate politics among states. One of the reasons, I will argue, that China’s behaviour is 
often seen as so unpredictable is because inappropriate theoretical frameworks are being 
used.  How to capture the dynamics underpinning China’s  role  and strategies within 
global climate politics is one of the main concerns of this thesis.
Research Objectives
The aim of this thesis is to examine the governmental rationalities underpinning China’s 
politics and governance of climate change at both international and domestic levels. It is 
not to blur the separation between the domestic and the international, rather, this thesis 
treats governmental rationalities from both sides as mutually constituted. On the one 
hand, the domestic governmental rationalities have influenced the techniques of China’s 
climate  governance,  and  its  self-identification  and  strategies  in  international 
negotiations. On the other hand, these domestic governmental rationalities do not come 
from and stay  in  a  vacuum,  instead,  their  emergences  in  China  have  embodied  the 
encounters between China and the outside world and they are constantly engaging with 
and influenced by the governmental rationalities from outside. The whole world is still 
on the way to establishing a long-standing international regime on climate change and 
the future remains uncertain. It is an ongoing process and the results will be able to 
affect  the  political  agenda  and  even  lifestyles  around  the  globe  in  the  future. 
Consequently, the need to understand China’s roles, identities, and strategies towards 
climate change has become more and more pressing after the failure to establish a post-
9Kyoto framework at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2009. By applying a revised 
governmentality approach which focuses on the governmental rationalities underpinning 
China’s politics and governance of climate change, this thesis is going to examine the 
following questions:
1. What  are  the  driving  forces  of  global  climate  politics?  In  order  to  answer  this 
question,  it  is  necessary to examine: what are the main disputes in international 
negotiations? Where do these controversies stem from? What solutions are more 
popular on the international agenda, and why?
2. What  structures  and dynamics  have  shaped China’s  climate  politics  and climate 
governance? What is the target and aim of China’s climate governance? Through a 
case study, this thesis analyses the governmental rationalities underpinning China’s 
politics  and  governance  of  climate  change  by  examining  China’s  perceptions, 
positions,  knowledge,  and techniques  within its  own climate governance at  both 
domestic and international levels. 
    Accordingly,  the  primary  research  objective  in  this  thesis  is  to  explore  the 
governmental rationalities framing and directing China’s climate politics, at both the 
international  and  domestic  levels.  At  the  international  level,  it  examines  what 
governmental  rationalities  have  influenced  and  directed  China’s  strategies  and  self-
identifications.  At  the  domestic  level,  it  explores  how China  encounters  one  of  the 
driving forces in global climate change politics, the force and the mentality of the neo-
liberal market in its domestic governance of climate change. From the case study on 
China, the intertwined dynamics in global climate politics are demonstrated, and these 
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need to be analysed historically and contextually. It is also important to explore the 
state/society  relationship,  the  legitimacy  of  the  present  Chinese  government,  the 
knowledge of ‘environment’ and ‘climate change’ and the way to accommodate them in 
China. Another research objective in this thesis is thus to disentangle these somehow 
conflicting factors. 
Analytical Framework
Inspired by Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 1991b, 2007, 2008), this 
research  focuses  on  ‘rationalities  of  government’ or  ‘governmental  rationalities’ in 
global climate politics, and specifically on China’s politics and governance of climate 
change. I will elaborate this concept and the reasons to deploy this revised framework in 
the next two chapters, but briefly speaking, ‘governmentality’ refers to the ‘conduct of 
conduct’, the ‘art of government’, and the ‘right dispositions of things’ (Gordon 1991). 
The concept of governmentality has focused on nuanced and multi-faceted dimensions 
of power practices. For Foucault, the emergence of ‘government’ marked a rupture with 
‘sovereignty’,  based  around  a  traditional  Machiavellian  understanding  of  power, 
principality, territoriality, and politics. Since the 18th century the welfare of populations 
has become the end of governance (Foucault 2007). However, as I will discuss in the 
next  two  chapters,  Foucault  developed  his  work  on  governmentality  based  on  the 
observations  of  the  development  of  modern  states  in  Western  Europe.  I  argue  that 
transformations  in  governmentalities  in  different  regions  of  the  world  should  be 
understood  contextually.  Moreover,  the  emergence  of  governmentality  and  its 
dominance over sovereign and disciplinary modes of power since the 18th century has 
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not been a linear or teleological process. Instead, what Foucault was concerned with 
were the historical connections between sovereignty,  discipline,  and governmentality 
(Foucault 2007, 2008). As a result, I argue that it is necessary to analyse ‘rationalities of 
government’  dynamically  in  concrete  historical  contexts  in  order  to  examine  the 
relevant  knowledge,  norms,  techniques,  apparatuses,  objects  and  subjects  of 
governance. 
    To operationalise this Foucauldian concern with governmentality for the study of 
China  within  global  climate  change  politics,  I  adopt  in  this  thesis  an  analytical 
framework organised around four distinct rationalities of government which focus more 
on  the  ‘norms’  and  ‘knowledge’  of  governance.  These  are  rationalities  of  the 
sovereignty, the development, the market, and the environment. Here, I briefly introduce 
these four rationalities to be used in the subsequent analysis. Detailed discussions on the 
emergences and interpretations of these governmental rationalities in China and their 
influences on China’s politics and governance of climate change are in Chapter Three.
    Sovereignty: Sovereignty has long been a core concept in international and domestic 
politics,  as  long  as  the  state  is  recognised  as  the  legitimate  player  in  these  fields. 
Sovereignty  refers  to  the  supreme  political  authority  within  a  fixed  territory.  The 
modern notion can be traced to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 which established the 
basic  framework  of  international  politics  and  international  law.3 The  concepts  and 
practices of the sovereign state and the state system were gradually disseminated to the 
whole world.  According to  this  Westphalian Order,  every state  should be treated as 
equal  and  independent.  The  exclusivity  of  the  sovereign  implies  the  intolerance  of 
foreign  interference  into  a  state.  In  line  with  this,  sovereignty  as  a  rationality  of 
government  is  a  mode  of  thought  and  action  which  emphasises  the  exclusivity, 
territoriality,  independence,  and  autonomy of  a  state.  In  analysing  sovereignty  as  a 
3Nevertheless, it is still contested that if the Westphalia Treaty had represented the emergence of modern 
state and state system (Teschke 2003). 
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rationality of government, my aim is to examine the understandings, knowledge, and 
discourses of Chinese sovereignty and statehood in relation to global climate change 
politics. 
    Development: A variety of definitions and practices of the concept of development 
can be found in other disciplines but here in this thesis I deploy this concept from the 
social and economic dimensions which are mostly discussed in development studies. 
This  concept  of  ‘development’  and  the  discipline  of  development  studies  started 
appearing after the Second World War, when how the countries and people from the 
‘Third World’ might fulfil goals of ‘development’ became a core concern. I will analyse 
the  emergence  and  evolution  of  this  concept  in  Chapter  Three.  In  my  analytic 
framework, development refers to improvement in economic and social conditions. The 
implication is that development has been internalised as one of several crucial goals for 
different countries. As a result, my analytic framework will focus on how the discourse 
and  knowledge  of  development  encounters  and  responds  to  the  environmental 
challenges, including global climate change. Moreover, I will examine the objects and 
subjects of development in specific contexts in order to disclose the role of this political 
rationality in environmental politics. 
    Market:  The rationality of the neo-liberal market refers to the general effort  to 
promote  a  global  free  market  in  which  national  barriers  and  interference  based  on 
‘protectionism’ are removed. Fundamentally, it aims to expand the market mechanism 
based on deregulation and liberalisation to different fields and corners of human society, 
such as  land, labour and the environment. To bring this rationality into environmental 
politics, the concept of ‘ecological modernisation’ and the discipline of environmental 
economics appear within the capitalist mode of production in order to transform nature 
and  the  environment  into  manageable  and  calculable  objects  based  on  cost-benefit 
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concerns. As I will analyse, this rationality has played a crucial role in contemporary 
environmental  governance  and  the  politics  of  climate  change  to  the  extent  that 
commodification  has  become  one  of  the  most  important  tools  for  tackling 
environmental  degradation  and  global  warming.  My  thesis  will  examine  how  this 
market rationality is understood, interpreted, and responded to by China. 
    Environment: From the broadest understanding, the term ‘environment’ can refer to 
all conditions surrounding specific objects. What I deploy here is the environmentalist 
concern  aimed  at  the  protection,  conservation,  and  improvement  of  the  natural 
environment. As a relatively recent object of social science research, the category and 
concept  of  ‘environment’  has  brought  challenges  to  existing  social  scientific 
approaches.  As a  contested  and contestable  concept,  this  thesis  thus  focuses  on  the 
interplay between the rationality of the environment and the other three governmental 
rationalities.  My  aim  is  to  examine  how  certain  knowledge  and  discourses  of  the 
environment in China have influenced China’s roles and strategies in global climate 
change politics, and how they have facilitated China’s domestic governance of climate 
change.
    These ‘rationalities of government’ should not be treated as  ‘fixed’ essences existing 
without dispute. Taking the rationality of sovereignty as an example, I do not discuss its 
legal  and institutional  aspects.  Instead,  my  aim is  to  examine the  existence  of  this 
rationality  contextually  and  to  further  analyse   to  what  extent  this  rationality  has 
influenced the governance of the environment and climate change. Moreover, the focus 
on rationalities of sovereignty does not mean the research is limited to the ‘reasons of 
state’ only.  Rather,  this  focus  helps  to  clarify  what  relevant  knowledge,  norms and 
techniques  have  been  produced,  reproduced,  and  shared  by  a  society  in  order  to 
facilitate governance. Since governance is related to the ‘right disposition of things’, it 
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is crucial to examine how the knowledge of those ‘things’ are produced and what is the 
criterion of right and wrong. The relations among these rationalities are not even and 
balanced, and they need to be approached within a concrete historical context in order to 
identify their continuities, ruptures, interpretations, adoptions and transformations. 
Research Method and Fieldwork in China
My research  starts  from archival  analysis  in  order  to  examine the  developments  of 
institutions,  regulations  and  conflicts  and  compliances  around  international  climate 
politics. A literature review on existing IR approaches is presented in the next chapter, 
in which different approaches that deal with ‘nature’, the ‘environment’ and ‘climate 
change’,  based  on  their  ontological  and  epistemological  grounds,  are  critically 
examined. Regarding the case study, this thesis examines China’s strategic concerns of 
climate  change  from  observations  on  the  government,  research  institutes  and  civil 
society in China. A discourse analysis is conducted in order to grasp the perceptions, 
expectations,  aspirations  and understanding of the people in  China while  facing the 
threats of climate change. The aim is to examine the “ensemble of ideas, concepts, and 
categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of 
practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer 
1995:  44).  In  this  thesis,  environmental  politics  is  where  ‘argumentative  struggles’ 
happen, and “actors not only try to make others see the problems according to their 
views but also seek to position other actors in a specific way” (Hajer 1995: 53). The 
power  relations  and  political  conflicts  behind  struggles  over  meanings  will  also  be 
explored in order to disclose the underpinning forces. At the same time, what has been 
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excluded is as important as what has been included. 
    Due  to  the  dearth  of  sufficient  English  language  sources  and  first-hand 
understandings of Chinese perspectives, I  conducted fieldwork in China.  I  stayed in 
Beijing for four months in the summer of 2009 and collected a large amount of data, 
including  official  documents,  media  coverage  and  records  of  climate-relevant 
symposiums held by official and semi-official institutions. I also conducted interviews 
with  government  officials,  researchers  on  climate  change  policy  and  sustainable 
development  studies,  experts  on  CDM  projects,  consultants  from  environmental 
companies  and  campaigners  from  environmental  non-governmental  organisations 
(NGOs) in China,.  I  undertook a total  of 16 formal  interviews (details  are given in 
Appendix 1). Each interview took at least one hour. 
    Due to the sensitivity of the climate change issue and the timing of my research, just 
a  few months before the Copenhagen Summit,  it  proved extremely difficult  to  gain 
access to government officials, which meant I had to turn my focus to Chinese NGOs. I 
will elaborate on this more later, but to give a brief introduction, all these NGOs have a 
strong connection with the government, from the fields of policy analysis, and public 
campaigns to  international  negotiations.  Therefore,  being able  to  conduct  interviews 
with these NGO campaigners provided another channel for gaining information about 
the government’s attitudes.4 Moreover, all the NGOs I met in China, the World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF), Greenpeace China, the Global Environment Institute (GEI), the Climate 
Group, and the Friends of Nature (FON) are all leading NGOs in the field of climate 
change research. Besides interviews, I attended two important symposiums, one a low-
carbon business  forum and the  other  a  forum about  the media and climate change. 
4 The fact is that there is no ‘pure’ NGO in China, because of the state-society relations and the way the 
Communist Party governs. However, it does not mean that these NGOs only work for the government. 
Instead, they still have relative autonomy but, at the same time, they also have many chances to develop 
cooperation with the government in different fields, for various reasons. Two of the interviewees from the 
WWF and Greenpeace China attend the international negotiations with the Chinese representatives 
regularly so they also have good insider information. 
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Several important officials, including a top negotiation representative Su Wei, and a top 
scientist Qin Dahe, and other leading researchers were invited to these symposia, which 
provided a chance to ascertain their government positions directly. 
    Interviews  were conducted  in  an  open-ended and semi-structured  way (Robson 
2002). My questions were categorised into three parts, concomitant with my empirical 
concerns:  China’s  foreign  politics  of  climate  change,  the  CDM  in  China,  and  the 
domestic politics and governance of climate change. Regarding the international arena, 
China’s use of different strategies, its self-identification in international negotiations and 
the  underpinning  reasons  of  these  preferences  were  my  primary  concerns.  China’s 
principles in the negotiations, its interaction with the developed and developing worlds 
and  its  expectation  of  a  certain  international  image  were  discussed  a  great  deal. 
Regarding the CDM in China, the original query for me was why China has become the 
biggest and the most important player in the CDM market, regardless of its previous 
rejection  to  the  proposal  of  flexible/market  mechanisms  in  the  pre-Kyoto  stage.  I 
wanted  to  know,  besides  economic  profit,  what  factors  brought  China  to  engage 
enthusiastically in this mechanism. From the interviews, I collected fruitful information 
about  the interpretations  and expectations  of sustainable development,  the reality  of 
public participation, the obstacles to applying and operating the CDM and the impacts 
of this market-based mechanism on China’s governance of climate change, all of which 
were very useful additions to the published sources. Moving to the domestic level, my 
aim was to understand the relation between the state, society and the Communist Party 
regarding China’s governance of climate change. A grasp of this background helped 
delineate how different governmental rationalities interact unevenly with each other. I 
also  tried  to  collect  information  about  how  certain  policies  were  campaigned  for, 
encouraged and implemented, and to ask what the reactions have been from society. In 
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summary,  I  tried to  examine how China governs climate change internationally  and 
domestically  through  specific  designs  and  measures  which  are  based  on  certain 
governmental  rationalities.  On  all  of  these  subjects,  my  interviewees  were  able  to 
provide much useful information. 
    Subsequent to the fieldwork, I collected crucial follow-up information from Chinese 
websites. These websites are run by NGOs or quasi-official media, some of which hold 
on-line forums regularly and where many important figures working on energy policy 
and climate change negotiations are invited to join the dialogue. These also provided a 
chance to observe the development and transformation of mentalities in China’s climate 
politics.5  
Structure of the Thesis
After the introduction chapter, I start from the theoretical review in Chapter Two. A 
literature review on international climate change politics is presented in this chapter. 
Five  approaches  in  IR  are  fully  discussed;  they  are  the  neo-realism,  neo-liberal 
institutionalism, social constructivism, critical international political economy (IPE) and 
Foucauldian approaches. The review starts by examining the theoretical assumptions of 
different  approaches  in  terms  of  environmental  politics  and  the  politics  of  climate 
change. It then goes on to examine existing literature on China and international climate 
change politics  from the  lens  of  different  approaches.  The  aim of  the  review is  to 
critically  engage  with  these  different  approaches  in  order  to  explore  theoretical 
5Such as the programme of ‘Climate Dialogue’. (http://www.china5e.com/special/show.php?
specialid=107 ) from the website of China Energy Net (http://www.china5e.com/ ). This programme has 
constantly invited influential officials, researchers, business leaders and NGO campaigners to have in-
depth talks about climate change and low carbon transition in China. The Green Channel of qq.com 
(http://www.qq.com/ ), one of the biggest portal sites in China, also has a programme called ‘Green 
Dialogue’  (http://news.qq.com/l/green/Gdialogue/list20100329151448.htm ) which regularly organises 
many interviews with climate experts. 
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potentials  and  limitations.  I  criticise  mainstream  neo-realism  and  the  neo-liberal 
institutionalism,  as  neither  of  them  can  provide  comprehensive  understanding  of 
international  climate  change  politics  and  China’s  role  and  preferences  within  it. 
Moreover, both approaches neglect the power relations behind existing knowledge and 
institutions and thus can only provide a limited understanding of global climate change 
politics.  Social  constructivism  stands  as  the  medium  between  positivist  and  post-
positivist approaches in the IR. Its emphasis on the ideas and norms has facilitated the 
research on the formation transformation of knowledge and mentalities in present global 
climate  change politics.  Although lacking the  inner  coherences,  the  hard  version  of 
constructivism can work with critical IR approaches to disclose the underpinning forces 
which  influence  China’s  strategies  and  self-identifications  in  global  climate  change 
politics. Critical IPE approaches have provided many insightful contributions to expose 
the  structural  forces.  However,  I  argue  that  a  more  historical  and  contextual 
understanding is necessary in China’s case. The governmentality approach provides a 
different  insight;  nevertheless,  the  universalisation  implication  in  the  global 
governmentality approach has limited its focus on neo-liberalism. As a result, in this 
thesis I develop a revised analytic framework based on the governmentality concern, 
which  is  developed  out  of  critical  engagement  with  both  neo-Gramscian  IPE  and 
Foucauldian governmentality approaches. Both the neo-Gramscian and governmentality 
approaches emphasise the univeralised power or hegemony of neo-liberal governance. 
However, I argue that this emphasis on the universality of neo-liberalism has prevented 
these two approaches from grasping the different and multiple dynamics of power. As a 
result,  I  propose  a  framework  consisting  of  a  complex  of  rationalities,  namely 
sovereignty,  development,  the  neo-liberal  market,  and  environment.  The  aim  is  to 
examine  how  these  rationalities  direct  and  influence  China’s  strategies  and  self-
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identifications in global climate politics.
    Chapter Three analyses the emergences of four governmental rationalities in China 
and how China interprets and transforms them to serve China’s governance of climate 
change  in  both  international  and  domestic  levels.  By  applying  a  genealogical 
perspective, how China encountered these four rationalities is examined. By historically 
examining the process China encounters and adopts these governmental rationalities, 
and the relation among the state, society and the Communist Party in China, it helps 
explain  why the  rationality  of  sovereignty  and development  play  dominant  roles  in 
directing and influencing China’s politics and governance of climate change at  both 
international and domestic levels. In this chapter, I also integrate the observations from 
my fieldwork to examine how these governmental rationalities interact and compete 
with  each other  unevenly,  and to  constitute  the mentality  of  China’s  governance  of 
climate change. As a result, this chapter not only serves as the analytic framework for 
the  empirical  analysis  in  Chapters  Four  and  Five,  but  also  provides  a  dynamic 
background in which different governmental rationalities reside in different positions. 
Why the rationality of sovereignty and development outweigh the rationalities of market 
and environment in China’s governance of climate change; and why the rationality of 
market is instrumentalised and how the rationality of environment is incorporated into 
different  governmental  needs  can  be  grasped  through  the  context  depicted  by  this 
chapter. 
    Chapter  Four analyses  China’s roles,  strategies  and self-identifications  in  global 
climate change politics. I firstly review the developments of the international regime of 
climate change in which the achievements and failures in international negotiations are 
discussed.  Reviewing  this  process  can  also  help  to  demonstrate  which  ideas  have 
gradually gained popularity in terms of governing climate change. Then, I move on to 
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examine  the  development  of  China’s  foreign  policy  and  its  concerns  in  relation  to 
international  climate  negotiations.  China’s  positions  and  strategies  towards  crucial 
issues of global  climate change politics at  different  stages  are  discussed in  order  to 
examine  China’s  primary  principles  throughout  the  negotiations.  Besides  collective 
negotiations, China’s relations with the developing world, the US and the EU, through 
bilateral  and  multilateral  interactions,  are  discussed  in  order  to  examine  the 
underpinning  rationalities  at  different  levels.  Through  a  contextual  examination  of 
China’s  foreign politics,  the  imperatives  and guiding rationalities  become clear.  My 
argument is  that,  although four rationalities – sovereignty,  development,  market  and 
environment – can be observed from China’s interplay within global climate change 
politics,  the first  two play much more important roles than those of the market and 
environment for China. This is due to the country's specific path of nation/state building 
in the last century and it helps to explain why principles of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ and volunteer measures have become China’s primary emphases. The 
discussions from Chapter Three have provided a clear context about the development of 
uneven relations among these rationalities. The findings in this chapter also explain why 
hard  issues  become  harder,  and  soft  issues  become  softer  regarding  China  in 
international climate politics. 
    Chapter Five examines specifically the CDM in China. The discussion focuses on the 
development  of  the  CDM  in  China  and  on  interactions  and  competitions  between 
different rationalities through the examination of implementation of the CDM. I start 
with a review of the adoption and development of the CDM in the international arena 
and discuss the critiques of this market mechanism. I then move on to examine the 
regulations and achievements of the CDM in China in order to explore how China deals 
with  this  market  force.  Crucially,  by  integrating  many  sources  from my study  and 
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fieldwork, the gap between the ideals and practices of the CDM in China are analysed. I 
argue  that  what   operates  in  China  is  a  ‘CDM with  Chinese  characteristics’,  with 
specific  relations  with Chinese  state  and society,  both  physically  and mentally.  The 
successful adoption of the CDM in China does not represent a dissemination and victory 
of the neo-liberal order in global climate change governance. Rather, the Chinese case 
demonstrates how the operation of the CDM is carefully regulated and monitored by the 
government.  The market force needs to constantly negotiate with political  forces on 
different levels regarding China’s CDM practices. As a result, I argue that the market 
rationality remains auxiliary to the sovereignty and development rationalities in China’s 
governance of climate change. A carbon market has gradually been established but its 
existence is for facilitating governance by the state. The findings of this chapter not only 
demonstrate  the  interaction  between  the  state  and  the  market,  but  also  depict  the 
dynamics  among  four  governmental  rationalities  in  China’s  governance  of  climate 
change. 
    A summary of the analysis and of my findings are provided in the concluding chapter. 
A neo-liberal way to govern, manage and commodify climate change has been gradually 
installed  throughout  the world.  However,  this  is  not  a  universal  or  one-dimensional 
process which can unilaterally force different countries with different historical paths to 
accept neo-liberal solutions. Critical IPE, neo-Gramscian and Foucauldian approaches 
have all provided critical accounts of the expansion of this neo-liberal project across the 
globe. However, to accept these critical approaches without bringing their contextual 
significance into account also runs the risk of putting the research objects under the 
academic  ‘gaze’.  By  placing  China  historically  and  contextually  in  the  site  where 
different political rationalities and structural forces have been entangled, it helps grasp 
China’s  strategic  concerns  of  mobilising  the  market  and  society  for  the  need  of 
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governance.  This  particular  ‘socialist  art  of  government’  is  the  crystallisation  of 
different rationalities from the international and domestic levels. In practical terms, this 
thesis  aims  to  provide  a  comprehensive  understanding  of  China’s  politics  and 
governance of climate change at both international and domestic levels, which can then 
help reveal the dynamics behind China’s choices and self-identifications in international 
negotiations in the future. In summary, climate change governance is a contested field in 
which different rationalities of government are struggling over the right way to provide 
the  ‘right’  governance.  Theoretically,  this  thesis  provides  a  reflexive  account  of 
environmental politics, politics and governance of climate change and the IR discipline 
as  well.  Specifically,  the  contributions  of  this  thesis  are  in  these  areas:  (1)  the 
Foucauldian approach to IR study, (2) the research on the politics of climate change, (3) 
the research on policy studies of climate change, (4) the research on China’s politics, 
and (5) the research beyond China.  In Chapter Six,  I  will  elaborate more about the 
contributions and limitations of this research. 
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2.  Theoretical  Review:  International  Politics  of  Climate 
Change and China’s Climate Politics
The  United  Nations  Conference  on  the  Human  Environment  in  Stockholm in  1972 
represented  the  beginning  of  a  new  era,  in  which  the  ‘environment’ started  being 
categorised and integrated into the agenda of international politics. Researchers from the 
IR  discipline  started  to  discuss  the  environment  and  relevant  issues  from different 
dimensions.6 Although gaining attention from human society and relevant disciplines, 
the concept of ‘environment’ is difficult to fit into existing disciplines and social life 
framed by the sovereign state and state system, in which the world is artificially and 
arbitrarily divided. The environment, from the beginning, has the potential to evolve as 
a trans-boundary phenomenon, such as global climate change, and cross-border dust 
storms originated from certain concrete national boundaries. “(T)he problems must be 
looked at as features of the globe as a whole…….[P]ollutants are indifferent to national 
boundaries  while  scarcities  caused  by  human  action  are  commonly  global  in  their 
implications” (Nicholson 1998: 157). As a result, from 1970s, the world has witnessed 
increases  in  multilateral  environmental  agreements  (MEAs),  international 
environmental and relevant organisations, international environmental NGOs, and the 
establishment of environmental protection agencies in almost every country (Najam et  
al. 2004).7 It  is  an  apparent  trend  that  the  environmental  issue  has  been  highly 
‘internationalised’ or ‘globalised’. How to understand, depict, explain, and theorise this 
burgeoning phenomenon has become one of the unavoidable tasks for IR researchers. 
6Such as Falk’s research on the sovereign system and environmental crisis (1971) and the response from 
Bull (1977); Waltz also points out pollution as one of the 4 “P”s in international politics (1979).
7 The leading international environmental organisations include the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), and the Commission of Sustainable 
Development (CSD). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and the World Bank are relevant international organisations in terms of global 
environmental governance. 
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    Climate  change,  from  the  scope  of  its  causes  and  consequences,  is  a  global 
environmental  phenomenon.  Although  voices  from  sceptics  have  never  ceased,8 
anthropogenically induced global climate change has been widely accepted as one of 
biggest threats to the future of human society, and it has been integrated into the agenda 
of  international  politics.  From the  establishment  of  the  Intergovernmental  Panel  on 
Climate  Change  (IPCC),  the  United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  
Change (UNFCCC, hereafter referred to as the  Convention), to the conclusion of the 
Kyoto  Protocol;  climate  change,  which  is  initially  understood  as  a  scientific 
phenomenon,  is  gradually ‘politicised’ and institutionalised internationally.  Plenty of 
reviews on the development of the international climate change regime have been made 
(Rowlands 1995, O’Riordan and Jäger 1996, Paterson 1996a 1996b, Oberthür and Ott 
1999, Newell 2000; Bulkeley and Newell 2010). In this research, one more important 
question is to explore how researchers from different IR approaches theorise ‘climate 
change’. To analyse climate change through different theoretical grounds, as is done in 
this chapter, is to make a de-naturalised and contextualised effort to grasp the dynamics 
of politics of climate change. Just as other environmental issues, climate change has to 
be introduced, recognised, cognised, and understood through the evidence provided by 
natural science. Regardless of the continuing challenges to the authenticity of climate 
science,  the  way  that  a  society,  international  or  domestic,  understands,  treats,  and 
tackles climate change reflects certain underpinning assumptions, and thus bears its own 
possibilities and limitations. It is a continuing process of human engagement,  which 
makes knowledge and the relevant measures about climate change possible, but at the 
same time,  constrains  and excludes  the  potentialities  of  some alternatives,  either  in 
theory or in practice.
    Due to the complexities and huge scale of this topic, most researchers can only 
8 See the event of ‘Climategate’ (Hickman and Randerson 2009) and the disputes over the mistakes in the 
IPCC report (McKie 2010, Watson 2010).
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provide  descriptions  and  empirical,  if  not  theoretical,  explanations  of  international 
climate change politics  (Oberthür  and Ott  1999;  Helm and Hepburn 2009).  Critical 
reflections from epistemological and ontological grounds are relatively lacking in the IR 
discipline.  While  the  focus  has  been moved to  China,  the  majority  of  the  research 
conducted  are  textbook-like  descriptions  which  include  somewhat  contradictory 
approaches. The mainstream research focuses merely on ‘what is happening in China’s 
climate  change  politics’,  instead  of  ‘why  China  governs  climate  change  in  certain 
ways’. In short, the underpinning political/governmental rationalities of global climate 
change politics and China’s climate change governance are neglected. 
    As a result,  the aim of this chapter is to establish the theoretical and analytical 
framework of this thesis based on the critical engagements with existing IR approaches 
to global climate change politics. Besides examining the validities and limitations of 
different approaches to global climate change politics in general, this thesis continues to 
explore how different approaches are applied to the Chinese case. The complexities of 
the politics and governance of climate change in China have thus provided the space for 
the critical reflections of existing approaches. 
    This chapter starts with the review of mainstream approaches. The first section is on 
neo-realism and the second is on neo-liberal institutionalism. This research contends 
that  both  mainstream  approaches  merely  tend  to  integrate  climate  change  into  the 
existing theoretical framework without reflecting the complexities and specialities of 
this issue. However, they do provide certain valid explanations in this field. Reviewing 
this literature critically does not mean abrogating them entirely. Rather, it provides a 
chance to examine the validity and limitations of mainstream approaches in order to 
develop  a  more  comprehensive  theoretical  framework.  The  third  section  moves  to 
examine a constructivist approach, which has brought the ideas, identities, and norms to 
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the agenda. As an intermediary approach in the IR discipline, constructivism has opened 
up  space  for  further  critical  engagement.  The  fourth  section  reviews  the  critical 
international  political  economy  (IPE)  and  the  fifth  section  is  on  the  Foucauldian 
approaches. This research contends that both critical approaches have to be critically 
examined as well. While the structural and underpinning forces are disclosed by these 
two  approaches,  it  is  crucial  to  examine  whether  the  ‘universalised’ critiques  have 
neglected  certain  contextual  factors.  That  is  why this  research  applies  a  framework 
which focuses on the ‘rationalities of government’. The detailed discussion is in Section 
Six.  In  summary,  the  attempt  of  this  chapter  is  to  critically  review  existing  IR 
approaches  to  international  climate  change  politics  and,  specifically,  China’s 
involvement. 
2.1 Realism/Neo-Realism
This  section  analyses  how  (neo-)realism  in  IR  deals  with  the  natural  world, 
environment,  and climate change specifically.  Strands of classical realism,  structural 
realism, offensive realism, and Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) are discussed in this 
section. This section starts with a review of realism which became dominant in the IR 
discipline after the Second World War. The essence of international relations, from a 
classical  realist’s  perspective,  is  power politics which “is  a  struggle for power over 
men…power  is  its  immediate  goal  and  the  modes  of  acquiring,  maintaining,  and 
demonstrating it determine the technique of political action” (Morgenthau 1965: 195). 
The international arena is full of conflicts between states pursuing their own national 
interests.  For  the  neo-realist,  based  on Waltz’s  argument,  the  basic  characteristic  of 
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international relations is the de-centralised structure of anarchy in which states search 
for the gain and maintenance of the balance of power (1979). All states are ‘like units’ 
in that they are only different due to their “greater or less capabilities for performing 
similar  tasks”  (1979:  97).  This  international  structure  of  anarchy  predetermines  the 
international  changes  and  states’  behaviours  with  Waltz  claiming  that  “structural 
constraints  explain  why  the  methods  are  repeatedly  used  despite  differences  in  the 
persons  and  states  who  use  them”  (1979:  117).  By  providing  a  strict  structuralist 
understanding of international relations, Waltz seems to provide a scientific explanation 
of international politics. 
    In short, from classical realism to neo-realism, this mainstream tradition has focused 
on  the  state  in  international  anarchy.  Power  and  security  are  treated  as  the  most 
important  targets  in  international  politics.  This  tradition  also  applies  the  positivist 
method of research in which value and fact are clearly divided. However, there also 
exist some differences between classical realism and neo-realism: first, classical realism 
treats international interaction as the extension of human interaction based on human 
nature; whereas neo-realism emphasises that it is the international structure determining 
the international interaction among states. Moral concerns no longer enter the agenda of 
neo-realism. Second, classical realism claims that the pursuit of power by states reflects 
human  nature,  whereas  neo-realism  argues  that  survival  and  security  are  the  prior 
concerns  of  states.  Third,  neo-realism clams that  states  are  like-units  and that  their 
decisions will be influenced and directed by the international structure of anarchy. As a 
result,  the domestic differences among states are not important theoretically.  Fourth, 
neo-realism is concerned more about international economic interaction than classical 
realism is. Fifth, classical realism emphasises the dimension of conflict in international 
politics, whereas neo-realism argues that it is still likely to have certain international 
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cooperation while the relative gains can be pursued. In other words, neo-realism has 
brought the research focus to the macro and systemic level of international politics. 
Although there are other variations of realism, including offensive realism, defensive 
realism,  neoclassical  realism,  and  the  HST,  the  key  assumptions  of  this  dominant 
mainstream  approach  remain:  (1)  power  politics;  (2)  clear  distinction  of 
international/domestic politics; (3) international anarchy; and (4) the centrality of state. 
State is treated as unitary and rational actors in international politics (Vasquez 1998). 
Based on these assumptions, realists claim that the pursuit of survival, national security 
and national interests in an anarchical international arena should be the most important 
task for a state.9 
    Regarding the natural world, there is no clear difference between classical realism 
and neo-realism. Realists simply treat it as a stock of natural resources which could be, 
and should be, exploited for industrial production and as one element of national power 
in  terms  of  warfare  (Morgenthau  1967).  The  understanding  of  ‘nature’  and  the 
‘environment’ is limited in the framework of power politics and the natural world is 
represented as a place of raw materials, which facilitates the operation of war. In the 
1970s,  neo-liberalism  appeared  as  the  challenging  force,  if  not  fundamentally,  to 
mainstream neo-realism so that the concept of complex interdependence was introduced 
to  the  IR  discipline  (Keohane  and  Nye  1977).  However,  the  understanding  of  the 
‘natural world’ has hardly changed. The term ‘nature’ is still treated as one fixed arena 
with natural resources and raw materials and it existed because of the management and 
control by human beings in order to pursue economic growth and development. In the 
end,  the  potential  dynamics  between  human  society  and  the  natural  world  is  still 
neglected  and  nature  and  the  environment  could  only  appear  as  a  fixed  and 
predetermined ‘factor’. The environment has been seated on the periphery within the IR 
9As a result, the term ‘realist’ represents this IR tradition in this thesis, whereas the term ‘neo-realist’ 
represents a specific approach with a distinct research agenda within this tradition. 
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discipline and will be kept marginalised because the centrality of environmental issues, 
such  as  ‘low  politics’,  depends  on  the  nature  of  wider  political  and  economic 
developments, namely the ‘high politics’ agenda (Smith 1993).
    As a result, the realist tends to integrate climate change and other environmental 
issues into existing hierarchical and anarchical frameworks, specifically in the (national) 
security category. Realists are pessimistic in the face of real insecure, violent, chaotic, 
and anarchic threats outside the national boundary, so much so that this fear becomes an 
inner drive to secure the ‘tame zones’ as they “search for the techniques of power that 
aim to secure territories in the most effective manner, seeking to make territorial borders 
a source of protection” (Lacy 2005: 2). By analysing the arguments of Mearsheimer’s 
offensive realism (2001), Lacy uncovers that there exist hierarchies of security within 
realism and this helps explain the realist’s attitude towards environmental issues (Lacy 
2005).  Based on the hierarchy of security,  those non-traditional  threats,  such as the 
spread  of  the  Acquired  Immune  Deficiency  Syndrome  (AIDS),  environmental 
degradations, population growth, global warming and climate change, can be treated as 
Second-Order  problems,  which  means  “there  is  little  evidence  that  any  of  them is 
serious enough to threaten the survival of a great power” (Mearsheimer 2001: 372). As 
Lacy claims,
[T]he hierarchy of First-Order/traditional and Second-Order/non-traditional 
problems secures the foundations of the discipline from alternative ways of 
thinking about (in)security…Realism works to foreclose and pre-empt the 
unraveling of human possibilities by arguing that military insecurity is the ‘grand 
narrative’ of the human condition (Lacy 2005: 32). 
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    It  is  not only threats  that  are framed in this  hierarchical  understanding but also 
responses  and  attitudes  that  are  differentiated  by  this  framework.  Although  being 
pessimistic towards traditional threats, Mearsheimer (2001) posits a techno-optimistic 
perspective  towards  those non-traditional  threats  and claims that  problems could  be 
tackled as the development of advanced technologies progresses. Climate change, from 
this perspective, “will be able to create technological fixes, strategies of adaptation that 
will provide the re-attainment of security” (Lacy 2005: 134). In other words, investment 
in  adaptation is  more  important  than in  mitigation  measures  on account  of  fighting 
global climate change. The implication is that current international efforts to curb GHGs 
emissions are not urgent in international politics. Fundamentally, climate change, as a 
non-traditional threat with a strong science-relevant character, has not gained sufficient 
attention from realists and, as a consequence, this issue is only treated as another factor 
to be incorporated into the realist’s existing analytical framework. 
    Based on this universalised and hierarchical ontology, realists either treat climate 
change  as  a  ‘technical’ problem which  will  be  solved  by  advanced  technology,  as 
Mearsheimer claims; or they just keep addressing climate change at the level of ‘low-
politics’. For realists, there is no need to develop new perceptions of climate change in 
international politics since the existing framework is considered comprehensive enough 
for the analysis. Besides, for realists, (national) security is another category that is able 
to integrate climate change into the existing framework. In practice, climate change has 
gradually appeared as an emerging security issue, which could threaten nation states in 
many dimensions. In April 2007, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had a 
fierce debate about climate change. However, from the debate, it was clear that climate 
change needed to be considered seriously only because either its effects cause conflicts 
and violence in the international arena, or it has a direct impact on public health and 
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living conditions (Scott 2008). The discourses that appeared in the debate did not move 
away from the  traditional  concerns  of  national  security.10 Climate  change is  merely 
represented as a factor which may bring instability and conflict to nation states. This 
phenomenon does not guarantee the emergence of international cooperation; instead, the 
“goal  of  reducing emissions  could fall  prey to  a  competitive struggle for resources, 
exacerbating already existing tensions and divisions” (Giddens 2010: 205). However, it 
is not easy to figure out a clear realist account in terms of international climate change 
politics.  Partly,  it  is because of the complexities of this issue that researchers might 
unintentionally  use  some realist  language in  their  analysis,  and partly  it  is  because 
realists do not treat climate change seriously, except for when it is related to the field of 
national  security.  One  of  the  reasons,  this  research  argues,  why  researchers 
unconsciously  apply  realist  language  in  their  analysis  is  that  international  climate 
politics does, to some extent, involve the ‘resurgence of the nation state’. Consequently, 
many  features,  such  as  national  security,  national  interests  and  the  self-interested 
national state seem to fit in with the explanation of international climate politics. 
    This phenomenon is especially apparent when the focus turns to China, since in 
China the state is  run by the Communist  Party and has a dominant  role  over  other 
spheres in Chinese society. In other words, China seems to be a perfect model for a 
realist  account  in  international  climate  politics.  China’s  economic  growth,  since  the 
economic  reform which  started  in  the  late  1970s,  has  been  magnificent  and  it  has 
become the global centre of manufacturing (Liang 2007). This tremendous growth relies 
heavily on energy use, especially the consumption of coal, which is up to 70% in China. 
Following three decades of rapid growth, China is still on its way to industrialisation 
10 Even though the US has been continually criticised for its withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol since 
2001, it has recognised the potential threats from climate change. The Pentagon has admitted that climate 
change “may act as an accelerant of instability or conflict, placing a burden on civilian institutions and 
militaries around the world” (Goldenberg 2010). Again, the understanding is based on the framework of 
national and military security. 
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and urbanisation and the total amount of energy consumed and concomitant emissions 
of greenhouse gases are still increasing. China became a net importer of oil from 2003 
and a net importer of energy from 2007. Moreover, China is now the third-largest oil 
importer in the world (Jiang and Hu 2008: 314). These simple phenomena demonstrate 
just how China treats energy supplies and energy security as its main strategic concern 
and how difficult it will be to reform the coal-based energy structure, which plays an 
important role in the battle to tackle climate change. As a result, the politics of climate 
change,  international  or  domestic,  has  to  be  understood  through  a  geopolitical  and 
strategic  concern,  demonstrating  that  consolidating  energy  security,  including  the 
acquisition of raw materials in order to maintain economic growth, is the priority of the 
Chinese  government.  In  other  words,  China’s  climate  change  politics  should  be 
understood through the lens of energy security, which refers directly to national security 
and represents a strong realist  language.  Domestically,  China has taken measures to 
enhance energy efficiency and the readjustment of the energy structure (Jiang and Hu 
2008).  The  market  for  renewable  energy  has  grown  rapidly  in  China  and,  besides 
boosting the solar energy and hydropower sectors; China has become the world’s largest 
maker  of  wind  turbines  (Bradsher  2010).  Internationally,  the  expansion  of  Chinese 
investment in Africa and Latin America, in terms of the energy and raw material sectors, 
has  demonstrated  this  strategic  operation.  According  to  Liang,  the  total  amount  of 
Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa had reached 6.27 billion US dollars 
by the end of 2005 with most of the investment going to projects securing drilling rights 
in Nigeria, Sudan and Angola, together with exploration and extraction agreements with 
Chad, Gabon, Mauritania, Kenya and the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and 
Ethiopia. In Latin America, China has agreed a 100 billion US dollars investment in oil, 
gas, and mining projects and other infrastructure developments in countries with rich 
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resources,  such  as  Bolivia,  Ecuador,  Cuba,  and  Venezuela  (Liang  2007:  138-140). 
Energy security and climate security, therefore, are two sides of the same coin for China 
(Liu et al. 2008). 
    Consequently,  climate  change  is  not  merely  an  environmental  issue  for  China. 
Instead, it is essentially a ‘development’ problem from Chinese understanding11 or it has 
opened a new battleground for  international  competition in  which  the achievements 
from so-called  ‘clean  energy’ sectors  have  been strategically  incorporated  into  state 
capabilities and national interests (Gordon  et al. 2010). From the realist perspective, 
China’s efforts to tackle climate change by investing in energy security and clean energy 
should be translated into the thesis of ‘the rise of China’. China has taken strategies of 
neo-mercantilism and resource nationalism in the global energy market (Vivoda 2009) 
and  this  trend  has  marked  a  resurgence  of  state-centric  geopolitics  in  a  so-called 
‘globalisation’ era. From China’s self-interested concerns, including pursuing national 
interests, preserving sovereignty and enhancing its international image (Zhang 2003), to 
its aggressive role in the global energy market, it is clear that China is the ideal player in 
a realist game (Kobayashi 2003). China has represented how a state-centric actor should 
behave in international climate change politics. Meanwhile, China’s huge investments in 
the  renewable  energy  market  (Friedman  2010),  its  monopoly  of  rare  earths  (Lewis 
2009), and its aggressive attitude towards securing the supply of petroleum from foreign 
countries  have  demonstrated  the  realist  understanding  in  which  the  competition  for 
energy has brought a new international battleground among great powers. From a realist 
concern on the theme of ‘the rise of China’, it is not merely the threats from climate 
change but also the threats from China. However, no matter how successful the realist 
approach seems to explain international climate change politics, especially when China 
is involved, has China’s case proved the victory of realism in IR? 
11The Chinese President, Hu Jintao, first announced their position at the G8 meetings in 2007, following 
which this argument has been reaffirmed by Chinese officials and scholars (Buckley 2009). 
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    From the theoretical perspective, Paterson’s criticisms of the neo-realist’s account of 
international climate change (1996a) expose the theoretical deficiencies of neo-realism 
in this topic.  The assumption of international anarchy is deeply rooted in the realist 
approach, which makes international cooperation more difficult. Paterson then tries to 
examine  how  international  cooperation  could  possibly  happen  through  a  realist 
framework, since international climate change politics is, to some extent, the politics of 
how to tackle international public bad and to reach international public good at the same 
time through collective actions. As a result, Paterson has discussed HST, which deals 
with the public good problem, as the start of his critique. From both theoretical and 
practical  examinations,  Paterson  has  pointed  out  the  insufficiency  of  this  theory  to 
address the politics of global warming, since realists have a limited understanding of 
what ‘power’ is. The limited understanding of power, which can be merely reduced to 
physical  resources,  in  the  realist  approach  has,  therefore,  failed  to  provide  a  more 
comprehensive  depiction  of  climate  change  politics.  He  also  points  out  the  deeper 
problems  of  the  realist  approach,  which  arise  from  the  state-centric  assumption. 
Domestic factors, such as the structure of energy dependence and the perceived impact 
of global warming, are more influential in defining state interests in different contexts, 
rather than a fixed existence. Another problem is that the realist treats the state as the 
only legitimate actor in international climate change politics. The contributions of UN-
led  organisations,  such  as  the  World  Meteorological  Organization  (WMO)  and  the 
IPCC, in the process of knowledge forming, which influenced the agenda setting of 
climate negotiations, are severely neglected in the realist account. What is more crucial 
is  the  realist’s  anarchic  assumption  of  the  international  arena.  Waltz’s  (1979) 
structuralist  account  of  international  anarchy  makes  it  impossible  for  the  realist  to 
analyse the dynamic process of agenda setting (Paterson 1996a).
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    To put it in an abstract way, the reasoning of HST seems to make it acceptable that an 
international hegemon is a necessary condition to pursue the common good. However, if 
this  approach  is  applied  to  practical  issues,  it  becomes  problematic  in  different 
dimensions. First, the initial purpose of HST is to examine the decline of the US power 
in an international economic regime (Kindleberger 1973; Gilpin 1987). How far this 
approach can be applied to different issues remains problematic. Besides, whether US 
power was really declining it has not gained an academic consensus (Strange 1987). The 
limited and physical understanding of ‘power’ of HST is one of its core problems. When 
it  turns  to  the climate change issue,  how can people find the criteria  to  define and 
compare power and to  identify a hegemon in this  field? The amount  of  emissions? 
Advanced technologies for renewable energy? The will  and capabilities to make the 
sacrifice? The ability to provide convincing discourse? Or the capability of compliance? 
Second, what is the criterion if an international climate change regime was successfully 
established or  not?  To compare  the  Kyoto Summit  and the  Copenhagen Summit,  it 
seems  reasonable  to  claim  that  Kyoto  marks  a  success  and  Copenhagen  a  failure. 
However,  if  HST  is  applied  in  these  two  cases,  it  will  be  difficult  to  provide  a 
convincing explanation. If the US was the hegemon at the Kyoto Summit, how can this 
framework continue to work after the US withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001? 
Meanwhile,  when  the  attitude  of  the  US  towards  the  international  climate  change 
agreement  changed  after  President  Obama  came  into  power  in  2009,  why  did  the 
Copenhagen Summit still end in chaos? This thesis argues that HST lacks a dynamic 
understanding of these international events,  from the historical responsibility pulling 
developing  countries  together,  the  gradual  affirmation  of  scientific  knowledge  and, 
following  international  pressures,  to  the  different  situations  of  domestic  energy 
consumption and dependence. Moreover, even if the Copenhagen Summit has brought 
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disappointment to the world, the global carbon market is still running well regardless of 
the uncertainties of the post-Kyoto framework. As a result, this thesis contends that HST 
has its limitations when applied to climate change politics. 
    Nevertheless, where are these criticisms of realism in international climate politics 
from? Paterson has discussed Waltz, Gilpin and Snidal to develop his criticism. None of 
these  people  had used  their  theory  to  analyse  international  climate  change  politics, 
directly.12 Paterson is right to point out the theoretical limitations of the realist account 
to catch up with the dynamics in the process of international climate negotiations. The 
state-centric and international anarchy assumptions do bring difficulties for realists to 
properly analyse international climate politics. However, is that what realists try to do? 
Taking  Mearsheimer’s  argument  (2001)  into  account,  is  it  possible  that,  essentially, 
realists are not willing to engage in this topic because it is just ‘low politics’? On the 
other  hand,  despite  the  realists  trying  to  provide  a  useful  analytic  tool  regarding 
international climate change politics,  does the failure of the Copenhagen Summit in 
December 2009 not demonstrate the effectiveness of the realist approach in explaining 
the difficulties of international cooperation under an anarchic context? Do the roles that 
the  US  and  China  play  not  represent  state-centric  power  politics  with  self-help 
characters in the international arena? This research argues that due to the clear-cut and 
hierarchical  understanding  of  the  international  arena,  the  realist  approach  gives 
‘international’ and ‘high politics’ a dominant theoretical account over ‘domestic’ and 
‘low politics’. As a result, climate change is treated as a technological issue, which does 
not need to be theorised comprehensively. Laferrière and Stoett (1999) also provide a 
similar argument by examining realism through a meta-theoretical perspective and they 
claim that the five key elements of realism have directed its interplay with ecology and 
12 For the hegemonic stability theorist, besides the original concern on the evolution of the economic 
regime (Kindleberger 1973), the focus was on the decline of American hegemonic power in terms of the 
international liberal economic order (Gilpin1987). 
37
the world of ‘nature’. These elements are: (1) the ontology of conflict and aggression; 
(2)  hierarchical  component;  (3)  the  emphasis  on  homogeneity;  (4)  a  materialist 
worldview; and (5) reductionalist epistemology. As a result, the environment and nature 
is understood to be seen through a utilitarianist lens as scarce natural resources. It is the 
logic of conflict which underlies the international politics in an international anarchy. 
Fundamentally  and  theoretically,  it  is  clear  that  the  realist  approach  has  severe 
limitations when applying itself in international environmental politics. It gives too few 
credits to domestic factors and non-state actors and it also fails to explain the changes 
and transformations in this field. 
    Nevertheless, it is not to say that the realist approach is not useful at all. It is through 
practices by different states, and even non-state actors, that these realist assumptions are 
reproduced and consolidated. Therefore, it will always be useful to bear realism in mind 
when  analysing  this  topic,  especially  when  China  is  taken  into  consideration. 
International climate change politics can be represented and integrated into an existing 
realist framework which enables it to be understood and tackled through the concepts 
and categories of energy security, national interests and international competition. The 
realist  approach  has  its  own  theoretical  limitations  and  does  not  have  the  tools  to 
analyse the dynamics of international cooperation on climate change (Paterson 1996a). 
However,  it  is  useful  to  explain  why  the  international  society  could  not  reach 
cooperation from its own basic assumptions. It is also helpful, to some extent, to analyse 
China’s foreign politics of climate change in which competition and compliance happen 
around concerns of national interest (Lewis 2007, Schroeder 2009). At the same time, it 
is important to bear in mind that instead of those universal assumptions, the fact is that 
the realist account has its own historical and societal context. It is only when participant 
actors are still trapped in and obsessed by the state system consisting of sovereign states 
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that the realist approach could be effective.
2.2 Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
This section deals with different threads of liberalisms in the IR discipline, including 
complex interdependence, liberal institutionalism, and regime analysis.13 Some research 
of  global  governance  is  discussed  in  this  section  as  well,  due  to  its  practical  and 
theoretical connection with liberalist tradition in IR. Starting from the general review, 
the aim of this section is to examine how different liberalist approaches incorporate the 
themes  of  environmental  and  climate  governance.  As  another  pivotal  mainstream 
approach in the IR discipline, liberalism once challenged the dominance of realism and 
has produced many agreements and disagreements with its opponent. In general, the 
liberalist tradition in IR marks a different approach focusing on cooperation, progress, 
peace, norm, and order in the international arena. Some liberalists focus more on the 
societal  dimension  that  the  concept  of  ‘transnational  relations’ should  be  used  in 
international politics. This sociological and pluralist  perspective has raised academic 
interest in non-state actors and has influenced Rosenau’s research of global governance 
(1990, 2005).  Another strand of liberalism is the influential interdependence approach 
and  the  concept  of  ‘complex  interdependence’ raised  by  Keohane  and  Nye  (1977). 
Keohane and Nye claim that the priority of high politics over low politics no longer 
13 It is not easy to clearly accommodate regime analysis in the IR discipline. The regime theory has strong 
connections with the liberalist tradition in the IR discipline; whereas it also can be applied by the realist 
account, especially the HST. Hasenclever et al. (1997) categorise regime theory into three different 
approaches: liberal-derived interest-based, realist-derived power-based and constructivist-derived 
knowledge-based approaches (1997). Bulkeley and Newell (2010) also build up a similar categorisation 
of regimes: power-based, functionalist-interest-based and constructivist. The operation of power-based 
regimes relies on the existence of a hegemon and that the design of the institutions is for the hegemon’s 
needs. On the other hand, the emphasis of interest and knowledge helps explain the emergence and 
dynamics of international cooperation. This thesis understands the realist application of regime analysis 
but in this section, this thesis tries to focus on the possibility of cooperation caused by the establishment 
of international regimes, which has a strong tie with the neo-liberal institutionalism. 
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exists under the condition of complex interdependence. However, although they argue 
that the state is not a coherent unit and they have credited many non-state actors at 
international  and  domestic  levels,  they  do  not  want  to  challenge  neo-realism 
fundamentally. Instead, they situate themselves in a more balanced place to supplement 
the realist approach. Neo-liberal institutionalism thus sheds light on the establishment, 
impact and transformation of international institutions (Krasner 1983; Keohane 1984, 
1989;  Young  1989).  Finally,  some liberalists  focus  on  the  democratic  peace  in  the 
international arena (Thompson 1996, Fukuyama 1992). Just  as there are varieties of 
liberalism itself, the responses from the liberalist approach to realist critiques also vary 
between different branches.14 
    The liberalist approach has moved the research focus to many areas which the realist 
approach does not pay sufficient attention to, such as international trade, international 
governmental  and  non-governmental  organisations,  multinational  corporations, 
institutions, and ideas and norms. Although idealism, the classical liberalist approach in 
the IR discipline, lost its influence in the IR discipline after the Second World War, the 
liberalist tradition has revised itself by integrating concerns from different approaches 
and has become another mainstream IR approach. The development of the ideas of neo-
liberal  institutionalism was  based  on:  (1)  traditional  liberalist  thoughts  such  as  the 
emphasis on institution and norm to pursue international peace or cooperation; (2) the 
debates with neo-realism (Nye 1988, Keohane 1989, Grieco 1993); (3) the experiences 
of the integration of the EU (Keohane  et al. 1993) and (4) the dialogues with other 
disciplines, especially with the prisoners’ dilemma in economics and the research of the 
institution by the economist Douglas North (1990). The pursuit of the legal norms from 
the Kantian liberal internationalism has influenced the neo-liberal institutionalism on 
14Keohane (1989) is closer to neo-realism in that he moves his focus on the common interests among 
states. There are also a group of liberalists maintaining their strong criticisms of realism. They claim that 
liberal peace can be reached even under the context of international anarchy (Cooper 1996’ Sørensen 
1997).
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the  roles  of  norms  and  institutions  in  international  politics.  Meanwhile,  neo-liberal 
institutionalism also shares a similar emphasis with classical liberalism on the role of 
organisations consisting of individuals in international relations (Keohane 1989: 10-11). 
Nevertheless,  Keohane  also  points  out  that  the  cooperation  in  neo-liberal 
institutionalism  is  different  from the  harmony  under  natural  conditions  in  classical 
liberalism and that the former brings the emphasis of institutions without denying the 
state power (Keohane 1989: 11). Although how ‘liberal’ the neo-liberal institutionalism 
remains is controversial (Morraavcsik 1997),  15 neo-liberal institutionalism does share 
some core values with liberal traditions in IR, including the emphasis of societal factors, 
information, international law and organisation and norms. 
    Neo-liberal institutionalism emphasises the integration and interdependence practices 
in the international arena and argues that international cooperation is feasible even in an 
international  anarchy.  Keohane  and  Nye  (1977)  have  elaborated  that  societies  are 
increasingly interconnected and mutually  interdependent  at  various  levels,  especially 
through their economic aspects. Differing from neo-realist assumptions that the states 
act  only to  maximise relative gains,  the neo-liberalist  assumes that  the states act  to 
maximise their  absolute gains. Furthermore, the gains are not necessarily to do with 
power but are more reliant on an economic measure of welfare (Paterson 1996a: 63; 
italic in origin). Therefore, cooperation becomes possible and desirable in international 
politics. Neo-liberal institutionalism has adopted many assumptions from neo-realism 
that  states  can  only  follow  a  self-help  principle  to  guarantee  their  security  within 
international  anarchy.  Nevertheless,  these  realist  assumptions  do  not  preclude  the 
possibility of international cooperation which occurs while mutual understanding and 
mutual trust among states have been established, and this can be reached through the 
15Moravcsik (1997) treats neo-liberal institutionalism as ‘functional regime theory’  and argues that it 
shares more hard-core assumptions with realism than with liberalism. Nevertheless, Keohane does not 
agree to be treated as a functionalist (2002). 
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establishment of international institutions. 
    The  development  of  the  interest-based  regime  analysis  also  helps  grasp  this 
cooperative  dimension in  international  politics.  International  regimes  are  defined as 
“implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures” (Krasner 
1983: 4-5). Although neo-realism admits the existence of international regimes as well, 
it still argues that power is the main characteristic of the formation and maintenance of 
international regimes. Regimes can only facilitate states to coordinate, not cooperate. 
However,  neo-liberal  institutionalism  argues  that  international  regimes  will  bring 
international collaborations. International regimes can help reduce the uncertainties of 
the international system, and thus regulate international interaction. It can also provide 
reliable information and guidelines in certain fields. In the end, norms from different 
regimes are expected to be internalised to different states. An institutionalist approach 
involving the study of regimes thus provides the framework to understand how order 
and governance work in  an ‘anarchic’ system composed of sovereign states (Vogler 
1996: 6).
    The research of global governance that emerged in the 1990s is concomitant with 
phenomena such as the end of the Cold War, fierce competition in the global market and 
the transformation of the power and authority of the nation state (Held and McGrew 
2002).  The  report  Our  Global  Neighbourhood from  the  Commission  on  Global 
Governance in 1995 stated that ‘governance is the sum of the many ways individuals 
and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs’. The study of global 
governance has intimate connections with the liberalist tradition in the IR discipline and 
the  mechanism  of  global  governance,  to  some  extent,  can  be  treated  as  the 
representation  and  operation  of  international  institutions  and  regimes.  Nevertheless, 
differences remain between regime analysis and the study of global governance. First, 
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the international regime still treats the sovereign state as the only legitimate actor in 
international  politics,  whereas  the  study  of  global  governance  has  admitted  the 
significances  of  many  non-state  actors.16 Second,  regime  analysis  emphasises  the 
multilateral collaboration among states, whereas within the study of global governance a 
networked and multi-layered interaction  among public,  private  and the third  sectors 
emerges (Salamon 1994). Members from global civil society have also participated in 
the process of governance (Ferguson and Barry Jones 2002, Josselin and Wallace 2001, 
Mertus 2002). As a result, although influenced by the liberalist tradition, the study of 
global governance has the potential to challenge the state-centric assumptions from the 
mainstream IR approaches.
    Although this thesis does not engage with the research on global governance since the 
main  research  target  of  this  thesis  is  to  explore  the  governmental  rationalities 
underpinning  China’s  politics  and  the  governance  of  climate  change  at  both 
international  and domestic  levels,  some researchers  have  mixed approaches  of  neo-
liberal institutionalism, regime analysis and global governance in international climate 
politics (Young 2000a, 2003; Zhu 2007; Zhuang  et al. 2009). As a result,this  thesis 
claims it is necessary to briefly review the research on global governance. 
    The  critiques  of  the  research  on  global  governance,  whether  it  is  treated  as  a 
phenomenon  or  an  approach,  emerge  from  various  dimensions  as  well.  Besides 
questioning  the  problem  of  accountability  and  authority  in  global  governance 
(Kratochwil 1997, Ottaway 2001, Aksu and Camilleri 2002, Patomäki 2005), Barnett 
and  Duvall  point  out  the  need  to  examine  different  conceptualisations  of  power.17 
16 These non-state actors include: non-governmental organisations, sovereignty-free actors, issue 
networks, policy networks, social movements, global civil society, transnational coalitions, transnational 
lobbies, and epistemic communities (Rosenau 1999: 296-297).
17 They point out four conceptualisations of power: (1) compulsory power which is direct control over 
another actor; (2) institutional power which represents actors’ control over socially distant others; (3) 
structural power which concerns the constitutive, internal relations of structural positions; and (4) 
productive power in which different subjects are produced through social relations (Barnett and Duvall 
2005a: 8-22). Along with different conceptions of power emerge different forms of resistance. 
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Research on global governance should not focus on the technical level only, but also on 
the ‘spirit of the machine’ which is Liberalism (Barnett  and Duvall  2005a: 5). As a 
result, Barnett and Duvall claim that IR scholars “need to be more attentive to the many 
ways in which power exists  in the liberal  practices and liberal institutions of global 
governance”  (2005a:  24).  Based  on  this  understanding,  Adler  and  Bernstein  (2005) 
move beyond the material capacity of global governance and examine the importance of 
knowledge  which  is  represented  as  productive  power,  and  legitimacy  and  fairness. 
Müller and Lederer also sort out three critical voices which treat global governance as: 
(1)  an  ideological  project  that  global  governance  is  indeed ‘neoliberalism in a  new 
disguise’; (2) a project lacking legitimacy in the sphere of civil society where non-state 
actors participate; and (3) as a hegemonic project which is a disguise of ‘US power or at 
least one manifestation of the Empire’ (Müller and Lederer 2005: 8-9, italic as original). 
    After analysing the genealogy of global governance by examining the changes of 
state-society relations, Selby points out that the term ‘governance’ was presented as ‘a 
neutral, technical matter of social ordering’ (2003: 3). ‘Good governance’ thus presents 
itself  as  apolitical  and  technical  management.  The  de-politicisation  of  global 
governance has caused a lack of attention to the power, power/knowledge, structures, 
conflicts, resistance and changes in global politics. As discussed earlier, this has brought 
the phenomenon of ‘politics via market’ in which domination and surveillance operate 
through the language of market and managerialism (Lipshutz with Rowe 2005). The 
concept  of  ‘global  governmentality’ has  developed  its  Foucauldian  critique  in  the 
research  of  global  governance  and  it  argues  that  institutions  and  norms  of  global 
governance represent ‘newly reconfigured means of monitoring and regulating social 
conduct’ (Selby 2003: 8). The liberal project underlying global governance has involved 
‘new ways of defining, invigilating, managing and indeed governing social relations’ 
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(Selby 2003: 8). 
    Nevertheless,  this  thesis  recognises  the  contributions  of  research  on  global 
governance and it does enrich the understanding of global politics by bringing multi-
layered,  multi-centric  and  multi  actors  into  analysis  and  giving  credit  to  both  the 
material and non-material  aspects of the process. As Larner and Walters argue, both 
global governance and global governmentality have pointed out that the research into 
governance does not necessarily focus on a ‘single centre or source’. Meanwhile, both 
concepts  also  accept  that  governance  can  be  ‘pervasive  and  dispersed’ (Larner  and 
Walters 2004a: 16-17). Nevertheless, this thesis emphasises and agrees that the lack of 
historical  concern  has  made  the  research  into  global  governance  difficult  in  its 
connection  to  the  ‘longer  trajectory  of  liberal  political  reason’ (Larner  and  Waters 
2004a:  17).  As a result,  this  thesis  argues  that  the relation between the research on 
global  governance  and  global  governmentality  is  supplementary,  instead  of  mutual 
exclusive. Meanwhile, whether deploying the research of global governance or global 
governmentality,  the  context  and  history  of  the  research  object  need  to  seriously 
analysed.  In  other  words,  a  universalised  critique  of  the  liberal  project  should  be 
reflected  cautiously  while  analysing  a  specific  nation,  state  or  culture  with  its  own 
historical contingencies and specific contexts. In short, this thesis agrees on a potential 
contribution from the research on global governance, but this thesis also points out that 
the  underlying  depoliticised  assumptions,  power  relations  and  knowledge  by  some 
researchers need to be explored as well. 
    In terms of international environmental and climate change politics, the neo-liberal 
institutionalist approach, combined with an interest-based regime analysis, has become 
the mainstream approach in this  field.  Abiding by the developments in international 
environmental  agreements,  laws,  and  institutions,  the  neo-liberal  institutionalist 
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approach provides  a  theoretical  framework to  explain  and understand the ‘problem-
solving’ process  in  global  environmental  politics.  NGOs  and  other  influential  non-
governmental  actors,  such  as  the  media,  epistemic  groups  and  multinational 
corporations,  are  incorporated  into  this  framework  (Newell  2000)  and  have  also 
influenced the emergence of the study of global governance from the 1990s. In short, by 
applying  a  neo-liberal  institutionalist  approach,  researchers  have  claimed  that 
international  environmental  degradations/problems  could  be,  and  should  be  tackled 
through international collaboration by international regimes.
    Young’s rich work (1989; 1994; 2000b; 2002; 2003; 2004) has demonstrated the 
application  of  this  approach  in  international  environmental  politics.  For  Young, 
institutions  are  “social  practices  consisting  of  easily  recognized  roles  coupled  with 
clusters of rules or conventions governing relations between occupants of these roles” 
(1989: 32). From the attempt to broaden the regime analysis, he defines governance as 
[I]nvolving in the establishment and operation of social institutions, which includes 
sets of rules, decision-making procedures, and programmatic activities that serve to 
define social practices and to guide the interactions of those participating in these 
practices. (2000b: 4) 
    Regimes, according to Young, are “arrangements designed to resolve social conflicts, 
promote sustained cooperation… and…alleviate collective-action problems in a world 
of  interdependent  actors”  (2000b:  4).  Therefore,  he  focuses  his  research  on  the 
formation,  effectiveness  and  changes  to  international  environmental  institutions  and 
regimes in order to examine the questions of causality, performance and design in the 
institutional  dimension of environmental  change (2002).  For Young, regime analysis 
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focuses on “governance as a social function rather than on government as a collection of 
organizations’’ (2000b: 21). In other words, Young has integrated the study of global 
governance into regime analysis  and thus  emphasised the roles  of norms and rules, 
which  provide  the  possibility  to  overcome  obstacles  for  international  cooperation 
among states. However, this theoretical mixture has its limitation in that while the theme 
of  global  governance  focuses  on  ‘governance  without  government’ (Rosenau  and 
Czempiel 1992), Young still admits the core role that states play in the international 
regime (2000b). 
    Regarding the aspects of norms and rules, the epistemic community approach has 
provided  a  particular  insight  to  seize  the  dynamics  of  institution  formation.18 This 
approach, developed by Peter Haas (1990), takes scientific knowledge into account in 
order  to  examine  how knowledge  shapes  international  politics  and  to  explore  how 
common interests  among  states  are  formed  and  shared.  Epistemic  communities  are 
“knowledge-based groups of experts and specialists who share common beliefs about 
cause and effect relationships in the world and some political  values concerning the 
ends to which policies should be addressed” (Haas 1990: xviii).  They adhere to (1) 
shared  consummatory  values  and  principled  beliefs;  (2)  shared  causal  beliefs  or 
professional  judgment;  (3)  common  notions  of  validity  based  on  intersubjective, 
internally defined criteria for validating knowledge; and (4) a common policy project 
(Adler 1992: 101). This approach is most useful when analysing the stage of agenda 
setting  in  international  politics,  in  which  political  power  and  scientific  knowledge 
interplay and compete with each other to frame the evolution of certain rules and norms 
of  international  institutions.  This  is  just  as  Haas’  claims  that  “[i]nternational 
18 It is arguable if the epistemic communities approach can be categorised in the liberalist tradition. 
Paterson has points out the features that distinguish this approach with liberalism (1996a: 135). However, 
the varieties of liberalist approaches make it difficult to depict a coherent liberalist posture in international 
environmental politics. The reason why the epistemic communities approach is discussed here is its 
common feature with liberal institutionalists in terms of pursuing workable international norms. 
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environmental cooperation is  generated by the influence wielded by specialists  with 
common beliefs” (1990: xxii). The epistemic community approach is a relatively loose 
framework  in  that  many  of  its  key  concepts  remain  questionable  in  the  empirical 
operation. However, it is due to this loose ground that this approach has the potential to 
incorporate with other approaches. On the one hand, the exploration of the epistemic 
community helps supplement the neo-liberal institutionalist approach in terms of shared 
values and norms in the process of forming institutions. The role and influence of the 
IPCC in  international  climate  change  politics  demonstrates  the  applicability  of  this 
approach through an institutionalist framework. On the other hand, once the category of 
knowledge is taken into account, it is likely to radicalise the research agenda in order to 
question the relations between power and knowledge, which has not gained sufficient 
attention from both the realist and liberalist approaches. In other words, ‘knowledge’ is 
as  questionable  as  power.  In  order  to  examine  how certain  ‘truth’ is  generated  by 
science and then to influence the political sphere, knowledge has become a target for 
further examination. This leaves the space for constructivist and Foucaldian approaches 
for further engagements (Adler and Bernstein 2005). 
    Coming back to the international politics of climate change; it is not difficult to see 
the popularity of the neo-liberal institutionalist approach and the interest-based regime 
analysis. The international environmental regime, from the beginning, aimed to tackle 
international environmental problems, such as international commonly shared natural 
resources  and  transboundary  externalities  (Young  2000b)  through  international 
collective  actions.  Cognitively,  to  most  people,  the  international  politics  of  climate 
change  is  about  the  efforts  between  states  to  reach  feasible  international  treaties, 
agreements  or  organisations,  in  order  to  curb  global  warming.  A progressive  and 
relatively  clear  narrative  makes  neo-liberal  institutionalism  more  acceptable  as  an 
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analytic  tool  to  understand  international  climate  change  politics.  For  states,  the 
establishment  of  the  World  Meteorological  Organisation  (WMO),  the  IPCC and the 
International  Council  of  Scientific  Unions (ICSU) has  affected decision-making and 
altered incentives for further cooperation. These international organisations played an 
important  role  as ‘agenda-setters’ at  this  stage (Paterson 1996a:  124-125),  when the 
climate  change  issues  has  not  been  ‘politicised’.  Besides  this  ‘weak’  definition, 
institutions  and regimes  can  be  also  treated  as  norms and rules,  as  Young (2000b) 
argues, that a norm of how to respond to global warming was formed.
    Based on these assumptions, Depledge and Yamin (2009) have used an institutionalist 
account to review international climate change politics. They claim that through the 
gradual establishment of international institutions, including the IPCC, the UNFCCC, 
the Conference of the Parties (COP), the Kyoto Protocol, the Bali Action Plan, the CDM 
Executive Board (CDM EB) and many other relevant bureaus and organisations, the 
international  climate  regime  has  made  huge  achievements.  This  regime  has  helped 
international  society  to  (1)  generate  momentum,  (2)  enable  reciprocal  deals,  (3) 
facilitate learning, and (4) promote reporting and verification (2009: 439-443). They 
argue that by reviewing the international climate change regime through a long-term 
perspective,  history  has  shown how this  regime  facilitates  international  cooperation 
when tackling climate change. However, they did not have the chance to witness the 
disputes and failure of the Copenhagen Summit in December 2009 and it is, therefore, 
no  wonder  that  they  have  given climate  change regimes  and institutions  such high 
accreditations.  Nevertheless,  their  analysis  does  challenge  the  fixed/homogeneous 
assumption of national interest from a realist account. Depledge and Yamin argue that 
through the dissemination of information by the international regime, states will change 
their preoccupied dispositions, such as the acceptance of the market mechanism in the 
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climate  regime.  The  development  of  an  international  climate  change  regime  has 
gradually enabled trust  to  be built  up among the participants  and,  hence,  facilitated 
further  international  cooperation.  Benwell  (2008)  also  has  a  similar  optimistic 
conclusion  from his  research  on  the  emissions’ trading scheme.  He claims  that  the 
establishment of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in 2005 and 
its ensuing implementation created an incentive to encourage other participants to link 
with the European scheme. In other words, the success of the ETS not only represents 
the  advantages  of  an  international  regime  but  also  has  its  own  dissemination  and 
demonstration effect on other participants. 
    Meanwhile, it is also not difficult to trace the narrative of a neo-liberal institutionalist 
approach in China in terms of international climate change politics. One of the reasons, 
this thesis argues, is that the neo-liberal institutionalist approach provides a clear and 
convenient  framework to  grasp and explain some crucial  developments in  this  field 
since,  no  matter  what  human  destiny  will  be,  there  is  definitely  some  successful 
international  cooperation  based  on  the  establishment  and  evolution  of  institutions, 
which provide a theoretical space for institutionalist involvement. Another reason is that 
due to the severe lack of critical  voices in Chinese academia on account of climate 
change politics (which will be discussed in the following chapters), the application of a 
neo-liberal institutionalist approach is understandable since it only stays at the problem-
solving level. Here, a similar problem from the realist approach appears again. That is, 
although most, if not all, Chinese scholars in this field do not position themselves as 
liberalists  or  institutionalists,  they  spend  lots  of  time  and  energy  describing  and 
reviewing the establishment and development of international climate regimes whilst, at 
the  same  time,  relevant  methods,  such  as  game  theory,  are  widely  applied  to  the 
analysis.  While  reviewing  the  development  of  China’s  roles  in  different  stages  of 
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international climate change negotiations, Zhuang  et al. (2009) also point out that the 
establishment of certain international institutions helped to facilitate cooperation from 
developing countries, including China. The mechanisms of the carbon market can be 
treated as selective incentives to enhance the participation from developing countries. 
The institutionalisation of international climate change arrangements, from those crucial 
agreements, such as the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, the annually held COP, bilateral 
and multi-lateral climate talks, can help to decrease the transaction costs (Zhuang et al. 
2009: 203-211). As a result, the design and introduction of the CDM is a good example 
to show how global governance of climate change operates in one country (Zhuang et 
al. 2009; Zhu 2007). In terms of the process of climate negotiations, researchers based 
on the neo-liberal institutionalist approach tend to apply game theory as the analytic tool 
(Zhuang et al.  2009; Zhang 2009; Cui 2003). While analysing China in international 
climate change politics through an institutionalist perspective, the mainstream research 
focuses  on  the  interplay  between  China  and  international  institutions,  including 
organisations and norms. As such, the research question will explore whether certain 
institutional  designs  and practices  have  promoted compliance from China and other 
developing countries (Zhao 2005; Lewis 2007; Vezirgiannidou 2009). Because of the 
emphasis on norms and rules, a constructivist approach has been taken on how China 
has  learnt  and  internalised  certain  norms  and  has  adjusted  its  own  position  in 
international  climate  negotiations  through  interaction  with  international  NGOs 
(Schroeder 2008). 
    The  reason,  this  thesis  argues,  why neo-liberal  institutionalism has  become the 
mainstream  approach  to  international  climate  change  politics  is  not  because  this 
approach has provided a solid theoretical framework; instead, it  is because what has 
happened, or what can be perceived, in  international climate change politics can be 
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depicted and explained by this approach to some extent. Just as Ward has mentioned, 
“[g]lobal climate change is characterized as a collective-action game played by nations 
through  time.  The  conditions  under  which  conditional  cooperation  can  occur  are 
explored”  (1996:  850,  in  Newell  2000:  23).  What  matters  is  the  description  and 
definition of the essence of international climate change politics. When it is understood 
and framed as a ‘collective-action game’ in order to pursue public good in the end, it is 
nearly unavoidable to accept a neo-liberal institutionalist approach as the starting point 
for  the analysis.  However,  it  does not  mean that  this  mainstream approach alone is 
enough to grasp the dynamics of international climate change politics, although it does 
challenge  the  neo-realist  approach  and,  as  such,  provides  the  possibilities  for 
international cooperation. 
    Paterson (1996a) has discussed a school of ‘cooperation under anarchy’ that shows a 
strong theoretical intimacy with the institutionalist approach. Game theory is the basic 
framework  used  in  this  school  in  order  to  explore  the  possible  conditions  for 
cooperation  under  international  anarchy.  Three  factors  need  to  be  considered  while 
pursuing  international  cooperation,  which  are  mutual  interests,  the  length  of  ‘the 
shadow  of  the  future’ and  the  number  of  players  (Axelrod  and  Keohane  1986,  in 
Paterson 1996a: 101). The establishment and operation of regimes and institutions can 
help  states,  to  some extent,  overcome the  obstacles  to  cooperation,  which  creates  a 
theoretical  space  for  neo-liberal  institutionalism  and  game  theory  to  converge  in 
international politics. As a result, the compromises, negotiations, failures and successes 
in  international  climate  change  politics  have  demonstrated  different  ‘games’ being 
played by nation states. Practically, the huge numbers of states, regardless of other non-
state actors, which do not gain sufficient attention in this approach, make it difficult to 
pursue a successful game in international climate change politics. The deeper theoretical 
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problem, this thesis argues, comes from the underlying assumption of the rationality of 
states in order to fulfil their strategic goals. Just as the realist’s problem is to assume 
fixed national interests, the assumption of predetermined rationality and the following 
gains to be pursued by states neglects the dynamic process at both international and 
domestic levels and in different periods as well. The instrumental understanding of the 
‘rationality’ in  the  neo-liberal  institutionalism  and  game  theory  fails  to  grasp  the 
structural dynamics and again, the ‘rationality’ is treated as a fixed existence. In other 
words, while rationally calculating the gains and interests in different games, both neo-
liberal  institutionalists  and  game  theorists  fail  to  explore  where  these  interests  and 
preferences are from and the possibilities of changes of interests based on the changes 
of political rationalities. The ‘calculations of gains’ of different states are embedded in 
different historical contexts, this thesis argues. 
    Returning to liberalist tradition in IR, its theoretical deficiencies emerge when it 
encounters international environmental politics. Metaphysically, the liberalist approach 
tends to pursue international peace and order, which is based on utilitarianism, through 
free  trade  and  ‘technocratic  managerialism’  (Laferrière  and  Stoett  1999).  This 
functionalist  tendency  has  demonstrated  itself  in  the  analysis  of  the  neo-liberal 
institutionalist approach and regime analysis. However, as Paterson criticises, regime 
theory reflects a ‘value-neutral language of positivist social science’ or, in other words, 
that  will  tend to  believe  regimes  are  benign and can  in  principle provide  adequate 
solutions to global environmental change (Paterson 2000: 15). Young’s institutionalist 
analysis  also fails  to explain how a particular  agenda was set  up;  although he does 
notice that there are at least three stages in the overall process of regime formation: 
agenda formation, negotiation and operationalisation (Young 2000b). It is true that neo-
liberal  institutionalism  has  contributed  a  great  amount  of  analysis  in  international 
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environmental politics in different areas. However, the problem is that no matter how 
dominant this approach is, it still avoids explaining the causes of contemporary global 
environmental change (Paterson 2000), and thus it restricts itself at the problem-solving 
level. Meanwhile, neo-liberal institutionalism has brought about a liberal interpretation 
of global environmental politics. By transforming the ‘environment’ as a manageable 
and calculable object, it could be tackled through institutional designs and operations. 
“Environment  economics  will  become  an  integral  part  of  the  calculus  of  decision-
making and will be crucial to decisions on resource management” (Smith 1996: 34). 
Bernstein  also  mentions  that  “liberal  environmentalism  predicates  international 
environmental  protection  on  the  promotion  and  maintenance  of  a  liberal  economic 
order” (2002: 1).  The solution to international environmental problems, for the neo-
liberal institutionalist, lies in the establishment, or extension, of a (free) market in which 
environmental  objects  are  regulated,  managed  and  traded  technologically. 
Environmental  politics,  through  the  operation  of  neo-liberal  institutionalism,  is  de-
politicised politics. 
    Moreover, Paterson also points out that neo-liberal institutionalism tends to assume 
the separation between politics and economics. Each sphere has its own autonomy and 
this autonomy should be preserved. Consequently, the state has its own autonomy to 
pursue predetermined national interests. This naïve assumption has underestimated the 
influence of large corporations, especially those in the energy sphere that are involved 
in the decision-making process. Another criticism of neo-liberal institutionalism is that 
this approach only treats international institutions as the outcomes of state (inter)actions, 
rather  than  a  constitutive  structure  which  is  able  to  produce  symbolic  meanings 
(Paterson 1996a:  130-133).  For Newell,  the problem of the regime approach comes 
from (1)  its  generalisable  hypotheses  that  apply  across  areas;  (2)  the  unitary  actor 
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analysis which assumes the interests are given; (3) an assumed rationality about a states’ 
choice of cooperative strategies; (4) a separation between domestic and international 
politics;  and (5) lack of attention to non-governmental actors (Newell  2000: 26-29). 
Both criticisms from Patterson and Newell  demonstrate the theoretical limitations of 
neo-liberal institutionalism that no matter how progressive and optimistic this approach 
has been shown to be, it is deeply rooted in the traditional IR perspective. The state 
remains the most legitimate player in the international arena where national interests are 
predetermined.  In  addition,  clear  separations  exist  between  state  and  market,  and 
between domestic and international remain valid; institutions are benign and neutral; 
and experts have confidence in advanced technologies and knowledge. It is undeniable 
that  the  development  of  international  climate  change  politics  has  witnessed  the 
applicability  of  the  neo-liberal  institutionalist  approach  in  many  dimensions. 
Nevertheless, metaphysical limitations have prevented it moving further to reflect its 
basic  assumptions,  to  question  those  ‘naturalised’  categories,  such  as  power  and 
knowledge, and to take non-state fields and actors into serious consideration.  
2.3 Social Constructivism
Due to the failure to  predict  the sudden end of the cold war in the late  1980s,  the 
weakness  of  mainstream  IR  approaches,  including  neo-realism,  neo-liberal 
institutionalism,  and  scientific  behaviouralism,  has  been  exposed.  The  controversies 
between positivism and post-positivism quickly became the theme of the third great 
debate in the IR discipline. Different from the previous two main debates, this debate 
focused  on  the  ontological  and  epistemological  levels.  Under  the  name  of  ‘post-
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positivism’ gather a variety of challenging approaches, such as feminism, critical theory, 
post-colonialism, and post-modernism. The reflections from this debate also brought the 
emergence  of  social  constructivism  in  the  IR  discipline.19 Far  from  mainstream 
understandings in which anarchy is treated as a fixed and objective existence, Alexander 
Wendt, the leading figure in the constructivist approach, argues that anarchy is made of 
by the state (1992). The deep structure of anarchy is “cultural or ideational rather than 
material” and different cultures of anarchy are based on “different kinds of roles in 
terms of which states represent Self and Other”. As a result, three different cultures of 
anarchy, which are Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian, represent three different logics, 
identities, and roles of the state (Wendt 1999: 246-312). For neo-realism, international 
structure  is  the  consequence  of  the  distribution  of  material  forces,  however, 
constructivism moves beyond material level and claims that the international system is a 
social structure which consists of shared knowledge, material resources, and practice 
(Wendt 1995). Identity, norms, meanings, and social practices are thus the core factors 
to shape national interests and behaviours, and the essence of the international system.  
    Although Wendt recognises anarchy as the status of the international system and the 
states as the main actors within it, he challenges the fixed assumption of the anarchical 
international structure by neo-realism. The logic of Hobbesian anarchy is ‘the war of all 
against all’ that actors within this structure treat each other as the enemy. To pursue 
survival through military means is the primary target of different states and security is 
thus a ‘zero sum-affair’ (Wendt 1999: 251-266). The logic of Lockean anarchy is based 
on the different role structures in which states are in a mutual-rivalry relation. Within 
this anarchy structure, rival states try to pursue security instead of power, which makes 
the limitation of violence and war possible in the international system. The sovereignty 
19It is arguable that if social constructivism can be treated as a post-positivist approach. A strong version 
of constructivism does have the potential to work with post-positivist approaches, which will be discussed 
later.
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of state is respected and recognised and rival states compete with each other, rather than 
conquering or dominating other states (Wendt 1999: 279-296). The Kantian logic of 
anarchy is based on the role structure of friendship. States within this structure seek to 
pursue security  through cooperation and negotiation,  rather  than raising war against 
each other. A security community is established through the efforts of different states, in 
order to provide collective security (Wendt 1999: 297-307). 
    Regarding the relation between the agent and structure in the international system, 
constructivism also holds a different position from both neo-realist and neo-liberalist 
approaches. On the one hand, the constructivist approach argues that national interests 
are  not  fixed  and  pre-determined  and  the  international  structure  does  not  exist 
independently beyond the practices of agents, as both mainstream approaches assume. 
Instead, the formation of identity which is influenced by the structure plays a crucial 
role determining the interests and behaviours of different states. On the other hand, the 
intersubjective  practices  of  states  can  also  influence  the  formation  and  change  of 
structure.  Based  on  shared  knowledge  through  interactions  among  states,  different 
cultures, such as the cultures of anarchy, can be created in an international system. In 
other words, the agent and structure are mutually-constitutive in that neither the identity 
and interest of the agent nor the formation and content of the structure can be treated as 
fixed materially. As a result, the change from one international system to another is not 
based solely on the change of material forces, instead, the interactive practices among 
actors  can  shape  new  identities,  interests,  and  go  further  in  constructing  a  new 
international system.
    In summary, constructivism emerges from the third great debate in the IR and has 
emphasised the significance of idea, identity, and norms in the formation and changes of 
international systems. This approach has provided a new perspective and framework for 
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research  on  different  IR  issues.  When  it  is  brought  into  research  on 
international/national politics of climate change, constructivism shifts to focus on the 
“dialogue between knowledge and power found in the social construction of climate 
change” (Pettenger 2007b: 1). The meaning, the existence, the science, the knowledge, 
and the solution of climate change should be understood “from the context of social 
settings” (Pettenger  2007b:  3).  The ideational  and material  factors  are  not  mutually 
exclusive in that constructivist moves to examine “how material realities gain meaning 
through social interaction”. Meanwhile, the agent/structure duality becomes ‘recursively 
co-constituted’.  This  analytical  emphasis  makes  constructivism  capable  of 
understanding  the  process  and  change.  (Pettenger  2007b:  6-7).  
    Pettenger furthers points out that there are two constructivist approaches, one is 
norm-centred  and  the  other  is  the  discourse  analytical  perspective.  A norm-centred 
constructivism  is  usually  treated  as  ‘soft’  constructivism  as  it  stands  closer  to 
rationalism and  positivism.  Norms  are  treated  as  ‘conceptual  tools’ to  examine  the 
construction of international politics in which states are guided by “norms that define 
the identities......and the formal rules and accepted practices of the international game” 
(Farrell 2002: 52). Norms thus have a ‘causal force’ shaping actor’s behaviours and this 
norm-based approach focuses on why actors have certain behaviours (Pettenger 2007b: 
10). Different from the soft version of constructivism, a discourse analytical perspective 
of constructivism is inspired by critical theory (Oels 2005; Paterson 2001; Hajer 1995; 
Litfin  1994;  Onuf 1989).  The main  task  of  this  approach is  to  reveal  “how shared 
meanings are privileged or marginalized in social settings” (Pettenger 2007b: 10). As a 
result,  this  approach  based  on  discourse  analysis  moves  to  examine  how certain 
discourses emerge and the power/knowledge formation during the process. It is obvious 
that the soft version of constructivism is closer to the liberalist tradition, such as neo-
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liberal  institutionalism  and  interest-based  regime  analysis.  Nevertheless,  the  hard 
version  leans  to  the  critical  approaches,  such  as  critical  theory,  critical  IPE,  and 
Foucauldian approaches.  The middle ground where constructivism stands,  as  Wendt 
proposes (Wendt 1999: 3-4), has created the potential for this approach to be employed 
by different academic traditions in the IR discipline. 
    As discussed earlier, a soft version of constructivism can be merged into the liberalist 
tradition and the epistemic community approach as well, when it is about information 
sharing and norm building. Like the mainstream neo-liberal institutionalist approach to 
the  international  politics  of  climate  change,  this  soft  version  of  constructivism has 
contributed  to  the  examination of  how certain  international  norms emerge  and how 
these norms were translated into domestic politics in different countries (Cass 2007, 
Hattori 2007, Fogel 2007). Such norms include environmental protection, the reduction 
of GHGs, energy efficiency, and sustainable development. This research not only brings 
non-material factors to the stage of emergence and the diffusion of international climate 
change norms, but also emphasises the dynamics between domestic and international 
levels, which are neglected by the realist tradition. As Cass (2007) argues, based on case 
studies in the US, Germany, and the UK, international norms can influence domestic 
responses  significantly  in  terms  of  transnational  environmental  problems;  whereas 
‘domestic  political  norms,  institutional  structures,  and  material  variables’ can  also 
influence the ‘translation of international norms into domestic political dialogue and 
policy’ (2007:  48).  It  is  obvious  that  this  norm-based  constructivist  approach  can 
contribute to the liberalist agenda.
    While  taking  discourse  analysis  into  account,  the  constructivist  approach  has 
developed  different  perspectives  on  the  formation  of  certain  norms  of  international 
climate  change  politics.  Backstränd  and  Lövebrand  have  analysed  three  major 
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discourses:  green  governmentality,  ecological  modernization  and  civic 
environmentalism (2007). They point out the dominance of the previous two discourses 
in  international  climate  change  governance  which  has  excluded  voices  from  the 
grassroots. A more detailed discussion on green governmentality will be made in the 
Foucauldian  section  later.  In  short,  they  contribute  to  exposing  that  there  exist 
contesting  discourses  and  norms  in  international  climate  governance  and  that  each 
discourse has its own assumed preferences and underpinning governmental rationalities. 
This exploration also helps to bring alternative voices into the debate. To radicalise the 
constructivist  approach,  Paterson  and  Stripple  focus  on  the  phenomenon  of 
(re)territorialisation in international climate change politics, which has not been paid 
sufficient  attention.  From  this  perspective,  the  whole  process  of  international 
negotiations and the following outcomes to distribute the national mitigation target and 
the national carbon sink has reaffirmed the state as the dominant actor who can manage 
and control,  and claim the  monopoly  of  natural  resources  within  its  boundary.  The 
process of (re)territorialisation has indeed territorialised, rather than individualised, the 
carbon consumers around the world (Paterson and Stripple 2007: 160). The inequality in 
international climate change negotiations has not been solved through the consolidation 
of sovereignty over natural resources. Instead, according to Paterson and Stripple, it is 
where the theme of the ‘Empire’ emerges. The carbon sink was allocated nationally, 
following which the understanding of how to manage such sinks has served a ‘universal 
order’ (2007:  162)  through market  mechanisms, such as the CDM. It  is  the ‘global 
gaze’, which standardises the people and the natural world (Fogel 2004), as well as the 
reterritorialised control of the South by the North (Paterson and Stripple 2007: 162). 
This explanation helps clarify the contradiction between the efforts to establish a global 
carbon market, backed by the capitalist perspective and neo-liberal governmentality, and 
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the reaffirmation of the territoriality of the nation state. In other words, both Backstränd 
and Lövebrand (2007) and Paterson and Stripple (2007) have questioned the underlying 
assumption,  preference,  bias,  and  rationality  of  dominant  forms  in  global  climate 
governance in which states and non-state actors are involved. These contributions can 
be connected to the efforts made by critical approaches to challenge the global liberal 
project  and  relevant  governmentalities  which  have  framed  the  ‘right  disposition  of 
things’. 
    As discussed in the last section, it is not unusual to have liberalist approaches to 
China’s politics and governance of climate change. Considering the intimacy between 
the constructivist and liberalist approaches, the soft version of constructivism can also 
be found in the discussion of this field, in order to analyse how certain norms were 
disseminated to China, and under which circumstances did China internalise these ideas 
and norms. Schroeder (2008) applies this  soft  constructivist  approach to analyse the 
influence of transnational and Chinese NGOs on China’s climate change politics. By 
combing the ‘spiral  model’,  she has examined the role  of international and Chinese 
NGOs as norm advocates. In terms of China’s climate change politics, she has reviewed 
the impacts of this advocacy network in different phases: from the phase of ‘no debate’ 
(1949-1986), the phase of denial (1987-1990), the phase of tactical concessions (1991-
2001)  to  the  phase  of  prescriptive  status  (2002-present).  International  and  Chinese 
NGOs  have  made  contributions  in  the  field  of  information  dissemination,  public 
education,  media  campaign,  business/government  cooperation,  shame  campaign  and 
research and policy advisory. Schroeder explores how the diffusion of knowledge and 
information has played a more important role than the shame campaign does in the 
course of internalising international climate norms into China, which has transformed 
China’s  behaviour  in  international  climate  negotiations.  Chinese  researchers  also 
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emphasise how the changes to China’s identity and self-positioning have influenced 
China’s strategies in international climate negotiations since the 21st century. To identify 
itself as a ‘responsible power’ in international politics, China is willing to play a more 
active role in global climate governance (Yan and Xiao 2010a: 88-89). The changes in 
China’s  stances  in  different  stages  of  international  climate  negotiations  have 
demonstrated the subjective dimension of national interest. 
    The hard constructivist approach based on discourse analysis is also applied by some 
Chinese scholars. In order to fulfil the principle of equity in international climate talks, 
the theme of Empire and imperialism has been brought into account (Yu 2010). The 
global climate change regime which does not maintain the principle of ‘common but 
differentiated  responsibilities’ is  treated  as  imperialist  governance,  and  this  is  the 
continuation  of  the  imperialist  international  system (Yu 2010:  90-93).  Although the 
theme of the Empire is  raised,  the primary concerns between Paterson and Stripple 
(2007)  and  Yu  (2010)  are  different,  this  thesis  argues.  The  former  focuses  on  the 
reterritorilisation  in  global  climate  politics  and  points  out  the  phenomenon  of 
reterritorialised  control  of  the  South  by  the  North.  It  is  an  invisible  global  empire 
universalising the ways to tackle climate change. Whereas the concern of the latter still 
focuses on the unequal structure and treatment in international climate change politics, 
which refers to the distribution of the reduction obligations. China’s aim in international 
climate change politics is not only to protect its own national interests, but to enhance 
its discursive power and to establish a fairer international climate regime (Yu 2010: 94). 
‘To  pursue  the  discursive  power’,  such  as  to  point  out  the  differences  between 
luxurious/wasteful emissions and emission for basic need (Pan 2004), has become one 
crucial  task  for  China  in  international  climate  change  negotiations  (People’s  Daily 
2010a). Nevertheless, this hard constructivist approach has not been widely accepted in 
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Chinese academia and most of the time it is incorporated into the perspectives of the 
critical international political economy, which will be discussed in the next section. 
    In summary, constructivist approach has brought a new research agenda focusing on 
ideas, identities, practices and norms into the IR discipline, including the research of 
politics and governance of global climate change. It also helps the researcher to pay 
attention to the transformations and changes in international culture and the system. 
However, one of its disadvantages is that there is no consensus on epistemology and 
methodology  within  constructivism.  Ruggie  (1998)  classifies  constructivism as  neo-
classical  constructivism,  postmodern  constructivism  and  naturalist  constructivism; 
whereas  Katzenstein  et  al.  (1998)  classify  it  as  traditional  constructivism,  critical 
constructivism and postmodern constructivism. Wendt also has his own classification of 
constructivism  which  includes  modern  constructivism  by  Ruggie,  postmodern 
constructivism  by  Ashley,  feminist  constructivism  by  Tickner  and  his  own 
constructivism which aims at bridging the previous three and rationalism (1999). Each 
strand of constructivism, no matter  which classification they fall  under,  has its  own 
ontological  assumption  and  theoretical  concern,  which  makes  it  difficult  to  find  a 
coherent  constructivist  approach  in  international  politics,  including  the  politics  and 
governance of climate change. As discussed earlier, the soft norm-based constructivism 
can be integrated into liberalist tradition while the diffusion and internalisation of ideas 
and  knowledge  are  taken  into  account.  Since  neo-liberal  institutionalism  is  one 
significant mainstream approach in analysing global climate politics, it is not difficult to 
have this soft constructivist approach as a supplement of this mainstream. On the other 
hand,  the  hard  version  of  constructivism  based  on  discourse  analysis  focuses  on 
exposing the underlying assumptions of mainstream approaches by questioning the role 
of knowledge and its relation with power. As a result, this hard version is likely to be 
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merged into critical IR approaches, which examine the power structure of global climate 
change governance, the bias during the process of forming ideas, identities and norms, 
and the excluded alternatives. Standing on the middle ground has provided different 
constructivist  strands  the  opportunities  to  work  with  different  IR  approaches; 
nevertheless, this fact also demonstrates the difficulty to have a coherent, if not solid, 
constructivist approach to global climate politics.
    The divergent  assumptions  within constructivism makes the theoretical  conflicts 
occur more between different constructivist strands, rather than between constructivist 
and  other  IR  approaches.  Wendt’s  constructivism  has  adopted  many  rationalists’ 
assumptions on the international system. For him, international anarchy is recognised 
and the state is still treated as the basic unit of analysis, as neo-realist and neo-liberal 
institutionalists  claim.  This  thesis  argues  that  this  claim  by  Wendt  has  caused  the 
limitation  of  his  constructivist  analysis  and  that  the  further  question  to  the  state 
formation, the relevant knowledge, and the underpinning power structure are neglected. 
Just like different cultures and practices of international anarchy, this thesis argues that 
the emergence,  dissemination and consolidation of  a certain form of  state  and state 
system  should  not  be  treated  as  fixed  and  pre-determined.  The  phenomenon  of 
‘reterritorilisation’  in  global  climate  change  politics  (Paterson  and  Stripple  2007) 
actually  reflects  the  constructed  essence  of  territoriality  which  is  assumed  to  be 
attributed to the nation state. The soft norm-based constructivist approach, working with 
neo-liberal  institutionalist  approach,  help  depict  the  process  of  the  formation  and 
dissemination  of  knowledge,  ideas  and norms at  domestic  and international  climate 
politics.  However,  how these  structures,  norms,  knowledge,  identities,  interests  and 
even units of analysis are established, based on different power relations, needs to be 
analysed  more  fundamentally,  which  the  hard  constructivist  approach,  based  on 
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discourse analysis, has engaged. This radicalised version of constructivism can be found 
in critical IR approaches, which will be discussed in the following sections. 
2.4 Critical International Political Economy
This  section  discusses  the  main  variants  of  the  critical  IPE  approach  including 
dependency theory/ world systems theory, the Marxist ecologist approach, and the neo-
Gramscian approach in the IR discipline. This critical tradition has many branches with 
different concerns but one of the common features is the disclosure of structural forces 
and causes while analysing the interplay between the fields of politics and economy.20 
Regarding  the  relation  between  the  state  and  the  market,  there  exist  traditional 
approaches. Mercantilism emphasises the dominant role of government/politics over the 
market/economy. The state remains the main actor in the international arena and the 
purpose of economic activity is to enhance and pursue state power (List 1966). This 
strand  has  influenced  the  following  research  on  the  mode  of  ‘development  state’ 
(Amsden 1989, Johnson 1982, Wade 1990). In general, mercantilism treats international 
trade and the economy as a zero-sum game and that the growing of international trade 
cannot prevent conflicts  among the states.  As a result,  international trade should be 
integrated into national security. Meanwhile, mercantilism objects to international free 
trade since it  is  beneficial  to  the industrialised countries,  not the late  comers in the 
international economy. There also exists a liberal  strand in the IPE approach, which 
sheds light  on the economic and private  sectors,  and claims that  an economy is  an 
autonomous sphere with its own rational logic. This long lasting tradition, which started 
with Adam Smith in the eighteenth century, emphasises the superiority of the market 
20Another interchangeable label of this school is ‘global political economy’ (GPE), which emphasises the 
global dimensions over an ‘international’ one (Gill and Law 1988, in Palan 2000: 1).
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economy over politics and that governments and states should not interfere with the 
economic  sphere  and  should  respect  economic  law.  In  summary,  liberal  IPE  treats 
international trade as a positive-sum game and the development of international trade 
brings interdependence which will decrease the possibility of war and conflicts. As a 
result,  liberal  IPE  supports  and  promotes  free  trade  and  objects  to  governmental 
interferences. The critical strand in IPE came from the Marxist tradition. By applying 
historical  materialism  to  the  analysis,  this  approach  points  out  that  states  are  not 
autonomous  entities  anymore;  rather,  it  is  the  structure  of  world  capitalism  that  is 
directing states to maximise the profits of the capitalist class. As a result, class conflict, 
within and across borders, is the driving force behind international politics. The state 
and state systems play only a secondary role (Palan 2000:6). The structure of economic 
life, including the means and modes of production, social relations, social forces and 
property regimes,  play a dominant role in determining the political  settlements.  The 
Marxist  tradition  in  IR  constantly  provides  a  critical  and  structural  perspective  to 
explore the underlying forces of capitalism in the world economy. Wallerstein’s theory 
of the world system (1974) and the strand of dependency theory (Frank 1967; Amin 
1976) have developed their critical voices against world capitalism. This tradition also 
enlightens  critical  theory  and  critical  IPE  in  IR  and  revises  itself  when  applied  in 
broader areas. Generally speaking, critical IPE based on Marxian tradition argues that 
international  trade  will  bring  international  inequality  which  benefits  industrialised 
countries only. Less developed countries will become more dependent on industrialised 
countries.  
    This critical tradition is also influenced by critical theory in IR, which has been 
inherited from the Frankfurt School and it 
66
[S]tands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came 
about. Critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, does not take institutions and 
social and power relations for granted. (Cox 1986: 207-208) 
    This quotation from Cox has clearly pointed out the theoretical concerns of critical 
theory,  which  is  to  challenge  those  taken-for-granted  categories,  measures  and 
worldviews. Moving beyond problem-solving concern, it aims to question how certain 
problems are formed, evolved, and understood. As a result, a structural and historical 
reflection becomes necessary. 
    Another influential strand of this critical tradition is the neo-Gramscian approach. 
While discussing the (global) hegemony, different from the HST, the neo-Gramscian 
approach  claims  that  hegemony  cannot  be  understood  as  a  single  powerful  and 
dominant state (Cox 1981; Gill 2008). By extending the theoretical concerns to civil 
society, the historic bloc, organic intellectuals, the passive revolution, hegemony and 
counter-hegemony, this approach has helped explain how the ruling class consolidates 
its power through the establishment of consent. The main themes of the neo-Gramscian 
approach in the IPE include commodification and the deepening of capitalist relations of 
production  (Pijl  1998),  the  political  articulation  of  class  interests,  forms  of  state, 
transnational hegemony (Gramsci 1971), internationalisation of the state (Cox 1987), 
new constitutionalism (Gill 1995) and counter-hegemony. Moving beyond economic or 
material determinism, this approach has broadened the understanding of the causes of 
dominance and the sources of possible resistance. Civil society, which represents liberal 
rationality,  has  become  the  battleground  of  ideologies,  hegemony  and  counter-
hegemony, both domestically and internationally. 
    Emerging  from  the  debate  between  positivism  and  post-positivism  in  the  IR 
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discipline, the neo-Gramscian approach has made efforts to explore how existing world 
order is established with relevant institutions, norms and practices. The ultimate purpose 
is to pursue the emancipation of humans in that “theory is always for someone and for 
some purpose” (Cox 1981: 128). The study of hegemony is a crucial contribution in this 
approach. The  social  relations  of  production  are  analysed  in  order  to  examine  the 
mechanisms of hegemony (Cox 1987). “The production and reproduction of knowledge 
and  of  the  social  relations,  morals  and  institutions  that  are  prerequisites  to  the 
production of physical goods” (Cox 1989: 39) thus enters the research agenda. Also, the 
state is no longer treated a fixed and pre-determined like-unit in the international arena; 
instead, the historical aspects are taken into consideration to examine different forms of 
the  state  which  reflect  the  different  social  contexts  of  power  struggles  constituting 
different historic blocs. Civil society becomes a necessary research target in order to 
understand the operation of hegemony. Moreover, once hegemony has been established 
and  consolidated  nationally,  its  social  relations  of  production  may  expand  to  the 
international  arena  and  become  a  world  order  (Cox  1987:  149-150).  International 
organisations are  involved in  facilitating the expansion of certain social  relations of 
production. 
    In short, neo-Gramscianism develops itself from the critical strand of IPE influenced 
by  Marxism.  It  has  raised  its  critiques  of  mainstream  neo-realism  and  neo-liberal 
institutionalism by emphasising (1) refusing the dichotomy between subject and object; 
(2)  refusing  the  dichotomy  between  state  and  civil  society  with  traditional  IR 
approaches; (3) refusing the value-free assumption; (4) the importance of the agency to 
change or maintain the structure or to constitute anti-hegemony forces; and (5) refusing 
methodological  individualism  and  reductionism  (Cox  1996a:  205-212).  What  neo-
Gramscianism seeks is the ‘dialectic totality of structure and agency’ (Overbeek 2000: 
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169).  Meanwhile,  compare  to  classical  IPE  theories,  including  mercantilism  and 
liberalism which focus on the relations between state and the market, neo-Gramscianism 
argues that the political economy should be the object of analysis. The fields of politics 
and economy are no longer treated as separated (Cox 1996c: 144-145, Rupert 1993). 
The  emphasis  on  world  order  and  transnational  relation  by  neo-Gramscianism also 
differentiate  it  from mainstream IR  research  on  international  relations  (Cox  1996a, 
1996c; Overbeek 2000).21 The emphasis on the non-material factors also makes neo-
Gramscianism different from classical Marxist IPE. The rediscovery of the significance 
of  ideology  and  civil  society  in  class  struggle  by  Gramsci  has  also  helped  neo-
Gramscianism move beyond economic and structural  determinism. As a result,  neo-
Gramscianism has developed its research through the historical structure consisting of 
material  capacities,  institutions  and ideas  and this  framework can  be  applied to  the 
analysis of social forces, forms of states and world orders (Cox 1996a). Cox has clearly 
rejected the ahistorical positivism in the IR discipline and claims that institutions are 
created through intersubjective ideas and practices which should be grasped through 
historicism (1996b). 
    The non-positivist and non-deterministic aspect of the neo-Gramscian approach not 
only makes it move beyond a ‘problem-solving’ perspective, but also leaves space for it 
to work with the Foucauldian approach. Gill has made an attempt to integrate the neo-
Gramscian  and Foucauldian  approaches  when he  discusses  ‘market  civilisation’ and 
‘disciplinary  neo-liberalism’ (2008).  The emergence  of  market  civilisation  relates  to 
cultural transformation, which brings a new ‘common sense’ to legitimise the ‘long-
term commodity logic of capital’ (Gill 2008: 124). Disciplinary neo-liberalism, a very 
Foucauldian term, takes the relations of power and knowledge into account and refers to 
21 Overbeek (2000) points out that the term ‘transnational relations’ was introduced by Keohane and Nye 
(1971). Nevertheless, Overbeek states that Keohane and Nye (1971) still focus this concept on the actor-
oriented level. He argues that transnational “must be distinguished from inter-national, supra-national, 
and global” (Overbeek 2000: 182). 
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a concrete form of structural and behavioural power, combining the structural power of 
capital  with  ‘capillary  power’  and  ‘panopticism’  (Gill  2008:  137).  When  this 
disciplinary  neo-liberalism  is  institutionalised  internationally,  the  ‘new 
constitutionalism’ appears to protect and consolidate the corporate capital.  Discipline 
and surveillance of  the public,  in  order  to  maintain obedience,  has formed the new 
global panopticism associated with technology and knowledge of social control. Gill 
also  points  out,  following  Polanyi’s  thesis,  that  this  neo-liberal  project  is  self-
contradictory and will induce counter-hegemonic resistances as social inequality grows. 
Gill has criticised the limitations of the Foucauldian approach when explaining social 
transformation and the emergence of resistance (2008). 
    In  general,  although  there  are  many branches  in  this  critical  IPE tradition,  the 
common  research  interest  is  to  historically  reflect  on  and  re-examine  existing 
knowledge, institutions, political measures and power relations in order to disclose the 
underling  structure(s)  and  forces.  In  terms  of  international  environmental  politics, 
Broadhead  (2002)  points  out  that  mainstream  realist  and  liberalist  approaches  to 
international  environmental  politics  are  based  on  four  assumptions:  (1)  the  role  of 
instrumental logic; (2) market structures; (3) the concept of sustainable development; 
and  (4)  green  diplomacy.  Therefore,  a  critical  perspective  in  global  environmental 
politics aims at examining the interrelations of these assumptions. The way of framing 
environmental problems and solutions is never neutral.  Instead,  it  reflects ‘particular 
standpoints, values, and preferences’ (Stevis and Assetto 2001b: 2). Paterson argues that 
three primary questions have to be taken as central to the study of global environmental 
politics:  (1) the production of environmental problems; (2) the differential  effects of 
environmental problems on a variety of categories (class, nationality, race, gender); and 
(3) responses to these problems (2000: 3). Saurin also claims that research on global 
70
environmental politics should focus on the ‘production of environmental degradation’ 
(1996: 81) and that researchers should be careful of the risk of reducing the global 
environmental changes to a set of discrete ‘environmental issues’ (1996: 78). Based on 
the critical IPE approach, Irwin argues, after exploring the development of the concept 
of  ‘sustainable  development’,  that  solving  environmental  problems  can  be  easily 
reduced  to  the  problem  of  managing  resource  scarcity,  which  is  in  favour  of 
quantitative, objective, differentiated and directional knowledge. He concludes that it is 
through  historical  and  political  struggle  that  the  global  environmental  order  is 
constituted (2001: 36-37). For these researchers, issues appearing on the international 
agenda did not come from a vacuum; instead, the production and reproduction of certain 
knowledge and ‘truths’,  and the material  and historical contexts behind this  process 
together  influence  how  people  and  states  understand  and  operate  in  international 
environmental  politics.  The  separation  between  politics  and  the  economy,  which 
appeared in realist and liberalist political economy studies, has narrowed the research 
agenda to the assumed ‘economic’ spheres and set up the wrong questions. 
    While discussing the relationship between the IPE and global environmental change, 
Williams points out that global environmental change is intimately linked to the national 
and international systems of production distribution and consumption (1996: 49).  He 
thus  argues  that  environmental  degradation  arises  from  the  capitalist  mode  of 
development, “environmental degradation is seen as the direct result of the processes of 
accumulation,  production  and  reproduction  central  to  capitalism”  (1996:  51). 
Accordingly,  the  popular  term ‘sustainability’ in  international  environmental  politics 
should be situated in the dynamics of capitalist industrialisation and development (1996: 
54).  By  criticising  the  mainstream  approaches  in  IR,  which  try  to  resolve  the 
environmental  crisis  through  market  forces  behind  the  concept  of  ‘sustainable 
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development’ applied in 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit, Foster argues that sustainable 
development  depends  on  the  “privatization  of  the  commons  and  the  assignment  of 
monetary values to parts of the environment…a process that has been termed ‘costing 
the earth’” (2002: 56-58). The realms of ecology and capitalism are essentially opposed 
to  each  other  (Foster  2002:  7).  As  a  result,  it  is  pointless  to  tackle  international 
environmental degradations without paying attention to the structural cause, capitalism. 
In  summary,  these  critical  approaches,  based on insights  from Marxism and critical 
theory, try to provide a structural and historical perspective to re-examine the long-term 
causes of global environmental change and to search for more feasible solutions based 
on  these  findings.  Social  forces  and  the  relation  of  production  under  the  capitalist 
context  should  be  taken  into  account  in  order  to  grasp  the  dynamics  of  global 
environmental  changes.  These  critical  theorists  made  the  effort  to  expose  the 
depoliticisation trend in the mainstream approaches, in which the (capitalist) power has 
not been paid enough concern theoretically, and international institutions are treated as 
neutral establishments. Global environmental governance thus should be located “within 
broader patterns of governance designed to promote (and manage) the globalisation of 
the economy” (Newell 2008: 511). As a result, critical IPE scholars have raised entirely 
different  concerns  regarding  international  environmental  politics.  On account  of  the 
norms  and  rules  in  international  environmental  politics,  Newell  asks  the  question, 
‘[w]hose rules rule?’ (2008: 514). Far from mainstream interpretation, environmental 
change does not represent “interstate collective action problems, nor in a set of ad hoc 
trends, but in the internal dynamics of both systems of accumulation and exploitation 
and systems of domination” (Paterson 2000: 5).
    As a result, when human beings face threats of global climate change, what should be 
taken  into  account  is  not  just  the  international  politics  and  governance  of  climate 
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change.  Instead,  the  political  economy of  global  warming/climate  change  based  on 
historical materialism (Paterson 1996a) should be the focus of relevant research. The 
historical  materialist  approach  allows  researchers  to  transcend  the  division  between 
domestic  and  international  levels,  to  discuss  normative  questions  and  to  bring  the 
development of capitalism into analysis (Paterson 1996a: 7). Paterson also discusses 
historical transformations within the world political economy, which are the shift from 
Fordism to flexible accumulation, the processes of globalisation and the move towards 
neo-liberalism  as  the  hegemonic  project  of  transnational  capitalist  classes. 
Consequently,  the  first  and  second  transformations  appear  as  a  new  mode  of 
‘competition state’, which causes the dismantling of welfare states in the West (1996a: 
168). Moreover, under the ideology of neo-liberalism, new concepts, such as ‘ecological 
modernisation’ and ‘sustainable development’, were introduced and legitimised as the 
most suitable and feasible way to tackle environmental problems within the framework 
of  growth  imperative  (Paterson  1996a:  169).  Capitalism  as  a  structural  power  has 
successfully  limited  many  state  decision-makers  to  take  ‘cost-benefit’ and  ‘profit’ 
concerns into consideration. At the same time, the logic of capital accumulation also 
aggravates the international inequality between the North and the South, which later 
framed the basic confrontations in international climate change negotiations. In short, 
from Paterson’s argument, the (critical) political economy approach, based on historical 
materialism, is able to provide a more comprehensive understanding of global climate 
change politics and, meanwhile, he also points out the importance of structural power. 
“The  structure  of  anarchy  is  a  secondary  consideration  to  that  of  the  structural 
constraints imposed by world capitalism” (Paterson 1996a: 176). 
    The mainstream liberal project has installed itself in the measures to tackle climate 
change  internationally.  Taking  the  three  flexible  mechanisms  in  the  Kyoto  Protocol 
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(Joint Implementation, Emissions Trading and the Clean Development Mechanism) as 
examples, they work on the same basic principle; that is to assign property rights to 
emissions and to create carbon markets in which GHGs emissions are allowed to be 
transferred and traded. It is apparent that the response from neo-liberal institutionalists 
in  IR  to  global  environmental  issues,  especially  climate  change,  is  a  process  of 
rationalisation,  from  institution  foundation  and  incentive  design  to  merchandising 
‘nature’. Atmosphere and GHGs emissions have been commodificated in newly formed 
global carbon markets in which cost efficiency and profit maximisation are the primary 
concerns. 
    By emphasising the mode of capitalist  consumption as the cause of the present 
climate change problems, Pan differentiates between the luxurious/wasteful emissions 
and emissions for basic needs satisfaction and criticises Western stances in international 
climate change negotiations  when they request  developing countries  to bear binding 
commitments  of  emissions  reductions  (2004).22 As  a  market  design,  the  CDM  has 
attracted many criticisms because it only serves major players in the carbon market, 
enabling them to maximise their profits, rather than promoting sustainable development 
in host countries (Redman 2008; Pearson 2004). The CDM in developing countries, 
especially in China, is a well-operated institution in terms of climate change. However, 
what the critical approach finds out is that this market mechanism could not fulfil the 
targets of emissions reduction, but merely creates another market for the profit-seeker. 
The practices of the CDM, which makes neo-liberal institutionalists so proud (Depledge 
and Yamin 2009) just represents itself as another sphere of capital accumulation. 
    While  the  structural  and historical  contexts  are  critically  taken into  account  in 
international  climate  politics,  the  concepts  of  ‘fairness’,  ‘justice’,  ‘equity’  and 
22It is uncertain if Pan takes a political economy approach as his theoretical framework. However, as one 
of the leading scholars on China’s climate politics, what he proposed does reflect the structualist and 
historical explanation of current climate change problems, which should be attributed to the production 
and consumption of global capitalism. This approach is popular among developing countries. 
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‘sustainable development’ are raised in the politics of North-South relations (Agarwal 
and Narain 1991; Shue 1993; Grubb 1995; Singer 2002; Roberts and Parks 2007; Soltau 
2009).  There are three main concerns: (1) Whose responsibility? (2) Who pays? (3) 
Who bears the costs? (Bulkeley and Newell 2010). Considering the responsibility of 
global climate change from a historical perspective, the world is split into two parts: 
developed countries and developing countries that the developed world, the North, is 
requested to bear the main responsibility for, or ‘ecological debt’ in other words. Due to 
the history of industrialisation, there exists the inequity of per capita emissions between 
developed  and  developing  countries  (Roberts  and  Parks  2007).  Based  on  the 
differentiation  of  responsibility,  the  concept  of  ‘greenhouse  development  rights’ has 
been gradually developed (Baer et al. 2008) and right-based languages have been raised 
to the climate change debate (Humphrey 2010). Meanwhile, the developed world is also 
asked to provide funding for international mitigation efforts through the World Bank 
and  the  Global  Environmental  Facility.  Moreover,  considering  that  less  developed 
countries will also be the most vulnerable ones to climate change, the developed world 
is  also  expected  to  support  the  adaptation  measures  in  developing countries  (Soltau 
2009; Bulkeley and Newell 2010). Many disputes between the North and the South are 
developed  around  these  key  issues.  “The  issue  of  global  climate  change  is 
fundamentally  about  injustice  and  inequality—  in  vulnerability,  responsibility,  and 
mitigation, as well as participation in the global economy” (Roberts and Parks 2007: 
97). From this perspective, the cause of climate change is linked to the development of 
capitalism and industrialisation and poor countries will be more vulnerable if there is no 
international action to tackle climate change. As a result, justice and equality should 
always  play  core  roles  in  international  climate  change  politics.  The  North-South 
confrontation should be understood from a historical and structural perspective based on 
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the analysis of the critical political economy. 
    This approach also helps give a grasp on China’s different strategies in international 
climate change negotiations. The concept of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ 
has  been  always  the  primary  concern  for  China  in  multilateral  climate  change 
negotiations,  especially  when  China  locates  itself  as  part  of  the  developing  world, 
namely the G-77 plus China.  This concept has brought two dimensions into debate: 
historical responsibility and the per capita emissions, or greenhouse development rights 
(Baer  et  al.  2008).  As discussed in  the  last  paragraph,  the historical  dimension has 
identified the main cause of present climate change problems, which is the accumulated 
concentration of GHGs, mainly carbon dioxide, from the industrial revolution since the 
mid-18th  century.  Consequently,  this  concept  points  out  that  the  production  model, 
based  on  fuel  energy  in  the  industrialised  world,  should  be  responsible  and  the 
developed countries should firstly take action to tackle climate change.23 This position is 
consolidated in the Declaration of South Summit by G-77 and China in 2000:
We believe that the prevailing modes of production and consumption in the 
industrialized world are unsustainable and should be changed for they threaten the 
very survival of the planet……We advocate a solution for the serious……
environmental problems facing humanity, based on the recognition of the North’s 
ecological debt and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities of 
the developed and developing countries (Group of 77 2000). 
    Besides historical responsibility, the G-77 and China also proposed that every human 
23 This thesis does not argue that the developing countries in international climate politics operate an anti-
capitalism strategy. The developing world does point out the influences of the capitalist accumulation 
model in the developed world. However, what the developing world wants to pursue in the future remains 
obscure under the concept of ‘sustainable development’. It is a concept ambiguous enough to incorporate 
market environmentalism and ecological modernisation (Adams 2001), which might lead to the pursuit of 
economic growth on the capitalist model. 
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on Earth has equal rights to the global atmosphere and equal allocations of pollution on 
a per capita base (Roberts and Parks 2007: 144). By stating that industrialised countries, 
with relatively small populations, have already produced a disproportionate amount of 
carbon, developing countries were legitimately able to fulfil their development needs in 
advance, since their per capita emissions were still far below world average.
    Nevertheless, does the discourse above prove that China will always take strong and 
critical  positions  against  the  industrialised  world  in  international  climate  change 
politics? Especially when China claims itself  a socialist  state,  should it  not be self-
evident to take an anti-capitalist posture? The development and operation of the CDM 
in China tells another story. After the initial hesitant stage towards the CDM, China has 
taken the biggest portion of the CDM market in just  five years.  What interests  this 
research  is  that  from  the  government  to  the  environmental  NGOs  in  China,  the 
criticisms of the CDM that were discussed in this section rarely appear in the Chinese 
public sphere. Domestically, there appears to be a trend that China is willing to accept 
the market mechanism as part  of the governing tools to tackle climate change. This 
phenomenon  seems  to  suggest  that  certain  practices/mentality  of  the  neoliberal 
institutionalist approach have materialised in China. At the same time, the complexity 
and  the  difficulty  of  applying  a  specific  approach  to  address  international  climate 
change politics can be seen from China’s case, which inspires further exploration in this 
thesis. 
    In summary, the varieties of critical IPE approaches have provided a strong challenge 
to  the  mainstream  realist  and  liberalist  approaches  in  international  climate  change 
politics, both theoretically and practically. These critical approaches have been applied 
to  expose  the  capital  force  underpinning  the  formation  of  the  international  climate 
change regime, which benefits the capital holders (Egan and Levi 2001). It can also be 
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deployed as a negotiation tool for developing countries. However, this thesis argues that 
China’s case has shown more complexities in this field. One key factor is the role of the 
state  in  this  approach.  Are  state  and  state  systems  always  second  and  therefore 
subordinate to global capitalism? Can critical IPE approaches comprehensively seize 
different  discourses,  strategies,  and  rationalities  based  on  different,  or  uneven, 
developmental and historical paths of different states in international climate politics? 
Moreover, from the practices of North-South confrontation, it is also apparent that, even 
by identifying  capitalism as  the  clear  cause of  climate  change,  an  appeal  based  on 
climate justice hardly leads to a trans-boundary class coalition or counter hegemony 
movement on a global, or even regional scale. Rather, nation states still appear as the 
crystallisation of plural interests within concrete national borders.24 The right to emit 
GHGs and the  right  to  develop is  still  allocated  on the basis  of  the  state  and state 
system. It is the ‘geographies of responsibility’ (Bulkeley and Newell 2010: 36) that 
underpins the politics between the North and South. Ironically, the state has resurged 
itself in global climate politics. It has consolidated its dominant role, instead of being 
only one of the agents for the operation of capitalism. Again, this thesis argues that it is 
risky  to  universalise  the  understanding  of  the  state  and  state  systems.  Critical  IPE 
approaches have made great contributions to bring historical and structural factors into 
account in order to grasp the dynamic material conditions and social forces underlining 
the contemporary world. Nevertheless, this thesis contends that the Chinese case has 
demonstrated the different rationalities underpinning its politics and the governance of 
climate change. In China,  there are different paths and mentalities of state-building; 
moreover,  a  different  understanding  and  expectation,  or  aspiration,  of  state  and  its 
24 This thesis understands that there are many non-governmental civic movements standing on this critical 
side of environmental politics, which appear as grassroots, community-based and transnational networks 
(Szasz 1994; Guha 1997; Schlosberg 1999; Shiva 2000). As a result, this thesis does not argue to disclaim 
the efforts and achievements from these civic movements. However, the state remains the dominant role 
in international climate change politics, not only from the practical operations, but also from the cognitive 
framework where the state becomes the dominant subject bearing expectations from different groups. 
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relation with society. These different historical developments and consciousness may 
lead to different state-society relations, social forces and imaginations of state. 
    Paterson  argues  that  international  environmental  politics  should  be  understood 
through four interrelated power structures: the state system, capitalism, knowledge and 
patriarchy (2000: 40-54). These power structures play crucial roles in the causation of 
global environmental problems. It is clear that Paterson does not cast capitalism as the 
only  structure  causing  contemporary  environmental  degradations.  By examining  the 
state’s need to extract the surplus from the people in order to raise war, the impact of 
war on the environment, the environmental displacement in a bordered world and the 
hierarchical ontology of the modern state, Paterson claims that environmental change 
was brought  about  by the state  and state  system.  This  thesis  agrees  that  it  is  more 
comprehensive to incorporate different power structures in the discussion, instead of on 
capitalism alone. However, regarding the state and the state system, what appears in 
Paterson’s argument is a rather static and fixed understanding. How non-Western people 
learn, practice, translate and become obsessed with the existence of the state should be 
reviewed  contextually  as  well.  This  thesis  does  not  contend  to  propose  culture 
relativism or another theme of ‘Chinese characteristics’, but this thesis argues that an 
historical review and re-examination of how a state, either the entity or the concept, is 
formed and formulated is  equally crucial  to  grasp the dynamics of the relationships 
between  the  state  and  global  environmental  politics.  Besides  the  rationality  of 
sovereignty which was developed through the specific path of state building, different 
rationalities should also be taken into account in order to comprehensively and critically 
examine how and why certain modes of politics and governance of climate change are 
established  and  transformed.  In  order  to  analyse  and  grasp  how the  ‘rationality  of 
government’ is deployed in the governance, the next section moves on to discuss the 
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Foucauldian approach in the IR discipline. 
2.5 Foucauldian Approach
This section focuses on the Foucauldian approach in the IR discipline and examines 
specifically the concept of ‘governmentality’. The aim of this section is to analyse how 
this  Foucauldian tradition is  deployed in environmental  and climate change politics. 
Although there is no certain ‘Foucauldian’ School in the IR discipline, Foucault’s works 
have  deeply  influenced  the  ‘postmodern’  or  ‘poststructuralist’  approach  in  IR. 
Postmodernists in IR are sceptical of the notions of ‘rationality, ‘objectivity’ and ‘truth’ 
and treat theory as ‘narrative’ or ‘discourse’, which is intersubjectively constructed and, 
as such, has the potential to be deconstructed. Consequently, the neutrality of theory and 
institution is as problematical as other ‘truths’. “All power requires knowledge and all 
knowledge relies on and reinforces existing power relations…there is no such thing as 
‘truth’ existing outside of power” (Smith 1997: 181). Postmodernist critiques in IR have 
challenged the anarchical assumption of neorealism, which demonstrates the ahistorical 
bias and, thus, fails to explain the change in the international system (Ashley 1996). 
Based on these deconstructive and post-rationalist themes, Foucault’s theory has been 
applied  in  three  ways  in  IR:  (1)  to  support  critiques  and  deconstructions  of  realist 
international  theory;  (2)  to  analyse  discrete  discourses  and  practices  of  modern 
international politics;  and (3) to develop novel accounts of our contemporary global 
liberal  order  (Selby  2007:  325-326).  Meanwhile,  comparing  the  Marxist  and 
Foucauldian approaches, Palan concludes that 
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[T]he singularity of the class-based exploitative politics of traditional Marxism is 
giving way to the multifaceted and sometime subtle forms of exploitative politics, 
including the various discursive techniques which are viewed as expressions of 
power relations (2000: 7). 
    As a result, the Foucauldian approach in IR turns the research interest towards the 
various dimensions of power relations. 
    When this approach is applied to environmental politics, the research object turns to 
the discourse of the environment. ‘Environment’ should not be treated as a self-evident 
existence; rather, it appears as the target to be deconstructed. “Environmental politics 
becomes an argumentative struggle in which actors not only try to make others see the 
problems according to their views but also seek to position other actors in a specific 
way,”  according  to  Hajer  (1995:  53,  italic  added).  The  task  of  the  research  on 
environmental politics, therefore, is to analyse the story lines and discourse coalition 
behind mainstream discourse (Hajer 1995).25 Based on the efforts to de-neutralise and 
de-naturalise discourse in environmental politics, Hajer has helped expose the symbolic 
struggle in the process of power/knowledge formation. Based on the Foucauldian and 
social  constructivist  approaches,  Keeley  also  criticised  regime  approaches  in 
international environmental politics that “lose a full sense of the world as contestable 
and contested” (1990: 84; in Newell 2000: 35). In short, the environment, the natural 
world, the international arena, the relevant knowledge and the successes and failures of 
international environmental politics should not be treated as taken-for-granted; rather, 
all these categories should be understood as contested and contestable arenas in which 
there exist struggles for meanings. 
25 “ A story-line is a generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive 
categories to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomenon”  (Hajer 1995: 56). Discourse-
coalitions can be defined as the ensemble of story-lines, involved actors and the discursive practices 
(1995: 65).
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    Besides discourse analysis, another influential contribution from the Foucauldian 
approach in the analysis of environmental politics is the concept of ‘governmentality’, 
or  ‘governmental  rationality’.  Governmentality  is  the  notion  from Foucault  and  the 
concept was developed from the late 1970s until Foucault’s death in 1984. Foucault 
elaborated this concept in two of the lectures given at the Collège de France in Paris in 
1978 and 1979, which were entitled  Security, Territory, Population and  The Birth of  
Biopolitics. In these two lectures, Foucault explored and demonstrated a new field of 
research,  which  was  ‘governmental  rationality’,  or  ‘governmentality’.  Foucault  also 
deployed this concept in other terms, such as ‘rationality of government’ and ‘art of 
government’. By shedding light on government, Foucault emphasised that research on 
government should focus on the governmental practices instead of state institutions. The 
government is not an activity or phenomenon monopolised by the state but it is ‘the 
conduct of conduct’ that is  “a form of activity  aiming to shape,  guide or affect  the 
conduct of some person or persons” (Gordon 1991: 2). 
Government as an activity could concern the relation between self and self, private 
interpersonal relations involving some form of control or guidance, relations within 
social institutions and communities and, finally, relations concerned with the 
exercise of political sovereignty (Gordon 1991: 2-3). 
    Governmental practices should not be limited within state practices but “a plurality of 
practices…conducted within and across countless social sites; practices that are often 
contradictory and only ever partially coordinated” (Haahr and Walters 2005: 289-29). In 
short,  far  from  mainstream  IR  approaches  where  the  state  always  plays  an 
unchallengeable and determinant role, Foucault had opened a new framework to analyse 
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government through plural and microgovernmental practices. To Foucault,
     
state is nothing else but the effect, the profile, the mobile shape of a perpetual 
statification or statifications, in the sense of incessant transactions which modify, 
or move, or drastically change, or insidiously shift sources of finance, modes of 
investment, decision-making centres, forms and types of control, relationships 
between local powers, the central authority, and so on (Foucault 2008: 77). 
    It is the governmental practices constituting and influencing the existence and the 
change of state, rather than the converse. The state, as a result, is just “the mobile effect 
of  a  regime  of  multiple  governmentalities”  (Foucault  2008:  77;  italic  added). 
Governmentality refers to “a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice 
of government” and it is about the questions of “who can govern, what governing is and 
what or who is governed.” (Gordon 1991: 2-3, italic added) It is a regime of power, 
which is “the ensemble formed by…the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise 
of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as 
its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means 
apparatuses of security.” (Foucault 1991b: 102) 
    Meanwhile, as Foucault’s previous and lasting concerns on the relations between 
power  and  knowledge  (Foucault  1978),  the  concept  of  governmentality  is  also  a 
‘methodological  maxim’ that  “draws  attention  to  the  complex  relationship  between 
thought and government” (Larner and Walters 2004b: 2). Consequently, the research on 
governmentality is 
[A] way of not taking as a primary, original, and already given object, notions such 
as the sovereign, sovereignty, the people, subjects, the state, and civil society, that 
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is to say, all the universals employed by sociological analysis, historical analysis, 
and political philosophy in order to account for real governmental practice (Larner 
and Walters 2004: 15). 
    
    The Governmentality approach also brings challenges to the perception of knowledge 
and  ‘naturalness’.  By  separating  this  concept  into  ‘govern’  and  ‘mentality’,  or 
‘mentalities  of  government’,  Dean’s  contribution  serves  to  emphasise  the  role  of 
‘thought’ and ‘knowledge’ in the practices of government and to demonstrate how and 
what governed subjects interpret by the way they are governed: 
An analytics of government thus views practices of government in their complex 
and variable relations to the different ways in which ‘truth’ is produced in social, 
cultural and political practices. On the one hand, we govern others and ourselves 
according to what we take to be true about who we are, what aspects of our 
existence should be worked upon, how, with what means, and to what ends…On 
the other hand, the ways in which we govern and conduct ourselves give rise to 
different ways of producing truth (Dean 1999: 18).
    Therefore, ‘naturalness’ and ‘taken-for-granted’ should be questioned in the research 
on government and, by doing so, “it renders practices of government problematic and 
shows that things might be different from the way they are” (Dean 1999: 38). 
    When applied in the international arena, this approach has brought challenges to the 
approaches  of  neo-liberal  institutionalism,  regime  analysis,  and  global  governance. 
Global governance can be, and should be, seen as “a variant on such technologies of 
governmentalism…to  ensure  the  right  disposition  of  things”  (Lipschutz  with  Rowe 
2005: 14). In contrast to the traditional understanding of government, governmentality 
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works  through  “self-disciplining  and  self-regulation  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
disciplining function of surveillance and law on the other” (Lipshutz with Rowe 2005: 
15).  The  phenomenon  of  ‘politics  via  markets’ in  contemporary  global  governance 
demonstrates  the  dominance  of  neo-liberal  governmentality,  which  is  governance 
without politics, in a globalisation period. The neo-liberal way to govern demonstrates 
not only “direct intervention by means of empowered and specialized state apparatuses, 
but  also…indirect  techniques  for  leading and controlling individuals” (Lemke 2001: 
201). The ‘self-regulated’ individual, or subject, is also a ‘responsible’ one where the 
responsibility  for  managing  social  risks  has  been  transferred,  from  state  to  the 
individual. In other words, by applying a governmentality perspective, the question of 
global governance should be not just on how to reach ‘good governance’ but why global 
governance  is  understood  through  functional,  technological  and  institutional 
approaches.
     From a neo-liberal institutionalist’s point of view, global environmental governance 
is  either introduced as a ‘world collective life’ through global civil  society (Wapner 
2000:  65);  “coordination  of  action…through  many  different  institutions  including 
private  social  and  economic  ones”  (Vig  1999:  5);  or  realised  through  the  social 
institutions  which  are  “arrangements  designed  to  resolve  social  conflicts,  promote 
sustained cooperation  in  mixed-motive  relationships,  and…alleviate  collective-action 
problems in a world of interdependent actors” (Young 2000b: 4).  These mainstream 
institutionalist perspectives place the emphasis on ‘problem-solving’ rather than ‘critical 
reflection’ in their analysis (Vogler 1996). The ‘efficacy’ of international institutions or 
regimes  has  become the  core  concern  of  this  approach and,  in  this  context,  global 
environmental  governance  “has  come  to  legitimise  a  neoliberal  ecopolitics, 
characterized by a rehabilitation of the state, liberal-individual notions of justice, and a 
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technocratic emphasis on managerialism, standard setting and rules-based behaviour” 
(Elliott 2002: 58). There also embodies a process of normalisation and the normalising 
strategy of ecopolitics, which attempts to extend control, in terms of management, to the 
entire  planet  (Sachs  1999).  Accordingly,  the  focus  of  contemporary  environmental 
discourse  is  how  to  manage populations  and  resources  in  relation  to  their  natural 
environments. 
    This  phenomenon  demonstrates  the  appearance  of  the  concept,  ‘green 
governmentality’ (Bäckstrand  and  Lövebrand  2007).  Within  green  governmentality, 
which is related to enviro-discipline and eco-knowledge, the ‘right disposition of things’ 
between  human  and  the  environment  is  established  and  enforced  (Luke  1999).  By 
analysing the discursive framework of international  climate politics,  Bäckstrand and 
Lövebrand demonstrate three main discourses in this arena: (1) Green governmentality, 
which refers to science-driven and centralised multilateral order, associated with top-
down climate monitoring and mitigation techniques implemented on global scale. (2) 
Ecological  modernisation,  which  is  a  decentralised  liberal  market  order,  in  order  to 
search for cost-optimal solutions to climate problems and (3) Civic environmentalism, 
which represents the challenge force to the former two mainstream narratives (2007: 
124).  However,  this  thesis  contends  that  green  governmentality  and  ecological 
modernisation  indeed  converge  together  to  constitute  the  main  driven  narrative  of 
international  climate  politics,  especially  after  the  Kyoto  Protocol was  concluded  in 
1997. Green governmentality provides the kind of rationality, which aims at managing 
the global atmosphere  rationally through scientific-driven policies, in order to secure 
the state, especially the welfare, of its population. Meanwhile, ecological modernisation 
embraces a liberal economic order, which claims to be a flexible and cost-effective way 
of  governing  the  environment  and  climate  (Bäckstrand  and  Lövebrand  2007:  127). 
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Superficially,  it  seems these  two discourses  are  in  contrast  to  each other,  since  the 
former focuses on the top-down management dimension, whereas the latter has a belief 
in  a  decentralised  market  mechanism.  However,  contemporary  neo-liberalism  has 
already kept away from the naïve laissez faire imagination. According to the practice of 
Ordoliberalen in post-war West Germany, the market is no longer a ‘natural reality’ but 
exists  and functions  in  a  framework maintained by state  policy.  Neo-liberalism has 
adapted  itself  into  different  versions  to  spread  its  dominance  around  the  globe. 
Consequently, green governmentality and ecological modernisation together represent 
the  mainstream  neo-liberal  institutionalist  approach  regarding  international 
environmental politics and climate change politics as well. What is important is not the 
existence of management but the question of ‘how to manage’; in other words, ‘how to 
govern’. In short, these two discourses together constitute the substantial elements of 
contemporary  global  climate  change  politics,  which  aims  to  manage  global  climate 
problems by creating a market mechanism in which the earth and the atmosphere are 
commodificated.
    In  general,  the  Foucauldain  approach  has  provided  a  different  framework  to 
understand international  climate change politics  by problematising and exposing the 
power/knowledge  relation  behind  established  institutions.  Specifically,  the 
governmentality  approach  tries  to  uncover  the  present  neo-liberal  project  within 
international climate change politics. This neoliberal project is channelled and installed 
through,  what  seems  to  be,  decentralised  market  designs.  In  order  to  maintain  and 
enhance this certain way of governance, relevant ‘truth’, ‘naturalness’ and knowledge 
are necessary to place the ‘right disposition of things’. The Foucauldian approach has 
provided  an  insightful  and  inspirational  observation  of  contemporary  international 
climate  change politics.  This  research  has  not  found consistent  literature  discussing 
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China’s  climate  change  politics  in  this  approach.  However,  there  are  growing 
governmentality studies on different dimensions in China (Jeffreys 2009). The problem 
is how to deploy the governmentality study historically and contextually in China. 
    When examining the green political theory and green politics in IR, Paterson claims 
that the problem with these theories is that they are not ‘structuralist enough’ (2000: 40). 
Paterson argues that there is a need to “understand the structures which produce these 
ethics and social imperatives” (2000: 40). However, this thesis contends that he has not 
given the governmentality study or other post-structure approaches fair credit. First, no 
matter whether for Hajer, Dean, Gordon, or Foucault himself, none of them has claimed 
that the discourse, the rationality, the mentality and the art of government come from a 
vacuum.  Those  concepts  have  their  own material,  historical  and structural  grounds. 
Paying attention to discourse and governmentality does not necessarily need to keep a 
distance from a structuralist approach; conversely, by examining the power relations of 
different discourses and governmentalities, multifaceted structures directing the subject 
and knowledge formation are exposed. 
    Second, while examining the four power structures which influence contemporary 
environmental  degradations  (Paterson 2000),  there  is  space  for  these postmodern or 
Foucauldian approaches  to  be involved.  No matter  the  structure of  capitalism,  state 
system, knowledge, and patriarchy, there is always the need to have certain norms and 
rules in order to smooth the operation of these structures. This thesis argues that the 
relationship between individual and structural is not mechanical. As Cox argues, the 
structure should be understood as “persistent social practices made by collective human 
activity and transformed by collective human activity” (1987: 4).   Consequently, this 
thesis claims that a Foucauldian approach needs, and should be based on the dynamic 
structural  analysis  which  provides  the  space  to  trace  the  developments  of  different 
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rationalities. 
    Okereke et al. (2009) have tried to transcend the limitations of the mainstream regime 
analysis  in  climate  governance  by  combining  neo-Gramscian  and  Foucauldian 
approaches. Their aims are to re-examine (1) the nature of power in global governance; 
(2) the relationship between public and private authority;  (3) the dynamics between 
structure and agency; and (4) the rationalities and actual processes of governance. They 
have raised similar criticisms, as discussed earlier, of neo-liberal institutionalism and 
about its assumption of the nation state. By extracting some theoretical elements, these 
two  approaches  together  help  to  challenge  the  assumptions  of  neo-liberal 
institutionalism. According to Okereke et al. (2009), power is ‘multiple and relational’. 
State is a ‘site of strategic selectivity’ where different social forces are encountered and 
governance should be understood as a process. However, this thesis is aware of the risk 
to combine these two different approaches directly, although both of them explore and 
criticise the neo-liberal project in global politics. This thesis recognises the theoretical 
contributions from both neo-Gramscian and Foucauldian approaches but does not try to 
combine these two approaches. Instead, this thesis moves on to establish the theoretical 
framework based on the revised governmentality approach for further analysis. 
2.6 Towards a Framework for Analysis 
This  chapter  has  reviewed  the  main  IR  approaches  to  explore  how  they  address 
international  climate  politics.  It  is  impossible  to  include  all  IR  approaches  in  this 
review; as a result, each of the selected approaches discussed in the previous sections 
has  represented  specific  ontological  and  epistemological  assumption,  which 
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differentiates it from other approaches. Before moving on, this research would like to 
review normative theory, especially the English School, in the IR discipline. Although 
there remain disputes to clearly categorise the English School,26 the key figures of this 
school such as Hedley Bull (1977) and Martin Wight (1977, 1991) have demonstrated 
the core concerns of this approach which are the research on international society and 
bringing history, norms, moralities, and interpretations into the study of international 
politics. Although admitting international anarchy and recognising the state as the most 
important  actor  in  international  politics,  the  English  School  has  brought  the  non-
material  aspects,  such  as  rules,  institutions,  and  culture  into  analysis.  International 
society, different from the Hobbesian international system based on state-centric power 
politics,  is  the  institutionalisation  of  shared  interests  and  identities.  Rules  and 
institutions  can  be  established  through  dialogues  between  states  and  the  common 
interests  are  crucial  to  maintain  these  institutions  (Bull  and  Watson  1984).27 This 
Grotian  perspective  makes  the  English  School  seem  similar  to  the  institutionalist 
approach of liberal IR tradition; nevertheless, Wendt and Davall argue that the English 
School  is  based  on  an  interpretative  approach  which  is  different  from  neo-liberal 
institutionalism  based  on  rational  choice  and  instrumental  logic  (1989:  51-73).  In 
summary, the English School has developed a new research agenda focusing on the 
order and norms of international politics. Its concept of international society has also 
26 Roy Jones (1981) argues that the English School is based on the London School of Economics and it is 
known as: (1) treating IR as an independent discipline, (2) researching ‘international society’ and (3) 
focusing on traditional research methods. Whereas Tim Dunne (1998) contends that the English School 
originates from the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics founded in 1959 and this 
school emphasises: (1) different research traditions such as the international society, (2) an interpretative 
approach and (3) normative international theory. The later description is widely accepted as the path of 
the development of the English School. 
27 Besides the Hobbesian international system and Grotian international society, English School 
researchers claim there is  also the Kantian world society based on different methodologies. While the 
international society is still based on international interaction among states, the world society provides 
idealist international politics where individual and non-state actors play more important roles. Little 
(2000) explains that the international system is based on positivism, the international society on 
hermeneutics and the  world society on critical theory. Wight, from the epistemological perspective, 
argues that the three traditions of international relations: realism, rationalism and revolutionism, have 
corresponded to the concepts of the international system, the international society and the world society 
(1991). 
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influenced  the  emergence  of  constructivism  in  the  IR  discipline.  Nevertheless,  its 
ontological  assumptions  are  not  clear  enough  so  that  the  relation  among  the 
international  system,  international  society  and world society  remain  underdeveloped 
(Buzan and Little 2000). 
    This thesis accepts that the English School contributes to bringing non-material and 
normative  aspects  into  analysis  in  a  hermeneutic  way  and  its  inspiration  to 
constructivism. Nevertheless, this thesis contends that the norms and moralities need to 
be critically and contextually examined as well so that where these norms are from and 
under which circumstances and power relations these certain norms acquire legitimacy 
should be taken into analysis. In other words, this thesis contends that a more dynamic 
analysis about the formation, change and transformation of norms, rules, institutions 
and moralities is needed for the English School. Moreover, how to apply the concept of 
international society into the analysis of international climate change politics remains 
ambiguous. Are the North and the South in the same international society or not when 
both  side  recognise  the  importance  of  tackling  climate  change?  How  does  this 
normative theory deal with competing, or even conflicting, international societies based 
on different  common values  and norms?  How can  different  norms with  conflicting 
assumptions  be  reconciled?  Can  normative  theory  integrate  the  ‘equity’ concern  in 
global climate politics, which is based on the unequal political economy structure? To 
sum up, this thesis finds it difficult to apply the framework of the English School to 
grasp the dynamics of global climate politics, although some of its  concepts can be 
deployed in different situations. Roberts and Parks (2007) also point out the enormous 
‘worldview gap’ in international climate change politics while the concept of ‘justice’ 
and ‘equality’ are brought into negotiations. The four different proposals of allocating 
the responsibilities of emissions reductions: grandfathering, carbon intensity, per capita 
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and historical responsibility have all had their own underlying reasoning and knowledge 
of ‘justice’ (Roberts and Parks 2007). As a result, Roberts and Parks argue that no one 
party can ‘win’ their fairness argument while there exists no ‘universally shared norms 
of  justice’ in  international  climate  change  politics  (2007:  221).  How  to  grasp  the 
dynamic process of ‘moral compromise’ is an unavoidable task for normative IR theory, 
this thesis argues. In addition, Roberts and Parks (2007) argue that different claims of 
norms and justices from different countries do not represent different ‘perceptions’ only; 
instead, they represent certain social realities. “[F]airness positions are configurational, 
or based upon a nation’s position in the global economy” (Roberts  and Parks 2007: 
182). Consequently, this thesis keeps arguing that while bringing norms into analysis, 
whether they are neo-liberal institutionalists, regime analysis, constructivist approaches 
or  the  English  School,  the  norms  always  need  to  be  explored  historically  and 
contextually and the power/knowledge behind norms need to be examined as well. In 
summary, this thesis argues that the normative theory needs to develop a more dynamic 
framework to grasp the competition between different norms in international climate 
change politics. Meanwhile, the research on norms needs to be broadened to incorporate 
other structural, historical and contextual factors. As a result, while China has raised 
certain  norms representing  its  concerns  of  ‘justice’,  ‘fairness’ and ‘equity’,  such as 
historical  responsibility,  developmental  rights  and  per  capita  emissions;  this  thesis 
argues that it is crucial to understand under which historical circumstances these norms 
emerge in China. Moreover, what mentalities, worldviews, knowledge and rationalities 
have these norms demonstrated? 
    In general, the neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist approaches share the same 
ontological assumption of international anarchy. Nature and the environment are treated 
by neo-realists and neo-liberal institutionalists as manageable and controllable objects in 
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their analysis. The difference is that neo-liberal institutionalists claim that through the 
establishment of international regimes, institutions and relevant norms and rules, states 
can cooperate rationally to tackle the challenges of global environmental changes. Both 
mainstream approaches understand and solve the environmental problems through the 
existing  theoretical  framework  without  reflexive  questioning.  Within  contemporary 
global  environmental  governance,  ‘sustainable  development’ has  occupied  the  core 
concern  in  the  mainstream agenda  (Irwin  2001),  which  tries  to  integrate  economic 
development and environmental concerns together through the introduction of market 
mechanisms. Liberal environmental norms, in Bernstein’s words, are now identified as 
the basis of current global environmental governance in which market mechanism and 
privatisation strategies were introduced to manage environmental problems (2002). In 
summary,  while  facing the challenges  of climate change,  both neo-realists  and neo-
liberal institutionalists  fail  to address this  serious issue,  due to their  ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. However, this thesis also points out that, except for these 
essential flaws, surprisingly,  both approaches, especially the realist  one, have shown 
their  effectiveness.  Nevertheless,  by  taking  the  hard  version  of  the  constructivist 
approach into account, it is clearer to see why there is the trend of (re)territorialisation, 
which  may  cause  the  popularity  of  realism.  Meanwhile,  this  thesis  argues  that  this 
constructivist  explanation needs to be critically examined when it  is applied to non-
Western areas where there are different paths of state formation. Nevertheless, the hard 
version  of  constructivism has  the  potential  to  work  with  critical  IR  approaches  to 
explore  the  underpinning  forces,  knowledge,  and  power  relations  of  international 
politics  and  the  governance  of  climate  change.  Critical  IPE  approaches  have 
successfully  challenged  the  neo-realist  and  neo-liberal  institutionalist  approaches 
through a structural and historical perspective. However, the resurgence of geopolitics 
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and the nation state in global climate change politics is a phenomenon the critical IPE 
researchers need to overcome. It is important, this thesis agrees, to take structure(s) into 
concern. Nevertheless, since structure is not a predetermined and immutable existence, 
it  is  also  crucial  to  examine  the  formation  and  transformation  of  certain  structures 
contextually and historically. Meanwhile, besides the exploration of why humans have 
current  climate  change  problems,  it  is  also  significant  to  address  how norms  and 
solutions are formed, where governmentality study plays an important role. On the one 
hand, by focusing on the how question, it helps to clarify why it is difficult to find out 
the structural causes and to ask the real why question. On the other hand, by combining 
these two enquiries,  it  will  help grasp the dynamics of international climate change 
politics and to answer the initial what question. 
    Nevertheless,  as  this  thesis  keeps  emphasising  in  previous  sections,  one  of  the 
difficulties when conducting a systematic review of existing approaches is that in the 
field  of  international  climate  change  politics,  it  is  not  easy  to  find  a  clear-cut 
categorisation based on the differentiations of different approaches. For an author who 
has made no attempt to produce a cohesive theory about climate change, the best option 
is to discuss almost every aspect, from domestic energy structure, cost-benefit analysis, 
policy preferences, international bargaining, to alignments and strategies; and then the 
actors, from national government, international organisations and NGOs to epistemic 
groups.  In  such  a  broad  work,  readers  can  always  find  literature  from  different 
approaches in different situations. This is an unavoidable phenomenon as long as global 
climate  change  politics  is  entangled  with  various  fields  of  human  society.  When 
discussing China in  global  climate change politics,  this  phenomenon becomes more 
apparent  when  a  variety  of  approaches  is  applied  interchangeably  in  Chinese  and 
Western literature. The initial motive for researchers is trying to understand and explain 
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China’s strategy concerns and policy priorities in international climate politics, which 
this thesis is also eager to know. However, no matter how much clarity these researches 
can bring, a comprehensive map grasping the structures and dynamics of China and 
international  climate  politics  will  be  constantly  missed  if  researchers  do  not  try  to 
abstract and theorise the phenomenon. The problem, this thesis contends, is that almost 
every  discussed  approach has  a  tendency to  ‘universalise’ the  empirical  world.  For 
mainstream neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist approaches, the universalisation 
trend appears from their ontological and empirical assumptions. For the critical IPE and 
Foucauldian approaches, this universalisation arises from their critiques of global neo-
liberal projects that different governmental rationalities have missed out. 
    As a result, this thesis has proposed a revised governmentality framework, based on 
the  critical  engagement  with  critical  IPE  and  Foucauldian  approaches.  From  the 
perspective of  critical  IPE and neo-Gramscian perspectives,  it  is  crucial  to  examine 
China’s  interplay  with  the  proposal  of  carbon  market(s),  the  introduction  and 
development of the CDM in China and the relevant social settings in order to expand 
the market force in global climate change politics. In other words, the inspiration from 
critical IPE and neo-Gramscian approaches is to understand how China reacts to climate 
capitalism, and the continuation and expansion of global neo-liberal project. Based on 
this concern, this thesis will examine whether the governmental rationality of market 
dominates  at  both  international  and  domestic  levels  when  China  is  involved. 
Meanwhile, besides the market rationality, are there different governmental rationalities 
influencing and directing China’s self-identification and strategic concerns of politics 
and  governance  of  climate  change  at  both  international  and  domestic  levels?  At 
international  levels,  the  review and analysis  of  changes  and continuities  of  China’s 
attitudes  towards  crucial  issues  in  international  climate  politics  help  grasp  China’s 
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primary concerns and help explore the underpinning rationalities further. At domestic 
levels,  through the critical  examination of the practices and mentality of the market 
rationality  in  China,  it  helps  disclose  other  crucial  governmental  rationalities 
underpinning China’s understanding, knowledge, and strategic concern of its climate 
governance  and  politics.  In  order  to  grasp  the  dynamics  of  China’s  politics  and 
governance of climate change at international and domestic levels, this thesis argues 
that the critical IPE and neo-Gramscian approaches which emphasise the universalised 
critique of neo-liberal project should be supplemented by integrating a more historical 
and  contextual  understanding  of  how  China’s  state  formation  and  historical 
contingencies have influenced its reactions to the market rationality in its environmental 
and climate change governance. 
    Meanwhile, while deploying the governmentality approach to examine the ‘art of 
government’ and the ‘rationality of government’ in China’s politics and governance of 
climate  change  at  international  and  domestic  levels,  this  thesis  also  points  out  the 
limitation of this Foucauldian approach. The problem is that while Foucault discussed 
the  development  of  different  governmentalities  in  different  historical  periods,  the 
resources he had for the argument were based on Western Europe. Again, this thesis 
does not tend to stand in a relativist position since this thesis has recognised the spread 
of capitalism, the state and state system on a global scale along with the proliferation of 
modernity. Nevertheless, while Palan (2000) praises the multifaceted explorations of the 
Foucauldian approach, this thesis contends that it is also crucial to reflect the potential 
trend of ‘universalisation’ behind the Foucauldian critiques. From the pastoral power of 
Christianity,  to  the  raison  d’etat and  the  police  state,  Foucault  had  shown  the 
development  of  governmentality  to  the  liberal  end.  Liberalism,  from  the 
governmentality  perspective,  should  be  best  understood  as  “referring  to  a  mode  of 
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government, not simply a doctrine of limited government” (Jeffreys and Sigley 2009: 
4).  However,  this  thesis  questions  how  can  authoritarian  governmentality,  or  the 
governmentality  in  authoritarian  states,  be  explained  from  this  argument  since,  in 
countries such as China, the state or the ruling groups have an overwhelming power 
over  society and civic  groups and do not  have  the need to  govern in  liberal  social 
settings. Dean (1999) has discussed the ‘authoritarian governmentality’ but he mainly 
deals with the despotic face of liberal governmentality and does not give a theoretical 
account on how governmentalities operate in authoritarian states. In order to answer 
these questions, this thesis argues that liberal governmentality did not appear from a 
vacuum. Actually  Foucault  has clearly explained that  the liberal  governmentality  he 
criticised was based on the establishment of the Westphalia system, the expansion of the 
global market, the rising of the mercantilist state and the enhancement of international 
competition (Foucault 2007). In other words, the historical contexts of the emergence of 
certain governmentalities should be taken into account.  Different historical paths do 
influence the outcomes of the encounter between the structural forces and the recipients. 
As a result, while this approach is applied to China, how China accepted, interpreted, 
and  transformed  different  global  forces  needs  to  be  examined  critically  in  order  to 
explore the formations and transformations of different governmental rationalities.
    Consequently, it is necessary to examine what governmentalities can be observed in 
China.  For Jeffreys and Sigley (2009) the ‘socialist  arts  of government’ in China is 
conducted  by  the  “technoscientific-administrative  Party-state  –  a  mixture  of 
conventional Chinese socialist technologies of government…and seemingly neo-liberal 
strategies” (2009: 7). Regarding China’s climate politics and governance, the aim of the 
research  is  to  explore  and  examine  the  underpinning  governmental  rationalities. 
Meanwhile, inspired by the critical IPE and neo-Gramscian approaches, this thesis does 
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not treat fields of politics and economy as separate; instead, it is crucial to grasp the 
formation and dynamics of the state/market/society relations in China. The inspiration 
also leads to the critique of mainstream approaches which stay at the ‘problem-solving’ 
level. As a result, this thesis will question those ‘taken-for-granted’ in China’s politics 
and  governance  of  climate  change.  As  a  result,  the  knowledge,  mentalities  and 
rationalities underpinning the present settings have become the research objects of this 
thesis.28 In the end, the inspiration from critical IPE and neo-Gramscian approaches has 
also  brought  challenges  to  the  positivist  ontology  and  epistemology  of  mainstream 
approaches.  As  a  result,  what  subject  and  subjectification  emerge  and  what 
state/society/market relations are formed in China need to be analysed historically and 
contextually.  These concerns from critical  IPEs and neo-Gramscian approaches have 
helped  establish  the  revised  governmentality  approach  of  this  thesis.  In  order  to 
understand  China’s  politics  and  governance  of  climate  change  at  international  and 
domestic  levels,  this  thesis  has  proposed  a  framework  in  which  governmental 
rationalities  of  sovereignty,  development,  market  and  environment  are  taken  into 
account. A more detailed discussion of this framework will be in the next chapter. 
28 This thesis agrees that the Foucauldian approach does not lead to the exploration of the ‘origin’ of 
present problems. Nevertheless, through the examination of how present problems and solutions are 
presented, the underlying forces constituting present ways of governance can still be understood 
genealogically. 
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3. Governmental Rationalities Underpinning China’s Foreign 
and Domestic Politics and Governance of Climate Change
As discussed in the last chapter, the mainstream IR approaches, including neo-realism 
and neo-liberal institutionalism have all tried to integrate the nature and the environment 
into their existing analytical frameworks. As a result, there is indeed no such field as 
‘environmental politics’ to these mainstream approaches. Through different mainstream 
lenses, the environment is treated as tameable, manageable, calculable, and tradable. 
The  history,  power,  and  structures  behind  these  environmental  phenomena  were 
neglected  by  mainstream  approaches.  Various  critical  approaches  have  challenged 
mainstream approaches from different perspectives by bringing underlining knowledge, 
norms, material elements, social forces and power structures into analysis. As this thesis 
keeps  emphasising,  although  mainstream  neo-realist  and  neo-liberal  institutionalist 
approaches can both partly explain international climate change politics, they fail  to 
grasp the dynamics behind it due to the ontological and epistemological assumptions. 
Constructivism has  the  potential  to  work  with  critical  IR approaches  to  expose  the 
knowledge,  norms and ideas  underpinning global  politics.  Nevertheless,  the  lack  of 
theoretical  consensus  and  the  intermediary  status  between  positivism  and  post-
positivism make it difficult to provide a solid analysis of global climate change politics. 
Meanwhile, this thesis argues that it has to reconsider the formation and constructability 
of different states through a historical perspective. The hard version of the constructivist 
approach  can  work  as  the  supplement  of  discourse  analysis  and  the  Foucauldian 
approach.  Critical  IPE  approaches,  including  neo-Gramscianism,  have  brought 
structural  and historical  aspects  into concern.  This  thesis  agrees  that  this  is  a  more 
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comprehensive  framework than  mainstream approaches,  but  as  discussed in  the last 
chapter, this thesis also argues that the liberal project, along with the global expansion 
of capitalism, is not the only factor directing international climate change negotiations. 
The resurgence of the nation state over its natural resources and the reterritorialisation 
trend in global climate change politics cannot be properly explained if the formation and 
transformation of state and state system do not gain sufficient attention. There exists the 
trend  to  commodify  carbon  emissions  globally,  but  the  universalised  and  unified 
understanding/critique of the liberal project does not help grasp the dynamics of global 
climate change politics, this thesis contends.
    As a result, the governmentality approach is applied in this thesis as the analytic 
framework which tries  to integrate  structural,  historical,  material,  technological,  and 
subjective factors along with power/knowledge. In order to build up this framework, 
Foucault’s governmentality approach needs to be revised in this thesis. As discussed 
earlier, Foucault’s analysis of governmentality was based on the history of states and the 
state system in the Western Europe,  which has its own specific historical path. This 
history had demonstrated a particular relation between the state and society in which a 
specific way of subjectification,  based on the Enlightenment,  was gradually formed. 
Foucault’s aim was clearly to depict how a new way of ‘conduct of conduct’ and ‘arts of 
government’ emerged along a new ‘governmental rationality’ defining the new relation 
between the  state  and society  and between politics  and the  economy.  Based on the 
history of Western Europe since the 16th history, it is apparent that Foucault has devoted 
himself to questioning and challenging the liberal and neo-liberal ways of government. 
This  critique  is  effective,  this  thesis  agrees,  to  expose  the  tacit  operation  of 
power/knowledge  in  contemporary  governance.  Nevertheless,  while  asking  these 
Foucauldian questions, such as ‘who governs?’, ‘how to govern?’, and ‘why govern in 
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such a way?’, it is unavoidable to shift the target of governmentality analysis beyond 
liberal rationality and apparatus. Liberal governmentality, as Foucault criticised, is not 
just a set of ideas and values, but a specific way of accommodating the state and society, 
and the politics and economy. This liberal governmentality has its own global influence, 
this thesis agrees, but it does not mean that this liberal governmentality has successfully 
penetrated into every corner of the world. The key to Foucault’s spirit, this thesis argues, 
is  thus  to  examine  the  formation/transformation  of  relations  between  the  state  and 
society and between politics and the economy historically and contextually. 
    Meanwhile, it is also crucial to recognise that to rule through self-discipline and self-
governance, which has long been the centre of Foucauldian research, is also based on 
specific  subjectivity  and  subjectification.  The  research  on  the  individual  body, 
aspiration, discipline and mentality helps grasp the micro power relations in a liberal 
society,  whereas  this  thesis  also  argues  that  this  should  not  exclude  the  research 
focusing  on  collective  aspects  of  subjectivity  and  mentality  in  a  society  where 
individuality is not embraced. Again, either the relation between the state and society or 
the understanding of the subject should not be treated as self-evident and fixed. Besides, 
this thesis has pointed out that limiting the understanding of governmentality within the 
liberal framework fails to grasp the power relations in authoritarian regimes based on 
different  historical  paths  of  formation  and  transformation  of  the  state/society  and 
subjectivity. As cited in the last chapter, the state is just “the mobile effect of a regime of 
multiple  governmentalities”  (Foucault  2008:  77;  italic  added).  In  order  to  examine 
multiple governmentalities in non-liberal states, this thesis contends it is necessary to 
examine more governmental rationalities than liberal one in which the governance is 
conducted via market and society. This is not an unusual academic attempt for those 
researching on non-liberal governance. Yao has compared the governmentality in the 
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ruling of Taiwan by the Japanese Empire before the Second World War and the Chinese 
Nationalist government after the war. The relation between the ruling government and 
local neighbourhood system is analysed and compared in order to examine surveillance 
and  control  over  Taiwanese  local  forces  which  consisted  of  collective  ties  such  as 
families and neighbourhoods (Yao 2008). It is apparent that either under the colonial 
ruling  by  imperial  Japan  or  the  authoritarian  ruling  of  the  Chinese  Nationalist 
government, Taiwan was never a liberal society and the governance in both periods was 
operated  through  administrative  command.  Jeffreys  and  Sigley  (2009)  also  use  the 
framework of the ‘socialist art of government’, in which “a mixture of conventional 
Chinese socialist  technologies  and seemingly neo-liberal  strategies” is  conducted,  to 
examine multiple dimensions of governmentalities in China. This ‘mixture’ aspect, this 
thesis argues, indeed represents part of Foucault’s concerns that he also claimed that the 
emergence  of  governmentality  did  not  replace  the  previous  way  of  government: 
sovereignty and discipline (Foucault 2007). 
    Beside the focus on the techniques of government, another contribution from the 
governmentality  approach  is  the  effort  to  examine  the  mentalities  and  rationalities 
underpinning the government. In other words, while conducting governmental research, 
it  is  crucial  to  both  examine  the  ‘arts  of  government’  and  the  ‘rationalities  of 
government’, and to reflect on the relation between these two domains. As discussed in 
the previous paragraphs, this thesis argues that micro power and governance is not the 
only domain needed to be examined. The reason, this thesis contends, of why collective 
and authoritarian techniques of governance are effective needs to be understood through 
the  grasp  of  the  rationalities  of  government.  Foucault’s  attempt  has  revealed  the 
emergence  of  liberal  governmentality  and  the  global  dissemination  of  neo-liberal 
governmentality.  Along this  liberal  rationality/mentality  are  governmental  techniques 
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with self-discipline,  self-governance and apolitical  governance based on technocratic 
managerialism  and  market  ideology.  Nevertheless,  this  thesis  argues  that  different 
historical  paths  which  were  underpinned  by  different  rationalities/mentalities  and 
arts/techniques of government should be analysed seriously as well, in order to grasp 
the real governmental practices in different contexts. Disciplinisation, subjectification 
and  governmentalisation  do  not  have  to  be  conducted  on  the  individual  body; 
meanwhile, they are not necessarily conducted in the apolitical and non-political spheres 
as  well.  The  examination  of  non-liberal  and  authoritarian  governmentalities  should 
enrich the understanding of this field. 
    As a result,  the revised governmentality framework of this thesis focuses on the 
multiple  rationalities  of government,  or governmental  rationalities,  in  global  climate 
change politics. At the same time, by examining different governmental rationalities, the 
techniques  and  arts  of  government  are  revealed  as  well.  While  focusing  on  the 
international levels only, the emphasis on liberal governmentality is helpful in grasping 
the general dynamics, to some extent. Nevertheless, in order to understand the conflicts 
and  resistance  from different  actors,  different  governmental  rationalities  need  to  be 
taken into account as well. This thesis argues that different governmental rationalities 
are competing with each other so that each of them should not be understood as an 
unchallenging  universal  force.  Meanwhile,  as  Foucault  claimed  (2007)  that  the 
emergences of different governmental rationalities do not always follow on from each 
other in that newly emerging ones replace previous ones. In order to grasp China’s self-
identity/identification and strategies in global climate change politics,  this thesis  has 
focused  on  the  governmental  rationalities  of  sovereignty,  development,  market  and 
environment.
    These rationalities all have their international derivations and domestic translations 
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and transformations. Meanwhile,  they influence both China’s climate diplomacy and 
domestic politics and governance of climate change. These governmental rationalities 
are not pre-given and pre-determined, but are excavated genealogically from the pieces 
of history. A genealogical analysis is “a history of the present in terms of its past” and 
that its task is not to “tell what actually happened in the past, but to describe how the 
present  became  logically  possible”  (Bartelson  1995:  7-8).  Taking  the  governmental 
rationality of sovereignty as an example, the aim is not to repeat the realist language 
while  analysing  China’s  climate  diplomacy  but  to  examine  under  which  historical 
circumstances/contingencies  sovereignty  becomes  an  influential  governmental 
rationality in China’s climate change politics, either at international or domestic levels. 
The four sections that follow discuss and analyse these four governmental rationalities 
not just from the abstract level since they all emerge from concrete history, but from a 
historical and contextual understanding in which international and domestic forces are 
intertwined. Section 3.5 moves to discuss the state/society relation and the particular 
role and the legitimacy of the Communist Party in China, in order to depict the context 
and background in which these four governmental rationalities interact with each other. 
It  also  helps  explain  the  uneven  relations  among  four  rationalities.  Section  3.6 
demonstrates how these underlying factors which are introduced from Section 3.1 to 
Section  3.5 have  influenced the  formation  of  relevant  knowledge and mentality  for 
political elites, academic researchers and ordinary people. By doing so through research 
fieldwork, it becomes clearer why certain insistences are taken for granted for China at 
international and domestic levels. In summary, the aim of this chapter is thus to provide 
a  feasible  framework  for  future  analysis.  How  different  rationalities  are  formed, 
understood, interpreted, and transformed in different dimensions of China’s politics and 
governance of climate change at both international and domestic levels are discussed in 
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the chapters that follow.
3.1 Sovereignty
Starting from the abstract dimension, the rationality of sovereignty in this thesis refers 
to the aim and political will to maintain and consolidate the integration of territory and 
sovereignty.  The  knowledge  behind  this  rationality  is  the  ideal  imagination  and 
understanding  of  an  international  system in  which  each  state  has  equal  status  and 
interference is not tolerated. This ideal type of sovereignty has its own historical roots in 
Western  Europe  from  the  17th century.  The  Westphalia  system  from  that  time  has 
brought  the concept of national  sovereignty which should not be interfered with by 
foreign  powers  and  international  anarchy  as  there  is  no  higher  authority  over 
sovereignty in the international arena. Before research on international relations became 
an academic discipline, how sovereign states interacted with each other was analysed by 
the disciplines of History, International Law and Philosophy. Nevertheless, the laggard 
of the development of the IR discipline did not prevent the ideas and practices of the 
Westphalia system from being spread globally. The sovereignty state and state systems 
were consolidated along with the tide of nationalism in Western Europe since the 18 th 
century. The imperial and colonial expansion in the 19th century brought this system and 
its relevant rules and norms to the whole world. Like it or not, the non-Western world 
encountered  the  Westphalia  system and  eventually  had  to  transform itself  into  this 
system.  To  examine  the  history  and  development  of  the  concepts  and  practices  of 
sovereignty  and  its  global  expansion  helps  deconstruct  the  ‘timeless  ontology  and 
unchanging epistemology’, in other words, “a history of sovereignty cannot be but a 
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history of the epistemic discontinuities, conceptual reversals and changing metaphors 
that breathe life into political philosophy, and animate the discourse on sovereignty” 
(Bartelson 1995: 53). China’s acceptance, knowledge and obsession of sovereignty have 
to be grasped through this historical contingency. 
    China did not have a modern/Western concept of ‘sovereignty’ until the mid 19 th 
century, though the obsession of sovereignty is very strong in the People’s Republic 
now. To start with a historical review, China and other periphery countries in East Asia 
lived in an entirely different international system, the tributary system, in which China 
was  the  ‘central  kingdom’  for  nearly  2,000  years.  The  idea  of  mutually  equal 
interactions among states did not exist in ancient China so  the internal affairs were 
always the primary concern in traditional Chinese political philosophy. Since the Qin 
Dynasty unified China and established the first empire in Chinese history in 221 BC, the 
tributary system was the fundamental system defining imperial China’s relation with 
other  countries  (Shan  2008).  The  deeply  rooted  Confucianism  throughout  Chinese 
society has created a world based on hierarchy, inside and outside China. The legitimacy 
of  the  government  came from the  superior  morality  and the  superiority  of  Chinese 
culture and Chinese civilisation had accommodated China at the centre of this system 
under heaven (Fairbank 1968). The ‘state’ in this context is an ethical concept (Shih 
2001).  China was not always the most dominant country in this  region, in terms of 
economic and military power, but this mentality, with a hierarchical international order 
had been widely accepted by China and the periphery tribes and countries. While this 
system reached its peak in the Ming Dynasty in the 15 th century, there were over 60 
countries in this Sino-centric system. As the centre of this world, China had no idea 
about equal relationships and interaction between countries. Most of time, the tributes 
from periphery countries were much less valuable than the rewards from the Chinese 
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Empire, which explained that what the central kingdom wanted was symbolic power 
rather  than  precisely  calculated  interests.29 Periphery  countries  gained  economic 
interests  by paying tributes  to China;  meanwhile,  the stability  and order within this 
system were guaranteed by the central kingdom. Both in the Ming and Qing Dynasties, 
China declared war  on foreign invaders in order to protect its tributary countries, such 
as Japan’s invasion of Korea in the 16th and 19th centuries and France’s invasion of 
Vietnam  in  the  19th century.  Both  Korea  and  Vietnam  were  the  closest  tributary 
countries in this system. However, these wars were irrational if they were interpreted 
from a  modern  instrumental  perspective.  China  had  made  a  great  sacrifice  but  the 
reward  was  just  the  symbolic  and  theatrical  demonstration  of  its  national  image 
(Adelman and Shih 1993). 
    As a consequence, when the Qing Dynasty fought the Opium War against the British 
Empire in 1840, it represented a conflict between two international systems. The defeat 
of  the  Qing  Dynasty  was  just  the  beginning  of  the  humiliation  for  China  in  the 
following century. China had no choice but to learn how to transform and adjust itself 
into a modern state with a concrete territory and exclusive sovereignty. The aspiration to 
be  a  modern  state  and  to  pursue  modernisation  had  become  the  primary  goal  for 
politicians and intellectuals in China since the late Qing Dynasty, nearly one hundred 
years ago. The Communist Party was the first political group capable of controlling the 
whole mainland since imperial  China collapsed in 1911, after  winning the civil  war 
against the Nationalist Party in 1949. However, even after the People’s Republic was 
established, this obsession of the ‘modern state’ has never been laid down because (1) 
the  socialist  state  has  to  prove  its  superiority  over  the  capitalist  state  and,  more 
specifically,  (2)  China  has  always  experienced threats  from the  West,  whether  it  is 
29Fairbank (1968) pointed out that the tribute was another form of trading. However, the periphery 
countries needed to recognise the central role China occupied in the system in order to get  permission to 
trade with China. 
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constructed or not. During Mao’s revolutionary period, the US and the Soviet Union, 
who both  threatened  China’s  survival,  were  depicted  as  imperialist  and  hegemonic. 
After China’s economy began to grow in the 1980s,  the theme of the ‘China Threat’ 
from the West,  mainly the US, in  the 1990s came about (Gelb 1991, Krauthammer 
1995). The Communist Party continues to fear that the West will try to overthrow it 
through ‘peaceful evolution’. As a result, the disputes about human rights in the past 
and about  climate  change in  the  present  are  both  treated  as  the  potential  means to 
threaten China’s development and even to endanger China’s sovereignty. This mentality 
appeared  in  the  interviewees  in  this  research  and  will  be  discussed  later.  The  high 
sensitivity  regarding  sovereignty  issues  and  the  necessity  of  independent  and 
autonomous  diplomacy  should  be  accommodated  in  this  historical  context.  This 
mentality has penetrated into the heart of China’s foreign politics, and the politics and 
governance of climate change as well. That partly explains why China firmly rejects the 
quantified reduction targets  but,  at  the same time,  is  willing to take many domestic 
measures to fulfil its own reduction targets, as long as those measures are non-binding. 
    In summary, although the concept and practices of ‘sovereignty’ were brand new to 
China 150 years ago, the history of imperial invasion and the feeling of humiliation 
along  with  the  nationalist  mobilisation  after  the  collapse  of  imperial  China  have 
established a strong obsession of this Western concept. The language, understanding, 
practices,  and  knowledge  of  sovereignty  are  commonly  shared  by  ordinary  people, 
intellectuals, and political elites throughout the spheres of state and society so that it 
becomes  extremely  sensitive  to  discuss  or  even  demonstrate  will  of  concessions  in 
international  negotiations.  The  particular  characteristics  of  Communist  China  since 
1949 have made it more rhetorically stubborn while dealing with relevant issues. To 
maintain the integrity of sovereignty, to pursue the independence and autonomy and to 
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remove imperial/hegemonic influences from outside have become the prior concerns of 
China’s foreign politics in the last six decades, which is discussed in the next chapter. In 
other words, the rationality of sovereignty, which is based on the classical understanding 
of this concept, is rooted in China’s foreign and domestic politics. This governmental 
rationality has brought a stubborn and realist image of China in international climate 
negotiations. 
3.2 Development
To start from the abstract level, the rationality of development emphasises the need and 
the right (of a state) to develop. The underpinning knowledge is about the linear and 
teleological modernisation. The welfare of the population has been integrated into the 
primary targets of the state. When examining the rationality of development, it is crucial 
that the concept of ‘development’ has its own genealogy in the international arena, just 
as  sovereignty  in  China  does.  Researchers  have  pointed  out  that  this  concept  was 
brought into account while the then US President Truman defined the largest part of the 
world as ‘underdeveloped areas’ in 1949 (Sachs 1999, Ziai 2007). After that, the world 
was  divided  into  developed  and  underdeveloped,  or  developing,  parts  and 
‘development’ became an imperative of a new kind of worldview as well as a new type 
of worldwide domination (Sachs: 1999: 5). Meanwhile, the American model of society 
and  growth  was  projected  onto  the  whole  world.  Following  the  introduction  of 
‘development’, the category of ‘poverty’ was also discovered, which was not an issue 
before 1940. “When size of  income is  thought  to  indicate  social  perfection…one is 
inclined to interpret any other society that does not follow that (economic) model as 
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‘low-income’’’ (Sachs  1999:  7).  The  criterion  of  poverty  and  absolute  poverty  has 
reduced ‘whole ways of life to calorie levels’. Complex real-life problems are translated 
“into numerical terms that could be broken down and analyzed” by experts (Caufield 
1998: 61). Consequently, ‘poverty’ is treated as the problem and ‘growth’ as the solution 
in terms of development (Sachs 1999: 10-11). From the Foucauldian perspective, a new 
field  of  subject/object  was  formed  along  with  the  necessary  knowledge  and 
technologies. At the same time, the need for growth and development  also became new 
directives for states around the world. The core of this development discourse is the 
technicality in which managerialism leads the world to define and solve the problems 
through technical and anti-political measures (Germond-Duret and Howe 2011).
    Within this context, the emerging environmental concern in the international arena 
since the early 1970s had to deal with the relation between environmental protection 
and (economic) development, which, in the 1980s, brought the concept of ‘sustainable 
development’.  The  term ‘sustainable  development’ appeared  in  the  report  of  World 
Conservation  Strategy (WCS)  (IUCN  1980)  by  the  International  Union  of  the 
Conservation  of  Nature  (IUCN)  and  became  known  worldwide  from  the  World 
Commission on Environment and Development report,  entitled  Our Common Future 
(Brundtland 1987). Since then, this concept has raised public concern and entered the 
international political agenda. In  Our Common Future, also known as the  Brundtland 
Report, it states that development and environment could not be separated and issues of 
‘the factors underlying world poverty and international inequality’ should be taken into 
account while tackling environmental issues (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, WCED 1987: 3). Sustainable development was defined as “development 
that  meets  the  needs  of  the  present  without  compromising  the  ability  of  future 
generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987: 8). Another key issue stated in Our 
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Common Future is that poverty had played an important role in causing environmental 
degradation in developing countries and thus by economic growth leading to poverty 
alleviation, environmental pressures could be relieved.  Agenda 21, concluded at the 
Earth Summit in 1992, reaffirmed ‘the revitalisation of growth with sustainability’ as it 
still focused on the centrality of growth and the environment remained an object to be 
managed,  which  demonstrated  the  technocentric  implication  (Adams  2001:  88). 
Meanwhile,  the  World  Bank  also  contributed  to  enrich  this  concept.  In  its  World 
Development Report (1992), written under the direction of its chief economist, Laurence 
Summers, sustainable development was defined as ‘development that lasts’. The report 
recognises that poverty, uncertainty and ignorance, as the key causes of environmental 
degradations  (1992:  65)  and free market  mechanisms,  are  claimed to be  capable  of 
enhancing  economic  growth  and  gaining  efficiency.  The  report  also  says  that, 
“liberalized trade fosters greater efficiency and higher productivity and may actually 
reduce pollution of cleaner technologies” (1992: 67). It is apparent that both the UN and 
the  World  Bank  embrace  market  mechanisms  as  the  tool  to  fulfil  sustainable 
development.30 In short,  the mainstream idea of sustainable development shares “the 
dominant industrialist  and modernist  ideology of the modern world-system” (Adams 
2001: 102). From this perspective, climate change is integrated into this managerialism 
and  is  treated  as  ‘an  economic  issue’ (Zoellick  2008).  Problems  and  solutions  are 
defined in a “technical manner, social aspects are let apart, identification of problems 
and  solutions  relies  on  science……and  institutions  involved  are  anti-political” 
(Germond-Duret  and  Howe  2011:  9).  Consequently,  market  mechanisms  including 
carbon trading are preferred as the policy tool to tackle climate change. 
30The World Bank publishes another World Development Report and admits the win-win policies of 
sustainable development were “much harder to implement than initially thought” (2003: 34), however, it 
still insists on the role of a neo-liberal market mechanism that “experiences suggest, however, that 
regulations are sometimes less efficient and effective than market-based instruments-and costly in the 
institutional capacity they require for implementation” (2003: 32).
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    As  discussed  above,  the  concept  of  development  was  raised  by  the  rich  and 
industrialised North, especially the US, after the Second World War, and the emergence 
of sustainable development was initially a North reaction to the growing environmental 
movements. However, the South has accepted the language of development generally 
and  placed  economic  growth  as  a  primary  policy.  After  environmental  issues  were 
raised on the international  agenda by the North,  the South reacted by demanding a 
deeper realisation of development. The Beijing Declaration of the G-77 in 1991, one 
year before the Earth Summit at Rio, claimed:
Environmental problems cannot be dealt with separately, they must be linked to the 
development process, bring the environmental concerns in line with the 
imperatives of economic growth and development. In this context, the right to 
development for the developing countries must be fully recognized (Beijing 
Ministerial Declaration on Environment and Development 1991). 
    This firm attitude also provided the South with an opportunity to use “environmental 
concessions as diplomatic weapons” (Sachs 1999: 31). A ‘double contradictory’ emerges 
that  on  the  one  hand,  the  standardised  and  normalised  development  discourse  has 
prevailed  to  the  South.  On  the  other  hand,  developing  countries  are  to  be  blamed 
because  they  pursuit  economic  development  prior  to  the  environmental  concerns 
(Germond-Duret and Howe 2011). This contradiction has led to antagonisms between 
the North and the South. To sum up, the dominance of the managerial and technological 
rationality  of  development  has  influenced  the  North-South  divide  in  international 
environmental  and climate change politics,  and has created the discursive space for 
developing countries to claim and maintain their particular, if not united, interests in 
112
battles of international climate negotiations. 
    Regarding China, it is clear that the obsession of development, sustainable or not, has 
been infused into China as one of the core rationalities of government. The ideology of 
development  has  fitted  China’s  need since  Mao’s  period.  Partly  due to  the  need to 
demonstrate  the  superiority  of  socialism  over  capitalism  and  partly  due  to  the 
international  rivalries  of  anti-imperialism  and  anti-hegemonism,  economic 
development, which focused on productivity, had been the priority of China’s policy. 
‘Surpassing Great Britain and Catching up with the United States’, and a ‘Great Leap 
Forward’,  proposed by Mao in  the  late  1950s,  had demonstrated  this  obsession  for 
development.  After  China  started  its  economic  reform in  the  late  1970s,  economic 
development  gradually  became the  only  legitimacy  of  the  Communist  Party,  which 
strengthened this obsession. While facing environmental challenges and the threat from 
climate  change,  China  has  also  learnt  to  integrate  the  discourse  and  rationality  of 
development into its measures. ‘Sustainable development’ and relevant concepts such as 
a ‘cyclic economy’ and a ‘low carbon economy’ are raised as the guideline to tackle 
climate change without sacrificing economic growth.31 
    Meanwhile, the separation between the developed and developing worlds, which was 
due to the introduction of the concept and relevant categories of ‘development’, had 
accidentally created the space for international cooperation among developing countries, 
especially as many members of this alliance were forced to accept the rules and norms 
of an international society consisting of sovereign states. The rationalities of sovereignty 
31The concept of a ‘harmonious society’ was proposed by President Hu in 2004. It is a strategic goal of 
social development aimed at pursuing harmony and balance among different social dimensions. This 
concept soon became the core philosophical basis of various Chinese policies. While environmental 
issues are taken into account, the aim is to solve the contradiction between human society and nature. It is 
clear that the ‘harmonious society’  has borrowed the traditional perception of nature and of the 
relationship between humans and nature, which was based on cosmetic resonance. The concepts of 
‘sustainable development’ and the ‘cyclic economy’ were integrated into this philosophy (State Council 
2005). In the 11th Five-Year Plan (FYP), the development of a cyclic economy and the establishment of 
energy-savings and an environmentally-friendly society have become the primary goals. These concepts 
have provided the philosophical grounds, which also reflect the traditional perception of nature, for 
China’s climate governance.
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and development become powerful discourses among developing countries which co-
exist in an international category created by the industrial countries. The concern of 
historical  responsibility  brought  the  concept  of  ‘common  but  differentiated 
responsibilities’ to international climate negotiations, and this concept had become the 
powerful  discursive  tool  in  an  artificially  divided  world  between  developed  and 
developing parties. As a result, both at international and domestic levels, the rationality 
of development has become one of the crucial governmentalities for China in terms of 
politics and governance of climate change. 
3.3 Market
Starting  from  the  abstract  dimension,  the  rationality  of  market  is  backed  by  neo-
liberalism and it aims at establishing ‘politics via market’. The supporting knowledge is 
the liberal political economy, and the self-regulated subjects and society are the ideal 
condition for governance in which state intervention is expected to be excluded. While 
dealing  with  the  environmental  problem of  ‘the  tragedy of  the  commons’,  the  new 
source economists contend that the intervention from the government has brought the 
failure  of  the  government.  Based  on  the  Austrian  School  of  Economics,  New 
Institutional Economics, public choice theory and the Chicago School, they thus argue 
that  the  environmental  problems  should  be  tackled  through  market  mechanisms 
(Anderson  1982,  Anderson  and  Leal  1991).  This  strand  has  brought  free  market 
environmentalism which argues to transform the environment and natural resources into 
property  into debate.  A clear  attribution  of  property rights  and a  free  mechanics  of 
transaction is the best way to tackle environmental degradations/problems (Anderson 
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and  Leal  1991).  After  the  environment  has  been  successfully  privatised  with  clear 
property  rights,  the  environmental  disputes  can  be  easily  settled  through  advanced 
technologies  (Anderson  and  Leal  1991).  As  discussed  earlier,  this  techno-optimism 
appears  in  both  realist  and  liberalist  accounts  and  they  both  demonstrate  a  similar 
attitude  when  overlooking  environmental  problems.  In  short,  free  market 
environmentalism can be treated as the expansion of the governmental rationality of 
market based on liberalist traditions, this thesis argues. Due to the common interest of 
the economy over the environment,  the rationalities  of  development  and market  are 
likely to work together to tackle environmental problems that market mechanisms are 
welcome in the discourse of sustainable development, as discussed in the last section. 
    Meanwhile, the governmental rationality of the market fits with the phenomenon of 
‘politics  via  markets’,  argued  by  Lipshutz  with  Rowe  (2005).  It  is  a  phenomenon 
backed by the neo-liberal governmentality in current global politics. “Today……there 
are  no  politics  of  any  great  significance.  There  are  only  markets  masquerading as  
politics’ (Lipshutz with Rowe 2005: 12, italic as original). In this neo-liberal context, 
the power of the sovereign is replaced by ‘governmental management’. While looking 
at the rapid growth of the global carbon market and carbon finance and the laggard state 
of  international  climate negotiations at  the same time,  there seems to be a  trend to 
diffuse and install this neo-liberal governmentality to the whole world in terms of global 
climate politics, this thesis argues. Lohmann has made similar observations on global 
environmental politics. He argues that the mainstream framework aims to commodify 
the environment in order to ‘calculate’ the economic value of environmental objects. 
The market mechanisms are introduced in this commodification process to maximise 
the  profits  (2008).  Based  on  this  neo-liberal  rationality,  the  global  carbon  market 
appears to be the most efficient solution when climate change is taken into account. The 
115
mainstream ‘cap-and-trade’ trading scheme in the global carbon market has represented 
this market rationality that was promoted for decades (Dales 1968; Tietenberg 1980; 
Grubb et al. 1998; Nordhaus & Danish 2000; Stern 2007). Since emissions’ trading is 
assumed to be the most efficient and economical way to tackle climate change and to 
bring benefits to the buyers and sellers in the global carbon market, ‘let markets do it’  
becomes a dominant rationality, witnessing the triumph of market ideology (Lipshutz 
with Rowe 2005).
    As discussed in the last chapter, Bäkstrand & Lövebrand (2007) have also used the 
concept  of  governmentality  to  examine  the  current  climate  governance  that  green 
governmentality with ‘command and control’ logic was the dominant discourse in the 
early negotiation period,  whereas decentralised ecological modernisation brought the 
market  mechanisms  and  cost-effective  concerns  to  global  climate  politics  after  the 
Protocol was concluded in 1997. This thesis has reviewed and criticised their arguments 
in Chapter Two and contends both green governmentality and ecological modernisation 
represent neo-liberal governmentality. Nevertheless, their findings still demonstrate the 
trend  for  commodification  and  marketisation  in  global  climate  change  politics. 
According to these critiques, to keep focusing on the success or failure of international 
climate ‘politics’ is misleading. The expansion of capitalism and the liberal market to 
the atmosphere and the governmentality appearing in this process should be the focus of 
global climate change politics. This is also where the theme of ‘empire’ is involved, 
where the world is under ‘a single logic of rule’. Paterson and Stripple thus claim that 
this global culture of carbon management ‘puts the world’s entire biosphere under one 
type of rule’ where an ‘epistemological empire’ is formed (2007: 163). 
    While Communist China was established in 1949, it had a very weak industry sector 
as nearly 90% of its population lived and worked in the rural villages (Lin et al. 2000: 
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29). Meanwhile, the international political and economic pressures due to the Korean 
War and the economic blockade from the Western countries led by the US made the 
then Chinese government develop heavy industry first. This perspective led China to 
adopt the ‘forging ahead strategy’ which emphasised the monopoly role of the state to 
plan and direct the necessary resources to pursuit industrialisation. The 1st five-year plan 
(FYP) starting in 1953 confirmed the development of heavy industry as China’s core 
strategic concern. The rationality of development in China is rooted in this strategic 
concern, as discussed in the last section. Meanwhile, many other developing countries, 
socialist or not, also adopted similar strategies as newly independent countries in the 
post-war  era  tended  to  pursue  economic  growth  through  the  interventions  of  the 
governments rather than the market mechanisms (Lin et al. 2000: 27-65). 
    The ‘forging ahead strategy’ stimulated the development of the industrial sector in 
China; however, it also distorted the economics so that nearly half of the investment 
went to the industrial sector. Meanwhile, it also created an economic system lacking 
stimulation and efficiency (Lin  et al. 2000: 72-82). The end of the ten-year Cultural 
Revolution  in  1976  not  only  represented  the  demise  of  utopian  Maoism,  but  also 
brought  the opportunity for China to readjust  and reform its  political  and economic 
structures. China started its economic reform in 1978 when Deng Xiaoping came to 
power,  and the market  mechanisms were gradually introduced and the autonomy of 
enterprise was encouraged. This path of reform did not come from a well-articulated 
grand  plan  but  started  from  measures  gradually  conceding  rights  and  profits  from 
government  to  enterprises  and  rural  villages,  in  order  to  create  the  stimulus  for 
production. In other words, the Chinese government, led by the pragmatic Deng, tried to 
keep the gradual  pace of reform and constrain it  in  the economic sphere only.  The 
market mechanism was firstly introduced to the Special Economic Zones (SEZs), and 
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then was gradually applied to the rest of the country after the experiment in these SEZs 
had successful  achievements.  This strategy has  successfully  brought  rapid economic 
growth to China in the last three decades so that since 2010, China has become the 
second largest economy in the world (Barboza 2010). Meanwhile, when Deng carefully 
introduced  the  market  mechanism  to  China  at  the  beginning  of  China’s  economic 
reform, he also announced the Four Cardinal Principles in 1979, which were the (1) 
adherence to socialist road; (2) adherence to the people’s democratic dictatorship; (3) 
adherence to the leadership of the Communist  Party of  China and (4)  adherence to 
Marxism-Leninism  and  Mao  Zedong  Thought.  These  principles  were  officially 
recognised by the CPC as part of the prior guidelines which constituted the ‘Socialism 
with Chinese characteristics’.  This attitude was restated by President Hu on the 90th 
anniversary of the CPC in 2011 and he claimed that “the socialist road with Chinese 
characteristics is based on the centrality of economic growth, the adherence to Four 
Cardinal  Principles,  the  adherence  to  reform  and  open  policy  and  the  concern  of 
Chinese circumstances under the leadership of the CPC” (China Review News 2011). 
Apparently, the market mechanism in China has never been an ideal type of free market 
as it has to meet the needs of Chinese circumstances, socialist concerns and the state 
control. In short, although the concept and practices of the market was foreign to China, 
the  market  was  gradually  introduced  to  Communist  China  in  the  late  1970s  and it 
formed a certain governmental rationality to keep boosting China’s economic growth. 
Nevertheless, whether the definition of the so-called ‘socialist market economy’ is clear 
or not, this path of marketisation is under the government’s control in order to prevent 
the radical reform in other spheres of the society.  China’s acceptance of the market 
mechanisms should not be understood as merely the expansion of the liberal market and 
neo-liberal hegemony around the world.
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    The market mechanism was not only introduced to China for its economic reform, 
but  it  was  also  deployed as  a  governmental  tool  to  tackle  environmental  problems, 
which  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  Five.  In  this  section,  many  criticisms  of  the 
marketisation  strategy  in  environmental  governance  have  been  discussed.  All  these 
criticisms  point  out  and  challenge  the  current  relations  between  state/politics  and 
market/economy in global climate politics, which is the retreat and disappearance of the 
political  sphere  and  the  expansion  of  market  forces.  This  is  the  background  why 
Lipshutz with Rowe appeal to ‘bring politics back in’ (2005). Nevertheless, this thesis 
has argued in Chapter Two that market rationality alone is not the only determinant 
force driving global climate politics. While disclosing the dominance of capitalism and 
market  ideology,  it  is  also  important  to  examine  other  competing  and  conflicting 
rationalities. Moreover, these criticisms have implied a one-dimensional and universal 
process  in  global  climate  politics  where  market  rationality  triumphs  alongside  the 
expansion of the global carbon market. What if politics never withers away, but just 
transforms itself under the guise of the market? The encounter and competition among 
different  governmental  rationalities  in  China  regarding  climate  politics  is  to  be 
examined in the following chapters.
3.4 Environment
The rationality of the environment has brought environmental concern as the target of 
governance  so  that  the  relation  between  human  society  and  the  environment  is 
reconsidered. Based on this rationality, the bureaucratic structure and policy orientation 
have  adjusted  themselves  for  the  good  of  the  environment,  which  requires  human 
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interpretation.  Regarding  China,  through  an  etymology-like  study,  Weller  (2006) 
examines the words representing ‘nature’ in Chinese contexts. These include: ziran (自
然 ) whose original meaning is closer to ‘self-evidently’ or ‘spontaneously’ and thus 
does not have the Western meaning of ‘nature’. Tian (天) means ‘heaven’ and ‘heavenly 
power’.  This  word  constitutes  one  of  the  basic  principles  of  traditional  Chinese 
philosophy that is to pursue “the unity of heaven/nature and mankind” (天人合一, tian 
ren he yi) in which harmony between the human world and the environment is the ideal 
end. The term shanshui ( 山水 ) is about the landscapes in traditional Chinese paintings. 
The term  qi ( 氣 ) refers to the cosmic energy that characterises everything from the 
human body to the natural  environment  of the world.  However,  generally speaking, 
there was not a specific term and concept being used in Chinese culture that was like the 
term ‘nature’ in the Western context. Nature in the Chinese context is an ambiguous 
concept that could be used for different purposes. This thesis argues that this ambiguous 
understanding  has  created  the  space  for  the  practical  engagement  of  environmental 
governance.  Meanwhile,  although pursuing the resonance between humanity and the 
cosmic order of heaven lies at the heart of Chinese philosophy; Chinese understanding 
of nature and the environment demonstrated a strong humanist perspective, due to the 
influence  of  Confucianism  and  Buddhism  (Weller  2006).  In  other  words,  the 
exploitation and manipulation of the natural worlds for human’s needs was justified. 
Although cosmic resonance is always the ideal in Chinese culture,  the underpinning 
narrative  is  still  the  practical  and  anthropocentric  concern.32 It  is  a  humanist 
interpretation of nature but, in the traditional Chinese context, the human exists not as 
an opposite to the natural world.
    Since the early twentieth century, the Chinese have adopted the Japanese usage to 
32 This thesis also argues that it is risky to use the term ‘anthropocentric’  to describe this traditional 
perception. Although it is a humanist understanding of nature, it is important to bear in mind that human 
society is not clearly separated from nature in China, as the qi can go through both the human body and 
nature.
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translate ‘nature’ into the term ziran. In the Japanese context, the term ziran, nature, was 
treated as the opposite of culture, which demonstrated the similarity of the definition of 
nature by post-Enlightenment thought (Weller 2006: 43-47). Nature and culture, and 
human  society,  were  split  after  the  eighteenth  century  and  this  understanding  was 
brought into China by Christian priests at that time. This dichotomy flourished in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, while China faced imperial invasions from the 
West. At that time, nature had been entirely “disenchanted, dispirited, and laid open for 
exploitation” (Weller 2006: 48). As discussed earlier, the strong sense of humiliation 
caused by the imperial invasions, which started when the Opium War was lost in 1842, 
had  driven  China  to  pursue  modernisation  and  to  achieve  progress  through 
technological reformation. This understanding of the split between nature and culture 
from the West  had spread and achieved its  dominance in  China since the late  19th 
century,  when China  was eager  to  empower itself  through the  adoption  of  Western 
values. This post-Enlightenment perspective put nature entirely under human control, 
without considering the potential resonance between them. In the following turbulent 
years, this mentality was not challenged so that exploiting natural resources is treated as 
necessary to fulfil modernisation.33 
    Communist China, under Mao’s rule, faced severe environmental degradations. It was 
‘Mao’s  war  against  nature’,  in  Shapiro’s  words  (2001).  Under  the  anti-environment 
slogans of ‘Man must conquer nature!’ (人定勝天  ren ding sheng tian), and ‘Battling 
with nature is boundless joy!’ (與天鬥, 其樂無窮  yu tian dou, qile wu qiong), China 
had gone through policies such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, 
which lead to severe environmental pollution side effects (Shapiro 2001). Combining 
33 From the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911, to the unification of China by the Communist Party in 
1949, there were various warlords occupying different regions. However, despite their differences, these 
warlords were all modernisers who aimed at enhancing technological performances through exploiting 
natural resources, in order to beat their domestic enemies and catch up with imperialist rivalries. This 
mentality continued to exist across the strait after 1949 and both Mainland China and Taiwan have 
embraced the modernist and developmentalist path.
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the  ambitions  of  modernisation  and  anti-federalist  ideals,  traditional  thoughts  about 
nature were suppressed in Mao’s China. In Mao’s era, he aimed to remove the backward 
and outdated forces of feudal China by empowering the peasant and asking for personal 
sacrifice  for  the  higher  socialist  utopian  ideals  (Shapiro  2001).  He  encouraged 
population growth to enhance productivity, which also brought environmental problems 
for the current generation. Before the 1980s, nature was treated as an object for human 
need and this was the dominant perspective in daily life. In other words, nature was 
entirely  objectified  and  needed  to  be  exploited  and  managed.  Nature  and  the 
environment entered the Chinese mindset through the process of objectification based 
on the dichotomy between the subject and the object.
    China did not recognise the importance of environmental problems until the 1970s. 
Internationally, China became more active in international environmental negotiations 
after entering the UN in 1971. Domestically, after the disastrous Cultural Revolution 
and other mass-line movements, China had to face environmental degradations caused 
by these revolutionary policies. The 1970s, after the Stockholm Summit in 1972, was 
also the period when environmental issues started gaining public attention around the 
world. Just as imperial China had learnt and absorbed the mentality of exploiting natural 
resources  from  the  West  in  the  nineteenth  century,  modern  Communist  China  has 
gradually learnt the way to govern the environment since the 1970s. Although Deng’s 
years  did  not  cause  as  much  direct  environmental  damage  as  Mao’s  period,  the 
environment  degradations  were  increasing  during  the  process  of  urbanisation  and 
industrialisation (Lam 2008; Zhang  et al. 2007).  Therefore,  present Chinese leaders, 
unavoidably,  have  to  face  the  environmental  degradation  caused  over  the  last  few 
decades. Domestically, environmental degradation and social imbalance were also part 
of the consequences of economic reform in China after three decades and, therefore, 
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these issues have to be taken into account more seriously as the related upheavals might 
challenge the legitimacy of the current regime. Recently there are growing numbers of 
environmental protest in China (RedOrbit 2008). The SEPA reported there were over 
50,000  environmental  protests  in  2005  (Go  et  al. 2010).  This  phenomenon  has 
demonstrated that  the environmental  quality  has  gradually attracted public  attention, 
especially  for  the  rising  middle  class  in  China  (Moore  2009).  For  present  Chinese 
leaders,  to  tackle  environmental  degradation  whilst  in  pursuit  of  sustainable 
development has become one of the primary missions (Zhang et al. 2007).
    To move to the institutional level, an environmental regulatory system was gradually 
established after the promulgation of the Environmental Protection Law in 1979 and 
environmental protection was officially recognised as a basic national policy in 1984. 
The principles of environmental protection were ‘prevention is the main, then control’, 
‘polluter  responsible  for  pollution  control’,  and  ‘strengthening  environmental 
management’ (Mol and Carter 2006). The National Environmental Protection Agency 
was promoted from the National Environmental Protection Bureau in 1988 and was 
given ministerial status as SEPA in 1998. It was eventually promoted to the Minister of 
Environmental Protection (MOEP) in 2008. Other environmental protection agencies 
function  at  provincial,  municipal  and  county  levels  and  co-constitute  the  vertical 
national regulatory framework. Besides these institutional dimensions, Mol and Carter 
also point out the characteristics of the transition of China’s environmental governance. 
First,  the  trend  of  decentralisation  appeared  in  environmental  governance  as  local 
governments and Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) gained more flexibility and 
power to make their own strategic decisions, although local authorities are still facing 
GDP-oriented  pressures.  Second,  the  decision-making  on  production  was  slowly 
transferred to the economic domain in which the market principles were dominant (Mol 
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and Cater 2006: 156). Last, the rule of law was emphasised as the modernisation of 
environmental governance. At the same time, the principle was also tied up with the 
emergence  of  a  market  economy.  However,  the  enforcement  of  environmental  laws 
remains  difficult.  In  general,  from  Mol  and  Carter  (2006),  the  way  to  tackle 
environmental degradation/problems has been integrated into a system of governance 
where plural agents and non-public forces are involved. Their argument represents the 
perspective of neo-liberal institutionalism/regime analysis and ecological modernisation 
by focusing on the decentralisation governance. This perspective is shared by Zhu from 
the GEF China.34 Zhu emphasised the significance of establishing good environmental 
governance through the efforts  of  public-private  partnership.  “This  (emerging)  good 
governance  should  consist  of  governmental  regulation,  market  guidance  and  public 
participation”. “The market, either it is a full private sphere or not, plays a more and 
more  crucial  role  in  tackling  environmental  problems.  The  government  should 
encourage  the  private  sector  and  the  market  to  participate  in  the  environmental 
governance” (Zhu, interviewed in 2009).  In summary,  modern China has  learnt  and 
accepted the way to consider the relationship between nature and human society mainly 
from the West, regardless of the fact of whether it is about the exploitation, conservation 
or protection of natural resources.35 The environment gradually becomes the object of 
management and governance in China. However, the rationality of the environment has 
to interact and compete with other governmental rationalities. This thesis thus argues 
that within the specific historical path in China, the natural resources are monopolised 
by the state, the exploitation of the environment is for the country’s development and 
the objectification of the environment creates the possibility of commodification when 
34 Administratively, this office is regulated by the MOEP and the interview was, therefore, held in the new 
building of the MOEP.
35 It does not mean that the traditional understanding of nature has been abandoned entirely. Some crucial 
ideas, such as harmony between humans and the heavens, are frequently used in daily life. However, a 
different understanding based on the dichotomy has penetrated into modern China. 
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the environment is governed through a market mechanism.
3.5 State, Society and the Party in China
After reviewing the development of four governmental rationalities underlying China’s 
politics and governance of climate change at both the international and domestic level, 
this section moves to discuss the relation between state and society and the particular 
role of the Communist Party of China (CPC) within it. It is to demonstrate the context  
and the background in which these four governmental rationalities interact and compete 
with each other.  The discussion starts from examining the sphere of civil  society in 
China by taking Chinese environmental NGOs into analysis. Then the discussion moves 
to discuss the overwhelming role of the CPC in China and its self-identification, which 
heavily influences the development and transformation of different rationalities.
    While considering the category of the society in China, the fact is that no matter how 
researchers and officers claim and praise the establishment of environment governance 
on the  basis  of  public-private  partnership  (Mol  and Carter  2006,  Zhu 2007,  NDRC 
2010), it is hard to claim there is an autonomous and independent sphere of society in 
China. It is not just because authoritarian control and monitoring from the government 
is all around. It is also because of the shared understanding and mentality about the 
‘right’ relations between the state and society in China. Almost all the campaigners the 
author  has  met,  either  from  local  or  international  NGOs,  have  emphasised  the 
importance of cooperation with the government. The mission for the NGO, from this 
understanding, is to assist the government in those fields where effective governance 
has not been made, such as education or rural development. This good relationship with 
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the government is not necessarily an obstacle. Rather, it can facilitate the campaigns in 
many ways. This is not to claim that there is no resistance, dissent or civil movement 
against  the state  and government  in  Chinese society.  As mentioned earlier,  the civil 
protests and environmental movements around issue of pollution are growing and this 
phenomenon is even treated as a ‘new democracy movement’ (Liu 2007). However, by 
examining  the  interaction  and  relations  between  environmental  NGOs  and  the 
government,  and  more  importantly,  the  shared  governmental  rationalities  in  this 
relation,  it  is  clear  that  the  Chinese  state  and  society  are  not  standing  in  opposing 
positions.  Over 35 Chinese environmental NGOs have worked together to provide a 
coherent position of Chinese civil society on global climate change (FON 2007a, 2007b, 
2007c). These NGOs, international or not, clearly articulate that they can help promote 
China’s conditions and efforts to the world through better communication. (FON 2007c: 
72, 78). Domestic research and campaigns can help raise public awareness, improve 
corporate social responsibility and facilitate policy making and implementation. These 
efforts from Chinese civil society are highly praised by the state (NDRC 2010). As a 
result, this thesis contends that it is premature to treat emerging environmental protests 
as democracy movements (Liu 2007), as long as the legitimacy and accountability of the 
CPC has not been seriously discussed and challenged during these movements. 
    As  Hsia  and  White  have  pointed  out,  while  asking  about  the  state-society 
relationship, it is crucial to clarify what kind of civil society is discussed, “[w]hether as 
a powerful force against the state, as it is often seen in the West, or as a powerful force 
working with the state, to provide services the state cannot” (2002: 347, italic as origin). 
Wright (2010) also argues that the dominant status of the state and the strong support 
from the Chinese society to the CPC are due to these reasons: (1) state-led economic 
development  policies,  (2)  late  industrialisation  and  (3)  socialist  legacies.  The 
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achievements of economic reform in the last  three decades in China have made the 
Chinese public and entrepreneur ‘accept authoritarianism’, especially those groups that 
have special connections with the state. Meanwhile, the relatively late opening up to the 
global market has diversified workers whereby those in the public sector benefit from 
the economic reform and thus are more competitive than farmers and private sector 
workers. A polarised social structure has gradually appeared since the economic reform. 
The  rich  minority  shows  less  interest  in  political  reform  which  will  challenge  the 
legitimacy of the CPC. Neither  do the majority in the lower social  stratum want to 
pursue political reform, since they all benefit from the social setting in China to varying 
degrees.  The  socialist  legacies  have  privileged  the  urban  residence,  which  means 
Chinese  citizens  are  also  diversified  between  the  urban  and the  rural  areas.  It  thus 
becomes difficult to raise a common appeal for political reform (Wright 2010). 
    This thesis does not pose a liberal understanding that separation and confrontation 
between the state and society is necessary. Rather, what this thesis claims is to examine, 
historically and contextually, the relation between these two spheres. A Western model 
of state-society needs a (neo-)liberal way of governing through the market, society and 
private sectors, or it can govern through hegemony in the civil society. Nevertheless, are 
similar ways of governance needed in an authoritarian state?  Historically, in China, 
there is no clear distinction between society and the state (Shih 2001). To treat society 
as an independent, autonomous and even resistant entity, based on the Enlightenment 
tradition,  does  not  exist  in  China.  As  a  result,  the  state-society  relation,  even  in 
authoritarian China, cannot be understood as one-dimensional, as if society is simply 
oppressed  and  guided  by  the  state.  It  is  a  cooperative  relation  based  on  non-
confrontation,  which seeks common goals between the state and society (Brook and 
Frolic 1997, in Schwartz 2008: 68). The rationalities of sovereignty and development 
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are shared by the majority of society and the state. Meanwhile, the state represented by 
the CPC government is assumed to be the legitimate authority to pursue and fulfil the 
goals based on the rationalities of sovereignty and development.
    At the same time, it is necessary to examine the role of the CPC in China’s political 
structure  in  order  to  grasp  the  dynamics  among  different  governmental  rationalities 
more  clearly.  As  the  only  legitimate  party  to  rule  the  country,  the  CPC  has  the 
overwhelming power to control, not only society, but also the state apparatus.36 It is the 
CPC who controls the military and it is the Party who takes political decisions, rather 
than the other levels of governments. McGregor (2010), a journalist for the Financial  
Times, has written a detailed book on the relation between the CPC and the government 
in China and, specifically, how the CPC rules China. The CPC exists outside the legal 
system. He Weifang, a law professor at Peking University, told McGregor that “[a]s an 
organisation,  the  Party  sits  outside,  and above the  law” (2010:  22).  In  China,  “this 
doubling of power between public and hidden realms is itself institutionalised” (Žižek 
2010: 9). The status and role of the CPC should be understood through this context. 
     Although the CPC has transformed itself from the revolutionary party to the ruling 
party, it still has to face the question of its legitimacy. Where and how can the CPC have 
this dominant role in China, and how to maintain it? In order to depict the essence and 
characteristics of the rule of the CPC in China, Wang (2008) introduces the concept of a 
‘post-totalitarian socialist  developmental state’ (PTSDS). The post-totalitarian feature 
explains  that  the  CPC has  lost  the  absolute  dominance  of  ideology,  comprehensive 
social control and the massive social revolution. Nevertheless, the CPC still maintains a 
one-party system and its control over the media, education, and the military. Wu (2007) 
points out the characteristics of the developmental state, which appears in other East 
Asian countries, in the post-totalitarian CPC regime. Wu argues that the reform of the 
36 Zhao Zhiyang, the then General Secretary of the CPC in the 1980s once tried to separate the party from 
the state apparatus, but his attempt failed with the Tiananmen Square accident in 1989. 
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CPC after  the  end  of  the  cold  war  allowed  it  to  adapt  itself  to  a  post-totalitarian 
capitalist  developmental  state  in  order  to  maintain  political  control  and  economic 
growth at  the same time. Wang inherited Wu’s concept  but  argues that  the socialist 
feature still plays an important role in the CPC regime and, as a result, his concept of 
PTSDS are in table 3-1, 
Table 3-1: Features of Post-totalitarian socialist developmental state
Field Theoretical Explanation Features
Politics Post-totalitarianism The CPC has control over society 
Economy Developmental State State intervention for economic growth
Society Socialism Welfare policy 
Source: Wang (2008)
    This  thesis  argues  that  this  PTSDS description  of  the  CPC regime in China  is 
convincing in varying degrees. To put the CPC in a historical context, a communist 
party  cannot  escape  from  its  duty  to  provide  social  welfare,  to  correct  domestic 
imbalance and to pursue an equal society. Nevertheless, this thesis also argues that after 
economic reform since the late 1970s, the astonishing level of economic performance in 
the last three decades has created another aspect of legitimacy for the CPC, which is 
based on the capability of creating fortunes and prosperity. That is one of the reasons 
why China’s stance becomes so stiff when developing countries are asked to commit 
reduction obligations. It is not only because the sovereignty is violated or threatened but 
because the CPC cannot run the risk of endangering the path of economic growth in 
China by accepting reduction obligations, since economic performance is one of the key 
sources of its legitimacy. Regarding the legitimacy of the CPC, Laliberté and Lantigne 
claim that  there are  three bases of legitimacy claims in  China.  These are  economic 
performance, stability and nationalism (2008b). Žižek also argues,
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The Party maintained its hegemony, not through doctrinal orthodoxy (in official 
discourse, the Confucian notion of the Harmonious Society replaced practically all 
reference to Communism), but by securing the status of the Communist Party as 
the only guarantee of China’s stability and prosperity” (Žižek 2010: 8). 
    This  thesis  argues  that  these  legitimacy  claims  should  be  integrated  into  the 
framework of governmental rationalities. The sovereignty rationality has appeared in 
the nationalist appeals. Meanwhile, the rationalities of market and development have 
appeared in the pursuit of economic performance, where the market rationality has been 
instrumentalised. The environment rationality has been incorporated and dispersed into 
the concerns for economic growth and the territorialisation of climate change. 
3.6 Governmental Rationalities Facing the Politics of Climate Change
After discussing the emergence of four governmental rationalities and the state/society 
relation in China, this section will demonstrate how these different rationalities appear 
and influence the shaping and the understanding of China’s politics and governance of 
climate change at both international and domestic levels. The interviewees of this thesis 
and the phenomenon observed from the research fieldwork are the main sources in this 
section. These sources not only demonstrate how these four rationalities underpin and 
direct  China’s  climate  politics  at  international  and  domestic  levels,  but  also  how 
different rationalities are accommodated.
    When  the  issue  of  international  climate  change  politics  is  taken  into  account, 
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sovereignty  becomes  a  fragile  entity  which  is  under  threat  from the  outside  world. 
During  the  fieldwork  trip  for  this  thesis  to  Beijing  in  summer  2009,  besides  the 
interviews, the author also had the chance to attend some symposia on climate change. 
One of the symposia was the ‘Media Summit  on Climate Change and Low Carbon 
Development - China’s Voice’ held by the Energy Foundation, a semi-official NGO, and 
the Global Village of Beijing, one of the leading environmental NGOs in China. Most 
attendants  at  this  event  were  journalists  and the main purpose of  this  event  was to 
provide the chance for the Chinese media to have a further understanding of China’s 
roles while facing climate change in order to produce more correct coverage on China’s 
contributions. The opening lecture was given by Qin Dahe, a senior meteorologist and 
an academician of the Chinese Academy of Science. Qin served as the head of the China 
Meteorological Administration and was also the chairperson of the first working group 
of the IPCC. In other words, he can be seen as the authoritative voice of China’s climate 
science.  After  a  long and detailed  speech,  one  journalist  asked a  short  question:  Is 
climate change a Western plot? Qin gave this journalist a very official answer about the 
scientific  foundation  of  this  issue  and  this  discussion  did  not  continue.  However, 
considering the backgrounds of the attendants, this thesis does not think this question 
came from ignorance of the issue.37
    This journalist is not the only person who treats the need to tackle climate change as a 
Western plot. After the chaos of the Copenhagen Conference, China soon became the 
target  of  the  blame  game  in  the  international  media  (Lynas  2009,  Miliband  2009, 
Spiegel Online 2009) whilst, at the same time starting to fight back. Pan Jiahua, the 
leading researcher on China’s climate policy and the then deputy director of China’s 
37 This question sounded bizarre not just because it came right after a very detailed lecture but also 
because those attendants were journalists in charge of environmental coverage, which meant they should 
be familiar with the seriousness of climate change. Moreover, almost all the official documents, including 
the directive National Programme on Climate Change, which was released in 2007, have recognised the 
scientific findings from the IPCC and most of the disputes in international climate talks China had with 
other countries are not about the scientific grounds.
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advisory delegates in the Copenhagen Summit, warned at a symposium on the post-
Copenhagen situation that climate change is a “Western trap covered by flowers”. China 
should not tackle climate change by sacrificing its own economic development. Pan 
mentioned, “Climate change is a political issue, it is like a mountain which is too high 
to be climbed. For China,  there is no cable car to the top of the mountain” (Zhang 
2010). Pan has constantly led the think tank on China’s policy and politics of climate 
change,  especially  on  issues  of  diplomatic  strategy,  the  CDM  and  sustainable 
development. This thesis has interviewed three of his fellows and has watched his on-
line lectures and that was the first time such fierce language was used from this research 
group. This thesis contends that these attitudes did not appear accidentally. Instead, they 
just  reflected  China’s  constant  scepticism about  the essence of  international  climate 
change politics. These cases just implied that climate change might just be a Western 
tool to endanger China’s sovereignty and development. 
    While discussing how China reacts to the challenge of climate change, almost all 
interviewees in this research had pointed out that the 20% energy-intensity target China 
has set up for its 11th five-year plan (FYP) (2006-2010) is tough and even ‘tortuous’ for 
China and that the whole world should recognise and appreciate China’s sacrifice and 
contribution.38 “It is unfair that the world ignores China’s efforts but praises the changes 
from the US after President Obama came into power,” said by Zhu Liucai, the deputy 
Director of the China GEF Office (interviewed in 2009). “The US is like a villain”, he 
concluded.  In  the  media  forum,  the  host  told  the  participating  journalists  that  they 
38 Many interviewees in this thesis agreed that it is a tough task but that it can demonstrate China’s 
political willingness to the world. The officials the author has met in different symposia also hold similar 
and optimistic attitudes. Chen Ying, from the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), was the only 
interviewee who was worried that this target might not be reached. This thesis undertook the fieldwork in 
2009 when the world was suffering from an economic recession due to the global financial crisis. Chen 
analysed that this was the reason why China could still be on track at that moment to reach that target. 
“The economic recession had brought a decline in the demands from the industrialised countries, which 
influenced China’s manufacturing industry and thus decreased their energy usage”. “However, as soon as 
the global economy recovers, the need for energy will rise and it will be more difficult to fulfil the target” 
(Chen, interviewed in 2009).
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should let the world be aware of how much contribution China has made. In short, while 
wondering  why  international  society  is  so  dissatisfied  with  China’s  performance, 
China’s  mainstream perspective  is  that  it  has  not  propagandised  itself  enough.  The 
author  has  asked  the  interviewees  why  this  stark  task  cannot  be  represented  as  a 
quantified target. Almost all of the interviewees agreed with the government’s stance 
that a legally-binding commitment of emissions reduction was not acceptable for China. 
Nevertheless, they also agreed that China should keep devoting itself to its National 
Appropriate  Mitigation  Actions  (NAMAs)  and  elaborating  China’s  efforts  and 
contributions through clear numbers. The insistence on China’s autonomy to develop its 
mitigation and adaptation measures has demonstrated the influences of the rationalities 
of  sovereignty  and  development  underpinning  the  understanding  of  China  in 
international climate change politics. 
    This  mentality  also  explains  why  instead  of  the  MOEP,  it  is  the  National 
Development  Reform Commission  (NDRC),  a  government  organisation  working on 
promoting China’s economy growth and development through macro regulation, which 
is in charge of China’s politics and governance of climate change at both international 
and domestic levels. Climate change is never a scientific or environmental problem. It is 
an economic,  political and, essentially,  a development problem in China.  Chen Ying 
from the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), an expert on the economics of 
climate change and relevant development policy, expressed in the interview that “the 
MOEP does not have the capability to tackle climate change since climate change is not 
just the ‘governance at the endmost’ problem”. “It is related to a grand strategy and 
sustainable development for China and that is the reason why the NDRC is in charge of 
climate policy” (Chen, interviewed in 2009). During the interview, Chen introduced a 
research conducted by her fellows in the CASS from 2007 to 2008. This large scale 
133
research is to explore the attitudes of Chinese college students toward climate change 
(Luo  et al. 2009). Chen emphasised the importance to have  correct knowledge about 
China’s positions and attitudes concerns in international climate change politics. This 
knowledge is  based on the  understanding of  historical  responsibility  and per  capita 
emissions which accommodates China in the developing world where China is more 
likely to keep its autonomous path. Ang Li, who was in charge of international climate 
negotiations from the Worldwide Wildlife Foundation (WWF), said that the WWF and 
other  NGOs  had  once  initiated  a  proposal  to  categorise  China  and  some  other 
developing  countries  into  ‘emerging  economies’  in  the  international  negotiations. 
However,  this  proposal  was  fiercely  rejected  by  the  Chinese  government,  which 
demonstrated that the tie between China and the whole developing world should not be 
broken. To stay in the developing world and to treat the developing world as a whole is 
a  way  to  keep  China  from  committing  to  legally-binding  agreements.  Again,  the 
understanding of China’s foreign politics  of climate change is  directly  linked to the 
concern of sovereignty and development.
    Regarding the role of the market and business in the governance and politics of 
climate change, all interviewees agreed with the positive achievements of the market, 
especially the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in international climate politics. 
China should keep engaging in the global carbon market and enhance its pricing and 
discursive power in the market through more active participation. The negative effects 
of the CDM implementation were rarely mentioned during the interviews.39 CDM was 
basically treated as an effective  tool  to fulfil China’s goal of sustainable development 
from almost all of the interviewees. It is apparent that the acceptance of this particular 
market mechanism is for the need of the state’s development, as discussed earlier. As for 
the  domestic  business,  although  Zhu  from  the  GEF  China  had  emphasised  the 
39A more detailed discussion on the CDM in China will be made in Chapter Five. 
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importance  of  establishing  good  new  environmental  governance  in  which  the 
government, business and market, and the public were involved, Chen from CASS had 
different observations. She pointed out that the climate governance in China is a ‘top 
down’ and ‘internalisation’ process for business. For most businesses in China, “climate 
change is treated either as a profitable object, through the introduction of the CDM, or 
as an administrative target  about emissions’ reduction assigned by the government”. 
“The later one is closer to the mainstream understanding in Chinese society, which is 
through the  policy of  ‘saving energy and reducing emissions’ ( 節 能 減 排  Jieneng 
Jianpai)” (Chen, interviewed in 2009). It is a clear national goal with a simple slogan, in 
which  the  concerns  of  mitigation,  energy  security  and  energy  efficiency  were  all 
included.  To  sum  up,  to  pursue  development  remains  China’s  primary  goal  while 
adopting the market mechanism as a governing tool in China’s climate governance. 
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the emergence, adoption, interpretation and transformation 
of  four  governmental  rationalities  in  China.  Meanwhile,  the  contexts  of 
state/society/party relationship are analysed as well. How these rationalities interact to 
direct China’s politics and governance of climate change politics at international and 
domestic levels will be analysed in the next two chapters. Through the introduction of 
the  revised  framework  of  governmentality,  this  thesis  tries  to  depict  a  more 
comprehensive picture in which different contingencies bring different governmental 
rationalities into China. From previous analysis, it is apparent that the interplays among 
these rationalities are uneven: the rationalities of sovereignty and development were 
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made  prior  to  the  rationalities  of  market  and  environment.  The  rationalities  of 
sovereignty and development have become the pivots of China’s foreign politics, which 
will be discussed in the next chapter. Due to its specific historical path, the state and 
society in China are obsessed with the rationalities of sovereignty and development in 
order to fulfil the dream of modernisation. Nevertheless, the overwhelming role of the 
CPC has made it the representation of the state and sovereignty. Meanwhile, economic 
development  has  become another  source of  legitimacy for  the CPC. As a  result,  in 
international  climate  negotiations,  Chinese  delegates  become  very  sensitive  to  any 
proposal  which  implies  challenging  China’s  sovereignty  and  development.  The 
concessions for these issues will bring crisis to the ruling of the CPC. The rationalities 
of sovereignty and development, this thesis argues, have formed the dominant mentality 
of  government  in  which  the  right  disposition  of  things  is  directed  through relevant 
knowledge.  The  ‘conduct  of  conduct’ which  defines  the  problem and  provides  the 
solution is shared through individuals to collectives. 
    Comparing  the  dominant  rationalities  of  sovereignty  and  development,  the 
rationalities of market and environment are instrumentalised, or in other words, they are 
treated as technological issues which serve to fulfil the goal of development. They both 
represent  new  arts  of  government  in  China’s  climate  diplomacy  and  domestic 
governance.  The  introduction  of  market  mechanisms,  either  for  China’s  economic 
reform or environmental governance, is due to China’s specific needs, and the path is 
monitored and maintained in the desired direction by the CPC government. The detailed 
account of China’s encounter with the expanding market force in international climate 
talks and at its domestic level will be discussed in Chapters Four and Five. Meanwhile, 
the environmental governance on climate change can be fulfilled either through market 
mechanisms such as the CDM or through administrative measures such as the fulfilment 
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of the energy intensity target in the 11th FYP (Southern Weekly 2010). The promise must 
be kept, the targets must be fulfilled and the environment including the atmosphere must 
be  governed.  It  is  not  only  for  the  concern  of  environmental  protection,  ecological 
conversation and public health, but also for creating profits and development, improving 
the international image and enhancing the legitimacy of the CPC.
    As a result, climate change has essentially become a side issue of China’s grand 
strategy. How to pursue development based on economic growth and in the name of 
sustainability, how to protect energy security and how to reform the energy structure in 
order to create more profits are more important in China’s politics and governance of 
climate change, internationally and domestically. In other words, how to transform the 
threat of climate change into opportunities and profits has become the main task. The 
significance of the rationality of the market has to be grasped from this framework as 
there is an underpinning instrumental logic in introducing, deploying and controlling the 
market  mechanism  in  China.  Meanwhile,  the  tolerance  from  the  CPC  on  the 
development  of  environmental  NGOs  should  also  be  understood  through  this 
framework, as analysed in the previous paragraphs. To see the environment as the object 
of governance not only enhances the legitimacy of the CPC by responding and resolving 
environmental protests through technological, not political solutions; but also provides 
the legitimacy to reterritorise control over natural resources including carbon emissions 
and  carbon  sinks.  The  later  advantage  also  facilitates  the  pursuit  directed  by  the 
rationalities of sovereignty. The rationalities of market and environment appear as the 
new arts and mentalities of government along with relevant knowledge and techniques, 
however,  they  co-exist  and  compete  with  the  other  two  dominant  governmental 
rationalities  in  the  Chinese  context  to  comprise  the  ‘mixture  of  governmentalities’ 
directing China’s climate politics at international and domestic levels. 
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4. China and International Climate Change Politics
1st October  is  the  National  Day  of  China  and  there  follows  a  week-long  holiday. 
However, Chinese officials from the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC)  and  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  (MOFA)  were  too  busy  to  take  their 
holidays in 2010. The last international meeting before the Cancun Summit in Mexico, 
at the end of 2010, was held in Tianjin, the leading eco-city in China in early October. 
After the disappointing Copenhagen Summit in 2009, and the failure of the climate 
legislation in the US Senate,  expectations were low that the Cancun Summit would 
reach a binding climate treaty (Vidal 2010, AFP 2010, Johnson 2010). The spread of 
pessimism had kept other states from holding any pre-Cancun negotiations, since so 
many divergences remained unfixed. However, China came forward and took on the job 
of hosting this final tough meeting. This was the first time that China had hosted a UN-
level  conference  on  climate  change.  No matter  what  the  result,  China’s  stance  has 
demonstrated its positivity and confidence in global climate politics. China remains firm 
on its core principles but its positive image has been different from the criticism it faced 
right after the failure of the Copenhagen Summit (Miliband 2009, Lynas 2009, Spiegel 
Online 2009). As discussed in Chapter One, China has multiple faces in global climate 
politics. It has been the biggest CO2 emitter since 2007, the biggest energy consumer 
since 2010, the most active state in the CDM market and the biggest investor in clean 
energy since 2009. Meanwhile, rapid and constant economic growth over the last three 
decades  made  China  the  second  largest  economy  in  2010.  These  facts  have 
demonstrated  China’s  particular  role,  both  positive  and  negative,  in  global  climate 
politics. The core questions of this chapter are thus: Is China a complier or an obstructer 
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in global climate politics? How do researchers grasp the dynamics of China’s climate 
diplomacy? What are the underpinning rationalities in international climate politics and 
China’s climate strategy? 
    In  Chapter  Two,  this  thesis   critically  reviewed  the  practical  and  theoretical 
limitations of mainstream neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist approaches when 
they are applied to global climate politics and China’s foreign politics within it. Both 
approaches tend to reframe new issues, such as climate change, into their own existing 
framework in order to ‘solve’ or ‘manage’ the problem. However, what is ironic is that, 
although  having  their  own theoretical  flaws,  the  language  from both  approaches  is 
widely used when people discuss climate politics. China’s cooperative and obstructive 
images can both be depicted by these two approaches at different moments. This fact 
simply explains that both mainstream approaches fail to grasp the deeper dynamics of 
global climate politics and, instead, they can only focus on the ‘events’ around nation 
states. The power/knowledge and the underlying rationalities forming climate change 
and its responses are neglected in the mainstream approach. Therefore, one of the aims 
of this chapter is to apply the revised governmentality approach discussed in Chapter 
Three to examine the governmental rationalities underpinning China’s roles, strategies 
and self-identification in international climate politics. This chapter argues that while 
climate  change  has  been  gradually  politicised  in  the  last  two  decades,  a  green 
governmentality along with ecological modernisation has also emerged globally in order 
to  govern and manage the global atmosphere through market forces.  In Newell  and 
Paterson’s words (2010), it is the rise of ‘climate capitalism’. However, this capitalist 
force  is  not  the  only  dynamic  in  global  climate  change  politics.  The  trend  of 
‘reterritorialisation’ has to be re-examined to see how it interplays with this new capital 
force. Is ‘state’ merely the agency of this climate capitalism or is there the possibility of 
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resistance or counter-hegemony mobilised by the state? While a global norm of climate 
change is gradually formed, can the developing world escape, break, or even challenge 
the  ‘imperial  gaze’ from the  North?  While  facing  the  expansion  of  global  climate 
capitalism, what governmental rationalities drive China’s responses?
    This  chapter starts  from the review of the progress and developments in global 
climate politics, from the pre-Kyoto negotiations to the Copenhagen Summit. The aim is 
to provide a background of the direction of international climate negotiations. The main 
players and controversies are elaborated clearly in this section. Section 4.2 reviews the 
development  of  China’s  foreign  politics.  The  aim  is  to  contextually  explore  the 
underlying principles in China’s foreign politics, which demonstrates the significance of 
certain  governmental  rationalities.  Section  4.3  moves  to  examine  China’s 
understandings,  responses,  strategies,  and  self-identification  in  international  climate 
politics. China’s attitudes toward different issues and China’s bilateral and multilateral 
interactions with other major parties will be examined, in order to grasp the influence of 
crucial governmental rationalities. The detailed analysis is made in the conclusion.
4.1 Global Climate Change Politics: From Kyoto to Copenhagen
Climate change is a quintessential global environmental issue, which means its causes 
and consequences can hardly be grasped solely through the state system, based on the 
artificial separation of the earth. Nevertheless, global climate change politics in the last 
two  decades  have  still  been  developed  mainly  through   cooperation  and  conflicts 
between  nation  states.  Before  further  critical  reflection,  a  historical  review  on  the 
development  of  global  climate  change  politics  is  made  in  this  section.  From  the 
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perspective  of  mainstream  global  governance/liberal  institutionalist  approaches, 
progress can be shown  in Table 4-1, which also forms the common understandings of 
the achievements of global  climate politics.  In  Paterson’s  words,  this  is  the process 
where ‘global warming becomes politicised’ (1996a). 
Table 4-1: Development of Global Climate Change Governance
Time Critical Events Main Achievements
1988 The establishment of the 
IPCC
The IPCC is in charge of forming knowledge of 
climate change and providing scientific 
assessments and policy suggestions.
1990 The First IPCC Report
October to 
November, 1990
The Second World Climate 
Conference
The Ministerial Declaration asked the UN 
General Assembly to establish a negotiation 
forum of an international climate convention. 
June, 1992 The United Nations 
Conference on Environment 
and Development (Earth 
Summit) at Rio, Brazil
The conclusion of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate  
Change (UNFCCC),  Agenda 21, the United 
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity. 
21st March, 1994 The UNFCCC entered into force.
March, 1995 The first COP to the 
Convention
The conclusion of the Berlin Mandate, which set 
up the target to enhance the reduction obligations 
of developed countries.
1995 The Second IPCC Report
December, 1997 The third COP to the 
Convention at Kyoto, Japan
The conclusion of the Kyoto Protocol
November, 2000 The sixth COP to the 
Convention at Hague
Collapse of the talks due to great divergences 
between the US and the EU
January, 2001 The Third IPCC Report
March, 2001 The US withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol
July, 2001 The resumption of the sixth 
COP to the Convention at  
Bonn
The Bonn Agreement accepted the flexible 
mechanisms and the carbon sink. The 
compromise made by the EU  saved the Protocol. 
October, 2001 The seventh COP to the 
Convention
The Marrakech Accord, which made concessions 
to the Umbrella countries in order to realise the 
Protocol without the participation of the USA
August to 
September, 2002
World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg, South Africa 
October, 2002 The eighth COP to the 
Convention 
The Delhi Declaration in which sustainable 
development is the basic framework used to 
tackle climate change
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November, 2004 Russia ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol
16th February, 
2005
The Kyoto Protocol entered 
into force
November to 
December, 2005
The eleventh COP to the 
Convention and the first 
COP to the Protocol
The Montreal Roadmap: setting up the dual-track 
negotiations in the Convention and the Protocol.
2007 The Fourth IPCC Report
December, 2007 The thirteenth COP to the 
Convention and the second 
COP to the Protocol
The Bali Roadmap which set up the target for 
concluding the post-Kyoto framework in 2009. 
December, 2009 The fifteenth COP to the 
Convention and the fifth 
COP to the Protocol
The Copenhagen Accord which had no binding 
agreement. 
4.1.1 The Politicisation of Global Climate Change
The international negotiations on climate change began in 1990 and the first positive 
achievement  was  at  the  Earth  Summit  in  1992  with  the  conclusion  of  the  United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, hereafter referred to as 
the  Convention). The  Convention  entered into force in 1994 and pointed out the five 
basic principles for tackling climate change. These are: (1) the equity principle based on 
‘common  but  differentiated  responsibilities’;  (2)  the  special  circumstances  of 
developing countries; (3) the precautionary principle; (4) sustainable development; and 
(5)  an open international  economic system that  would lead to sustainable economic 
growth  and  development  (Article  3,  the  UNFCCC).  These  principles  set  up  the 
framework  for  the  international  climate  negotiations  in  the  following  years.  More 
importantly, in terms of climate change, the world was, subsequently, divided into two 
parts:  Annex  I  parties,  which  consist  of  industrialised  countries  and  countries 
undergoing economic transition and non-Annex I parties consisting of most developing 
countries. The obligations to tackle climate change were also split between these two 
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groups  so  that  developed  countries  were  asked  to  take  action  first.  Although  the 
Convention is not a binding treaty, it has gradually and successfully integrated almost 
the whole world into its framework through which climate change is now recognised as 
a  common  threat.  The  principle  of  ‘common  but  differentiated  responsibilities’ 
represents the historical and developmental dimensions of this global issue. It does not 
matter if the Convention has its own enforcement power or not. The crucial effect is that 
it has installed the concerns about climate change into different dimensions in different 
countries, which has started to transform the dynamics of human society, domestically 
and  internationally.  In  other  words,  the  Convention framed  the  discourse  and  the 
storyline in global climate politics. 
    The following step was the journey to reach a binding treaty at the Kyoto Summit in 
1997.  During  the  process,  although  many  international  organisations  were  involved 
(mainly UN-based ones and INGOs), national governments were still the main players.40 
State  groups,  which  were  roughly  differentiated  between  developed and developing 
worlds, formed the primary actors in international climate change politics.41 
(A)Developed Countries.
Among industrialised countries, there were two groups; one was the more ambitious 
40 Engaged international organisations included the UNEP, the IPCC, the WMO, the UNDP, the World 
Bank and the GEF. Important international NGOs in international climate negotiations included 
Greenpeace, the Climate Action Network (CAN), Friends of the Earth (FOE) and the World Wildlife 
Foundation (WWF). Beside these two groups, business groups such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and the global mass 
media also engaged in the negotiations. 
41 There were also a few factors which influenced each government’s attitude, behaviour, standpoint and 
strategy, such as the domestic condition of dependence on fossil fuels, the vulnerability of the impact of 
climate change and the potential costs and benefits of adaptation and mitigation measures. Besides these 
direct factors, some indirect ones, such as culture and institutional structures, also influence each national 
player’s decision-making (Oberthür and Ott 1999). Paterson (1996a) also argues that there are three 
factors influencing states’  positions in the international climate negotiations, which are energy 
dependence, the influence of the international political economy and the perceptions of the costs of 
impacts.
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European Union, which acted as the leader in the industrialised world. The other one 
was  an  unofficial  coalition  known as  JUSSCANNZ,  comprising  Japan,  the  United 
States, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway, and New Zealand.42 The situation of 
energy  efficiency,  the  dependence  on  fossil  fuels  and  cost  concerns  had  directed 
countries into this loose group in order to oppose a stringent commitment proposed by 
the EU.
Figure 4-1 CO2 Emissions of Industrialised Countries in 1990
US, 36.10%
EU, 24.20%
Other CEITs, 7.40%
Russia, 17.40%
Other OECD, 6.20%
Japan, 8.50%
Source: Kyoto Protocol, 1997
(B) Russia and the ‘Countries with Economies in Transition’
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, former communist countries in Eastern 
Europe were categorised as ‘countries with economies in transition’ (CEITs), of which 
Russia was the most important one. The per capita CO2 emissions of Russia was very 
close to the US in 1990 (see Figure 4-2). However, this number has fallen dramatically 
since  then,  by  about  30%,  due  to  economic  decline.  This  situation  has  created  a 
potential  profit  for  Russia  and  other  CEITs  when  complying  with  reduction 
42 Iceland and South Korea sometimes also participated in the JUSSCANNZ meeting. When Russia was 
included in this group, it was often referred to as the Umbrella Group consisting of non-EU Annex I 
countries. 
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commitments, creating the problem of ‘hot air’, which gives these CEITs extra emission 
allowances (Oberthür and Ott 1999). 
Figure 4-2: Per Capita CO2 Emissions of Major Countries in 1990
Source: adapted from Oberthür and Ott (1999).  
Countries listed above were displayed from left to right in Figure 4.2 
(C)Developing Countries
After  the  Second  World  War,  the  category  of  ‘developing  countries’ appeared  in 
international politics, partly due to the anti-colonialism movement and partly due to the 
power of ‘development discourse’ (Adams 2001: 1). The most important organisation of 
developing countries is the Group of 77 (G-77) established in 1964, which now has 
more than 130 member states. China often cooperates with the G-77 in international 
politics,  known  as  the  G-77  plus  China.  Additionally,  the  developing  world  also 
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consisted of different voices. One of these voices was the  Alliance of Small Island 
States (AOSIS), which was more vulnerable to the threats of climate change. AOSIS 
was  more  aggressive  towards  pursuing  a  relatively  stringent  international  climate 
agreement and supported ‘voluntary commitments’ for developing countries. The other 
one is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which made its 
major profit by exporting oil and gas and had higher per capita CO2 emissions than 
other developing countries due to the process of oil production (See Saudi Arabia in 
Figure 4-2). As a result, OPEC was more cautious about the international climate deal. 
The divergences within the developing world were getting bigger as some developing 
countries,  such  as  China,  India  and  Brazil,  had  better  economic  performances  than 
others and their GHG emissions were growing fast. The rising trend of GHGs in major 
developing countries made it clear that the participation of these countries in the binding 
agreement had emerged as one of the main disputes during the negotiations, which also 
influenced the solidarity of the developing world.
    In summary, ‘equity’ was the main concern of the developing world throughout the 
negotiations. It  was not acceptable to endanger the achievements of their  social and 
economic  developments  by  introducing  obligations  to  reduction  commitments.  The 
industrialised countries should be responsible for historical GHG emissions, which had 
started to accumulate from the Industrial Revolution. Developed countries should also 
bear the cost of mitigation (Tóth 1999) and provide financial and technological transfers 
to developing countries. ‘Common but differentiated responsibilities’ was reaffirmed as 
the primary principle in the negotiations.
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4.1.2 From Kyoto to Copenhagen 
The Kyoto  Summit  started  with  mistrust  and huge divergences  among participating 
countries. The then US Vice President Gore restated the basic principles of his country, 
which were the inclusion of market mechanisms, ‘realistic’ targets and timetables and 
the meaningful participation of key developing countries (Oberthür and Ott 1999: 86). 
Nevertheless,  India  and  China  were  strongly  opposed  to  the  emissions  trading 
mechanism,  although  some  other  developing  countries  were  willing  to  accept  it.43 
Through the tough negotiations with the strong leadership of  Chairman Estrada, the 
Kyoto  Protocol  to  the  United  Nations  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change 
(hereafter referred to as the  Protocol) was finally concluded as the first international 
legal treaty with direct targets to reduce GHG emissions. The goal was to reduce GHGs 
emissions by 5.2% during the period 2008-2012, compared to the 1990 level. Six gases 
were recognised as GHGs in the Protocol, which are Carbon Dioxide (CO2), Methane 
(CH4),  Nitrous  Oxide  (N2O),  Hydrofluorocarbons  (HFCs),  Perfluorocarbons  (PFCs), 
and Sulphur Hexafluoride (SF6). The base year of CO2, CH4, and N2O was 1990, and 
HFC, PFC, and SF6 was  1995.  Only developed countries  listed in  Annex I  had the 
obligation to reduce their GHG emissions. They can fulfill their targets partly through 
individual  measures  and  partly  through  three  flexible  mechanisms:  Joint 
Implementation (JI), Emission Trading (ET) and the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). It was prominent progress for international climate change politics. However, it 
also  represented  a  huge  compromise  in  terms  of  the  commitment  period,  reduction 
targets, lists of GHGs and flexibility to reach the targets.44 These flexibilities in the 
43These countries included South Korea, the Philippines, some Latin American countries and small island 
states. 
44 Some industrialised countries, such as New Zealand, Russia, and Ukraine, did not have reduction 
targets and some others, Norway, Australia, and Iceland, were even allowed to increase their emissions. 
The EU was treated as a unity, which also brought flexibility to allocate its inner targets. Meanwhile, the 
list of six GHGs enabled different reduction measures, which were fixed to different countries.
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Protocol have  also  represented  the  domestic concerns  of  different  countries  in  this 
international negotiation. 
    Nevertheless, it took another eight years to make the Protocol enter into force.45 The 
withdrawal  of  the  US  under  the  Bush  administration  in  2001  almost  brought  the 
Protocol to a desperate end but which then also gave Russia strong bargaining power. 
Just like the continuing conflicts during the negotiations, the Protocol itself is actually 
the crystalisation and extension of existing divergences. The tension between the EU 
and the US, between the North and the South and between fast growing developing 
countries and least developed countries (LDCs) remain unsolved in the post-Kyoto era. 
Moreover, the lack of an enforcement mechanism made the fulfillment of the targets 
dubious.  It  is  clear,  from Table 4-2,  that  most  major  countries  failed to  reach their 
targets. In summary, the conclusion of the Kyoto Protocol was one contradictory giant 
and tiny step in tackling climate change. It has marked the progress that nations around 
the  world can  cooperate  together  to  face  a  common problem.  However,  it  has  also 
exposed the difficulties of moving forward in global climate politics.
45 Article 25 of the Protocol conditioned that it shall enter into force on which “not less than 55 parties to 
the Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55 per cent 
of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I”, have ratified the 
Protocol. 
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Table 4-2 GHG Emissions of Major Countries (1990-2007)46
Annex I parties Reduction Target (%)47 Actual Emission (%)
Parties to 
the Protocol
EU -8 -4.3
Germany -21 -21.3
UK -12.5 -17.3
Italy -6.5 +7.1 
France 0 -5.3
Spain +15 +53.5
Greece +25 +24.9
Portugal +27 +38.1
Russia 0 -33.9
Japan -6 +8.2
Canada -6 +26.2
New Zealand 0 +22.1
Australia +8 +30.0
Non-Parties 
to the 
Protocol
US -7 +16.8
Source: UNFCCC Secretariat
    The  preparation  for  the  post-Kyoto negotiations  started  soon after  the  Protocol 
entered into force. A dual-track framework was introduced; one was the ad hoc group 
under the  Protocol for negotiating the post-2012 targets and the other was the talks 
under the Convention, which tried to keep the US and Australia in the negotiations. The 
EU still played an aggressive role. However, the Umbrella Group, under US leadership, 
and the leading developing countries, especially China, have become more and more 
influential in post-Kyoto negotiations. A heavily compromised Protocol, as elaborated 
in note 47, has witnessed the influence, negative or not, of the US. Meanwhile, one of 
the reasons for this deadlock is the discontent of the US against the lack of (meaningful) 
46These are the data excluding the LULUCF (land use, land use change and forestry). 
47 These are the targets listed in the Protocol. However, after the US withdrew from the Protocol, the 
Marrakesh Accord in 2001  made large concessions to the Umbrella Group in order to keep the Protocol 
alive. Before the Marrakesh Accord, the overall reduction target of Annex I countries changed from 5.2% 
to 3.6% due to the changes of the base years for different countries. After the carbon sink was included in 
the Marrakesh Accord, the actual targets, including the US, went from a reduction of 5.2%  to 1.7%. 
Taking both the carbon sink and  changes of the base years into account , this would decrease from  5.2% 
to 0%. Moreover, the withdrawal of the US made the targets of a 5.2% reduction to 1.7% increase to the 
1990 level (den Elzen and de Moor 2001). 
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participation from developing countries. As a result, a new triad of the EU, the US and 
China has gradually occupied the centre of post-Kyoto negotiations. 
    Although major states had expressed their willingness, the atmosphere had turned to 
pessimism before the opening of the Copenhagen Summit in December 2009. The EU 
came to the Conference with a 20% reduction target by 2020 of the 1990 level. It was 
the most ambitious target among industrialised parties,48 though still below the ideal 
targets suggested by the IPCC (2007), which was a 25%-40% reduction by 2020. Many 
major  developing  countries  had  proposed  ambitious  targets  as  well.49 Nevertheless, 
these targets were calculated either on the basis of business as usual (BAU) emissions or 
on energy or carbon intensity. In other words, there would only be ‘relative’ reductions, 
compared with the ‘baseline’ scenario, from these major developing countries. 
    The scale of the Copenhagen Summit had surpassed the one in Kyoto. Nevertheless, 
the  negotiation  was  full  of  mistrust  between  the  North  and  South.50 Meanwhile, 
divergences among the developing world were also enlarged (Vidal 2009b), while the 
new BASIC group consisting of Brazil, South Africa, India and China, appeared as the 
leader  of  the  G-77.  The  proposed  fund  of  100  billion  US dollars  per  year  for  the 
developing  countries  and  the  installation  of  the  MRV (Measurable,  Reportable  and 
Verifiable) for developing countries, especially China, emerged as the main dispute in 
the  last  few  days,  along  with  the  mutual  criticisms  between  China  and  the  US. 
Disregarding the formal UN negotiation procedure, US President Obama convened an 
48 The EU promised to strengthen its target to 30% if other industrialised countries  made similar 
progressive targets.  US President Obama proposed a 17% reduction to the 2005 level by 2020, which 
equals a 4% reduction of the 1990 level. Japan proposed a 25% target of the 1990 level on the condition 
that the Copenhagen Summit could reach an international binding agreement, which was very difficult. 
Australia also made a conditional proposal of a 15% reduction of the 1990 level, if major developing 
countries could commit significant reductions. Russia proposed to cut 20%-25% of the 1990 level. 
However, the GHG emissions of Russia had fallen 34% since 1990, which meant Russia could increase 
its emissions even when adopting this target. In short, most proposals from industrialised countries were 
conditional and, thus, impractical. 
49 A 30% reduction from South Africa, Indonesia, and Brazil; 40-45% from China and 20-25% from India
50 The leaked Danish Text had infuriated developing countries as this draft would limit the right of 
development in the South. The long-term 2050 target proposed by the Danish Text will cause the per-
capita 2.67 tons of emissions in industrialised countries and 1.44 tonnes in poor countries (Vidal 2009a).
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exclusive  meeting  among  major  countries  on  the  last  day  and  concluded  the 
Copenhagen Accord. However, due to objections from Bolivia, Venezuela and Cuba, 
which were excluded from that secret meeting, the Summit could only ‘take note’ of the 
Accord.51 Without any specific binding target and measure to reduce GHG emissions, 
the Copenhagen Accord brought huge disappointment around the world (Vidal 2009c). 
    The establishment of the  Convention and the conclusion of the  Protocol brought 
confidence and hope that a different kind of global politics, based on international and 
transnational  cooperation,  is  possible.  However,  the  withdrawal  of  the  US from the 
Protocol and the constant lack of participation from major developing countries have 
darkened the prospects. The huge gap between the expectations and outcomes of the 
Copenhagen  Summit  has  demonstrated  how  complicated  and  tough  global  climate 
politics is and will be in the future. Around the world, national and local governments, 
international organisations, NGOs, research institutes, global media and business groups 
have  all  been  involved  in  the  negotiations  with  different  preferences,  interests  and 
rationales.52 
4.2 Development of China's Foreign Politics
Before further discussion about China’s environmental diplomacy and its strategies in 
global  climate  politics,  it  is  crucial  to  review  the  development  of  China’s  foreign 
51 The achievements of the Accord include: (1) an international consensus to limit the  temperature rise  to 
2 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrialisation level, on the basis of ‘equity and sustainable 
development’; (2) the recognition of the importance of the Reduction of Emissions from the Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation (REDD) mechanism; and (3) the commitment from the developed countries to 
provide new and ‘additional’ financial support for developing countries, 100 billion US dollars per year 
till 2020 and 30 billion US dollars in the period 2010-2012, in the context of ‘meaningful mitigation 
actions and transparency on implementation’. Both developed and developing countries were requested to 
submit their reduction targets or mitigation actions to the UN by the end of January 2010. 
52 Two years after the Copenhagen Summit, there has not been much progress in establishing the post-
Kyoto framework. One of the achievements of the Durban Summit in 2011 is to extend the Protocol to 
another 5 to 8 years after 2012. The clear goal of reduction targets for different countries remain unclear. 
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politics  in  order  to examine the core concerns underpinning China’s  grand strategy. 
Therefore, this section focuses on the primary principles of China’s foreign politics in 
different stages since its foundation. After the establishment of the People’s Republic in 
1949, the Communist Party has ruled China for over sixty years. In the first thirty years, 
while Chairman Mao Zedong was in power,53 the primary concern of China’s diplomacy 
was  to  seek  its  own  survival  and  development  in  a  relatively  hostile  international 
environment  during  the  cold  war.  The  principle  of  ‘Independent  and  Autonomous 
Diplomacy’ was set up from the beginning of the People’s Republic and this principle 
has continued to be one of the key concerns of China’s foreign politics. Soon after the 
deterioration of its relationship with the Soviet Union in the 1950s,54 China sought to 
expand its international influence through ‘South-South Diplomacy’. Both the US and 
the Soviet Union had become China’s targets of international struggle, with the former 
representing imperialism,  the latter  hegemonism. In 1953, the then Chinese Premier 
Zhou Enlai announced the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence’ between China 
and  India;  which  were:  (1)  mutual  respect  for  each  other’s  territory,  integrity  and 
sovereignty; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference; (4) equality and 
mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful co-existence. These principles were not only accepted 
by the then Indian Prime Minister Nehru but were also brought to the international Non-
Alignment Movement. China’s attendance, which was led by the then Premier Zhou, of 
the Bandung Asian-African Conference in 1955, had marked the beginning of China’s 
53 It is a simplified expression that this thesis does not intend to discuss the domestic power struggles 
among Chinese leaders in this period. However, it is without doubt that Mao was the most powerful and 
dominant leader before his death in 1976. 
54 The Chinese Communist Party had gained a lot of military, technological and economic support from 
the Soviet Union during the Chinese Civil War and, thus, China had embraced a ‘Lean to One Side’ (to 
the Soviet Union) policy after 1949. However, China under Mao’s leadership, started criticising the de-
Stalinisation efforts by the then Soviet Union leader Khrushchev when he took power in 1954. Apart from 
the military and territorial conflicts between these two countries, the Soviet Union and China had many 
disputes over issues, such as Yugoslavia Revisionism, China’s Great Leap Forward policy, the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. The 
relations between these two countries did not improve until the early 1980s. The discussions on the 
causes and developments of the conflict between the Soviet Union can be found in Taubman (2003), 
Zubok (2007), and Li (2006). 
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participation and cooperation with the developing world. The Conference adopted the 
Declaration on Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation in which the five principles 
applied in the Sino-India relation had been included, and it emphasised that developing 
countries  should  decrease  their  economic  dependence  on  the  industrialised  world 
through cooperation with developing countries. This conference also sought to pursue 
anti-colonialism,  national  independence,  poverty  alleviation  and  economic 
development.  The  Bandung  Conference  was  a  milestone  for  the  international  Non-
Alignment Movement (NAM), which started from the Non-Aligned Movement Summit 
in 1961 in Belgrade. The NAM is a loose international organisation which has operated 
since then and it has tried to pursue a moderate stance beyond the confrontation between 
the US and the Soviet Union blocs during the Cold War. Although the influence of the 
NAM has declined since the end of the Cold War, it still holds regular meetings among 
its 115 member states every three years. Keeping its distance from the Western and the 
Eastern blocs, the NAM has created an international space for South-South cooperation. 
    China has never formally become a member of the NAM and the G-77. Nevertheless, 
China has kept a close relationship with the developing world since the mid 1950s. 
Apart  from the ‘Five Principles  of  the Peaceful  Co-existence’ which  influenced the 
development of the NAM, Mao also proposed a theory of ‘Three Worlds’ in which the 
hegemonic US and the Soviet Union were the First World, developed countries were the 
Second World and developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America were the 
Third  World.  The  ‘Five  Principles’ has  represented  China’s  aspirations  in  pursuing 
territorial  integrity,  independent  sovereignty  and  autonomy.  This  has  been  a  deeply 
rooted goal in Chinese society since the late 19th century, when imperial China, the Qing 
Dynasty, faced invasions from the Western and Japanese Empires. This aspiration has 
been  crystalised  by  the  Five  Principles  and  its  spirit  continues  to  be  influential  in 
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China’s contemporary diplomacy. The anti-Imperialism and anti-Hegemonism struggles 
proposed by China  had also  become the  discursive  tools  to  pursue  and consolidate 
territorial  integrity  and  independent  sovereignty.  Based  on  the  history  of  imperial 
invasion,  pursuing  modernisation  and  normalisation  of  the  state  with  an  integral 
territory has become the primary task of China’s foreign politics. This trend has also 
created the space for China’s cooperation with the developing world. 
    After  Mao’s  death  in  1976,  the  ‘Revolutionary  Diplomacy’ pursued during  the 
Cultural Revolution was abandoned (Tsai 2008).55 As Deng Xiaoping gained power and 
started the economic reform in the late 1970s, China started readjusting itself to the 
international system. Communist China took over the seat in the UN from Nationalist 
China (Taiwan) in 1971.56 The visit of the then US President Nixon to China in 1972 
represented  the  beginning  of  normalisation  between these  two countries  and finally 
brought about the establishment of a diplomatic relationship between China and the US 
in 1978. Just as his focus had been on economic reform, Deng’s strategic concern for 
China’s diplomacy placed the emphasis on economic cooperation in the international 
arena. His wisdom was to keep a low profile on China  in order to pursue economic 
development and to reserve national capacities.57 From Mao to Deng, independence and 
autonomy remained the primary goals of China’s diplomacy. However, Deng managed 
to fulfill this goal not through ideological confrontation under Mao’s era but by a more 
55 During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the peaceful Five Principles were left aside so that Mao’s 
revolutionary ideas could became dominant. The ‘Revolutionary Diplomacy’ in this period were aimed at 
enhancing the struggles with Imperialism, Revisionism and Reactionaries. Meanwhile, supporting 
revolutions around the world also entered into China’s diplomatic agenda (Tsai 2008).
56 China was the founding member of the UN and one of the permanent member states in the UN Security 
Council. After the civil war in 1949 between the Communist Party and the National Party (KMT), the 
national government was defeated and retreated to Taiwan, and mainland China was taken over by the 
Communist Party. The national government, run by the National Party in Taiwan, kept its seat in the UN 
through the support of the US. However, following the changes in the international power structure when 
the US started to build up a relationship with Communist China, the national government in Taiwan 
gradually lost its international support and its seat was taken over by the communist government from 
mainland China. The communist government has been widely recognised as the only legitimate 
government in China since then. In this thesis, ‘China’ refers to Communist China.
57 The principle Deng proposed is ‘韜光養晦  (Tao Guang Yang Huei)’, which means to conceal one’s 
flame and to stay in an unapparent location. 
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complicated and practical operation in order to pursue China’s national interests (Tsai 
2008).  In  1982,  the  then  Chinese  Premier  Hu  Yaobang  claimed  the  concepts  of 
‘Independent  and  Autonomous  Diplomacy’,  which  were  (1)  the  anti-hegemonism 
principle that China will not align with power states or blocs; and (2) national interests 
were the primary concern in China’s diplomacy (Tsai 2008). This revision of guidelines 
had lead China to normalise its relation with the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Meanwhile, 
China continued to stand with the Third World, the developing world. However, Deng’s 
low-profile principles kept China from being the leader of the developing world and an 
alliance with other developing countries. 
    China  faced  severe  international  pressure  after  the  1989  Tiananmen  accident. 
Nevertheless, the international isolation did not last very long and, by the early 1990s, 
China had re-established foreign relations with most countries.  Meanwhile,  with the 
continuing  boom  of  its  economy,  survival  from  foreign  threats  was  no  longer  the 
primary diplomatic concern. In the post-Cold War era, the anti-Hegemonism discourse 
was put to one side and the new task was now to establish an international environment 
in which ‘common development’ could be achieved. At the 16th Party Congress in 2002, 
the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin claimed that peace and development remained 
the themes of China’s foreign policy.  He also mentioned the new manifestations  of 
Hegemonism and power politics and the widening of the North-South gap. However, 
“[a] new world war is unlikely in the foreseeable future”, and thus “to preserve peace 
and promote development……represents the common aspirations of all peoples” (Jiang 
2002).  China’s  goal  is  to  pursue  its  own  development  and  prosperity  through 
independent  and  autonomous  diplomacy  in  a  ‘multipolarised  world’,  in  which  the 
divergences between different civilisations and social systems should be respected. The 
wide  usage  of  the  term  ‘common’  in  President  Jiang’s  report  represented  the 
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transformation of China’s attitude as it  has become more confident and active when 
engaging in international affairs (Tsai 2008). This transformation has brought about the 
current theme of China’s diplomacy: peaceful development. 
    The current Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have both claimed 
that  China  is  on the track of  a  peaceful  rise  to  fulfill  its  development;  ‘peace’ and 
‘development’ have remained  two key concerns in China’s diplomacy. As for the grand 
strategy, China’s foreign politics' targets are separated into four categories: big powers, 
neighbouring  countries,  developing  countries  and  multilateral  diplomacy.  When 
addressing  Chinese  ambassadors  in  2009,  President  Hu  elaborated  in  the  overall 
arrangements of these four categories that China ought to:  (1) maintain and manage 
relations with big international powers; (2) establish geopolitical and strategic relations 
with neighbouring countries; (3) consolidate a foundation with developing countries; 
and (4) positively develop multilateral relations (Chen 2009). In this speech, President 
Hu, for the first time, proposed the idea of ‘area diplomacy’ where non-traditional areas, 
such as a financial crisis, climate change and energy security, are taken into account. 
President Hu also encouraged Chinese ambassadors to strengthen China’s discursive 
power through multilateral cooperation (Chen 2009). 
    Comparing the first  thirty  years and the subsequent  thirty years of the People’s 
Republic,  China’s  diplomacy has  become more flexible,  practical  and rational  since 
Deng’s  open-door policy in  the late  1970s.  Ideological  confrontation is  replaced by 
multilateral cooperation and struggling for survival has been replaced by the pursuit of 
development (Tsai 2008). Nevertheless, few concerns remain central to China’s grand 
strategy, which constitutes the hardcore of China’s diplomacy. Starting from the ‘five 
principles’,  the  integrity  of  territory  and  the  independence  of  sovereignty  is  the 
unchallengeable  core  of  China’s  foreign  politics  and  this  leads  to  the  principle  of 
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independent  and autonomous  diplomacy.  National  interest  has  now appeared  as  the 
primary  diplomatic  concern.  The  anti-Imperialism and  anti-Hegemonism legacy  has 
driven China to the developing world, and cooperation with other developing countries 
was built  on the basis  of  non-interference.  Meanwhile,  no matter  what international 
status China has, the instruction from Deng to keep a low profile still matters in that 
China  is  not  willing  to  become  an  international  leader  and  to  bear  excessive 
international responsibilities. China seeks peace and development in the international 
arena only when the  above principles  are  followed.  China’s  climate diplomacy has, 
therefore, to be understood from this context as well. It is clear that through  analysis in 
Chapter Three, the insistence to pursue and maintain the integrity of sovereignty has 
constituted  to  the  dominant  governmental  rationalities  of  China’s  foreign  politics. 
Meanwhile, the will to develop joins to form other pivotal rationalities underpinning 
China’s self-identification in the international arena. In other words, China is eager to 
modernise, to prosper and to develop, but the path has to be under China’s control. Non-
interventionism is the principle China applies to other countries, at least rhetorically, 
and asks other countries to stick by this. This principle has demonstrated the crucial 
influence  of  the  rationality  of  sovereignty.  Meanwhile,  this  thesis  argues  that  this 
principle also helps China to concentrate on its economic growth and prevent the chance 
for foreign powers to intervene in the authoritarian rule by the CPC government. 
4.3 China’s Responses to International Climate Change Politics
The last two sections have reviewed the developments in global climate politics and 
China’s foreign politics. The reason for the reviews is to provide an international and 
domestic context for analysing China’s foreign politics of climate change. However, just 
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as Hajer has claimed environmental politics is where ‘argumentative struggles’ happen 
and “actors not only try to make others see the problems according to their views but 
also  seek  to  position  other  actors  in  a  specific  way’ (1995:  53),  the  textbook-like58 
description in Section 4.1 is merely the reflection of a certain perspective in which the 
storylines and discourses are developed within a concrete theoretical framework, the 
mainstream neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist approaches. Both approaches can 
be applied to explain certain events but this means they are both insufficient in grasping 
the  dynamics  of  global  climate  politics.  The  pessimism  since  Copenhagen  has 
strengthened the validity of the realist approach where states only take care of their own 
national interests. It does not matter if the target in the blame game is the US or China 
since they both represent the ideal type of realist narrative. Nevertheless, this universal 
and timeless assumption of the realist approach has failed to grasp the contexts and the 
dynamics of the formation of ‘national interests’. For realists, climate change is just 
another sub-field of international politics and this issue has no significance until it starts 
to threaten national security. The essence of international climate change politics, from a 
realist  perspective,  is  how  states  pursue  their  survival  and  national  interests  and 
maximise their powers in the battles on ‘managing’ climate issues. Also from a realist 
perspective,  the  ‘failure’ of  the  Copenhagen  Summit  and  the  pessimism leading  to 
Cancun demonstrated the validity of HST, which is that, without a hegemon willing to 
lead and make sacrifices, international cooperation is far from a reality. However, as this 
thesis has critically analysed, to explore the hegemony of global climate politics is more 
crucial than searching for a hegemon, which is difficult to  identify due to the superficial 
understanding  of  power  based  on  state-centric  assumptions.  As  a  result,  a  realist 
58This kind of description is widely accepted when people try to study the global politics of climate 
change. This style focuses on the interplays among states and state groups on a chronological basis. The 
criteria of the ‘failure’ and ‘success’ of global climate politics is when different states remain in conflict 
or reach a consensus for collective action. This state-centric understanding has become a dominant 
framework to direct people’s imagination about climate politics. In China, most scholars also develop 
their own arguments on this basis. 
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approach can merely provide a self-referential and retrospective understanding of global 
climate politics. 
    From the perspective of the neo-liberal institutionalist approach, although setbacks 
always exist, there have been huge achievements in global climate politics in the last 
two  decades.  Regimes  and  institutions  at  different  levels  have  demonstrated  the 
possibility of an international collective action and have facilitated further cooperation. 
Moving forward  to  the  global  governance  approach,  the  emergence  of  a  variety  of 
global  carbon  markets  has  witnessed  the  lively  engagements  of  non-state  actors  at 
different levels (Newell and Paterson 2010). However, as there is a limited validity to 
the realist approach, the liberalist approach has to face the same situation. Those states 
that disappointed the world in Copenhagen are those who brought prospects and hopes 
at  Kyoto  and  Bali.  What  have  international  climate  institutions  and  regimes  really 
brought?  Meanwhile,  the  same  question  remains:  why  does  global  governance  on 
climate  change  have  to  be  organised  through  certain  measures,  such  as  market 
mechanisms? The question of ‘who governs’ is directly linked to two other important 
concerns in global climate politics, which are ‘who profits’ and ‘who suffers’. In other 
words, the neo-liberal institutionalist approach alone is not enough to provide a solution 
to the North-South confrontation based on  ‘equity’ concern in global climate politics. 
    As a result, both neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalists can partly explain China’s 
approach in global climate politics, to varying degrees. Nevertheless, both mainstream 
approaches  cannot  grasp  why  China  behaves  in  certain  ways  due  to  a  lack  of 
understanding  of  the  historical  contexts  influencing  the  dynamics  of  different 
governmental  rationalities.  This  section  is  going  to  examine  the  continuities  and 
changes in China’s attitudes toward different key issues in international climate change 
politics. The review is through the lens of the revised governmentality approach and the 
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aim is to explore the interactions among different governmental rationalities underlying 
these continuities and changes. 
4.3.1 The Evolution of China’s Foreign Politics of Climate Change 
Starting with China’s understanding of climate change, Zhuang et al. (2009) elaborates 
on the five stages: (1) at the beginning of the international negotiations, China focused 
on the environmental implication of climate change. China was cooperative since the 
international climate agreement was treated as an international environmental treaty. (2) 
The international society started to negotiate reduction obligations in the COP1 to the 
Convention in 1995 and concluded with the Berlin Mandate. China remained cautious 
about  the  proposals  from  developed  countries  in  order  to  ensure  that  developing 
countries  had  no  reduction  commitments.  It  was  the  political  implication  which 
interested China at this moment. (3) After the conclusion of the Kyoto Protocol, flexible 
mechanisms were also introduced as policy tools to tackle climate change. China started 
to focus on the economic implications of climate change. From 1998, the National Plan 
Commission  (the  predecessor  of  the  NDRC)  took  over  the  mantle  of  coordinating 
climate policies from the China Meteorological Administration. This event represented 
how China’s  attitude toward climate change had been transformed from a scientific 
dimension to   economic  and developmental  dimensions.  (4)  The  World  Summit  on 
Sustainable Development in 2002  brought the concept of ‘sustainable development’ to 
the  arena  of  international  climate  politics.  As  a  result,  China  also  emphasised  the 
importance of integrating relevant climate measures into China’s strategy of sustainable 
development.  From the Chinese perspective,  the concept of sustainable development 
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should include (a)  protecting the basic  rights  of people in developing countries;  (b) 
matching  the  conditions  and  realities  in  developing  countries;  (c)  enhancing  the 
capability of tackling climate change in  developing countries;  and (d) reflecting the 
different capabilities and conditions in different countries (Zhuang  et al.  2009: 266). 
This thesis argues that these four similar concepts indeed represent China’s continuous 
insistence on the integrity of sovereignty and the assurance of different developmental 
paths and different social systems. (5) The latest stage of China’s attitude transformation 
is to bring the geopolitical implication into account. Through the extensive participation 
of Chinese scientists in the fourth IPCC report, China has strengthened its influence in 
the post-Kyoto negotiations (Zhuang et al. 2009: 264-266).
    This thesis contends that the above argument is not convincing enough because of its 
over-simplicity. The process of the transformation of China’s attitudes is not a linear one 
and, also, those implications cannot be clearly separated at different stages. China had 
recognised the political implications of climate change as it had proposed the ‘common 
but differentiated responsibilities’ in 1991. The separation between the developed and 
developing  world  was  the  basic  framework  of  China’s  climate  diplomacy  from the 
beginning  of  international  negotiations.  Moreover,  China’s  insistence  on  the  North-
South framework does not come from moral or ideological concerns alone but also from 
its calculation. In other words, the cost-benefit concern of tackling climate change has 
always been one of the key factors influencing China’s climate politics. The appeal of 
financial  and  technological  transfers  from the  industrialised  world  also  reflects  this 
concern.  The  concept  of  sustainable  development  has  a  rather  long  history  in 
international  environmental/climate  politics.  Indeed,  the  contents  of  this  concept,  as 
discussed by Zhuang et al. (2009), have strong connections to the political concerns that 
maintaining the development in the South is a priority. In the end, Zhuang et al. (2009) 
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only take the Chinese participation in the IPCC to explain the ‘geopolitical’ implications 
of climate change, which is severely insufficient. Apparently, science and knowledge 
have a strong connection to power/politics, according to Foucauldian and constructivist 
approaches  and  the  epistemic  community.  However,  the  simple  fact  Zhuang  et  al. 
(2009) describe is not sufficient to explain the complexities of the potential geopolitical 
conflicts/cooperation in global climate politics. The geopolitical concern should at least 
include energy security and competition in the global market for renewable energy. In 
summary, the argument from Zhuang  et al.(2009), the leading researchers of China’s 
climate policy, oversimplify the dynamics of China’s climate politics in that they fail to 
explain why China cares about sustainable development and why China keeps standing 
with developing countries. Behind this argument is a linear and spontaneous order that 
China  evolves  its  understanding and stance  in  international  climate  change politics. 
They are trapped in realist and liberal language, in which the reason of the state, and 
national interests, are treated as given and unchallenged.
    In terms of the causes which influence China’s decision-making in international 
climate negotiations, both Zhang (2008) and Zhuang et al. (2009) take a rational choice 
approach to explain China’s choices. Three factors are taken into account which are: (1) 
the cost of mitigation: the higher the cost, the less China has to commit to reduction 
obligations. This concern helps to explain why China welcomes the introduction of the 
CDM since this mechanism is supposed to draw financial investment into China; (2) 
ecological fragility: the higher the fragility, the more cooperative China will be and this 
factor  reflects  their  domestic  concerns;  and  (3)   equity  concern:  the  fairer  the 
international negotiations, the higher the possibility that China will bear their reduction 
obligations. China’s equity principle focuses on per capita emissions or, in other words, 
individual  equity  (Pan and Zheng 2009).  This  proposal  aims  at  a  fair  allocation  of 
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‘emission rights’ among all countries. This equity concern,  along with the concept of 
historical responsibility and ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, partly explains 
China’s  tough  stance  in  the  international  negotiations  even  though  the  international 
pressure on China is rising. Nevertheless, what Zhang (2008) and Zhuang et al. (2009) 
do not point out is the hidden meta-discourse and underlying governmental rationalities 
in  which  the  integrity  of  sovereignty  and  the  need  to  develop  are  overwhelmingly 
embraced. 
    From this  leading  research,  which  has  represented  official  attitudes  in  various 
degrees, the primary task for China in international climate negotiations is to strive for 
‘development  rights’,  which  will  help  to  achieve  China’s  industrialisation, 
modernisation and sustainable development without damaging China’s autonomy. China 
should insist on emphasising the historical responsibility of industrialised countries and 
should stress that economic development and poverty alleviation is the overwhelming 
task  for  developing  countries.  “To  tackle  climate  change  under  the  framework  of 
sustainable development” is the primary principle for China to launch its international 
struggle and domestic sustainable development (Zhuang and Chen 2005: 280). In short, 
by reviewing the  continuities  and changes  of  China’s  attitudes  and stances,  China’s 
strategic concerns are clearly revealed. To maintain the autonomous and independent 
position in international negotiations and to pursue developmental goals are the core 
concerns of China’s foreign politics of climate change. The continuities and changes to 
China’s attitudes can be roughly grasped from Table 4-3, which was mainly sorted out 
by Zhang (2008).59 Detailed discussions are in the parts that follow.
59Zhang (2008) only sorted out the data from 1991 to 2005. Part of year 2009 is added in this thesis. 
Meanwhile, considering that MRV is a newly emerging dispute, it is not included it in this list, in this 
thesis. Detailed discussion is made in  part (E) of this section. 
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Table 4-3 Continuities and Changes to China’s Attitude in International Climate  
                 Negotiations
Issues 1991 1999 2001 2005 2009
Legally-binding commitment of 
emissions' reductions 
No No No No No
Primary responsibility of 
industrialised countries 
Uncertain Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial and technological transfers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Supporting flexible mechanisms No Hesitant Yes Yes Yes
Supporting other modes of 
international cooperation?
Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Yes60 Yes
Focus on per-capita emission? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: adapted from Zhang (2008: 84-85)
(A) Quantified Legally-Binding Target of Emissions Reductions
China keeps refusing to accept any legally-binding commitment of emissions reductions 
and  insists  that  this  principle  should  be  applied  to  all  developing  countries.  While 
climate change started to be ‘politicised’ from the late 1980s, China quickly learnt the 
importance of this issue. The Coordinate Group on Climate Change was established by 
the State Council in 1990, leading to the production of China’s proposal in 1991. This 
proposal  was brought  to  the UN Earth  Summit  in  1992.  The key principles  of  this 
proposal  were  (1)  common  but  differentiated  responsibilities;  (2)  that  international 
cooperation should be based on the equity principle and not endanger each country’s 
sovereignty; (3) that proper economic development is the condition to tackle climate 
change; and (4) developed countries should provide necessary funding and technology 
to developing countries (Zhang 2008: 84). It is clear that China has set up the basic 
framework for climate negotiations  that  follow and those core principles in  China’s 
foreign  politics,  discussed in  section  two,  have  also occupied  the  centre  of  China’s 
60Zhang mentions that Chinese delegates in the COP11 to the Convention and the COP1 to the Protocol 
have held an open attitude towards other types of international cooperation systems (2008: 85). However, 
what Chinese delegates proposed was just a different international institution that can incorporate more 
public and private sectors to tackle climate change together. This appeal can actually be fulfilled under 
existing institutions, such as the CDM. As a result, what Chinese delegates had proposed should not be 
interpreted as the intention to move beyond the Convention and the Protocol. 
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stance. In 1999, the then leader of the Chinese delegates in the COP5 to the Convention, 
the  then deputy Minister  Liu from NDRC, further  reaffirmed that  China would not 
accept any binding reduction obligation until it reached the medium-development stage. 
(Zhang 2008: 84). China has kept insisting on this principle throughout international 
climate negotiations in the last two decades. For China, the principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’ accepted by the Convention is treated as unchallengeable 
so that this principle has brought historical responsibility into debate. As a result, the 
fact that China rejects the legally-binding commitment of emissions reduction should 
not lead to the conclusion that China is just a selfish obstructer in international climate 
negotiations. China has, following the regulations of the Convention and the Protocol, 
fulfilled its  required obligation to publish its  National  Communiqué and GHGs list. 
Moreover, China has made contributions to mitigate climate change so that its energy 
intensity target has successfully reduced emissions.61 Other measures, such as energy 
saving, population control, afforestation, readjustment of industrial structures and the 
investment  in  renewable  energy,  have  also  contributed  to  the  mitigation.  More 
importantly, China’s non-commitment stance is actually responsible internationally and 
domestically.  China cannot  and should not bear unrealistic commitments which will 
bring  excess  burden to  the  Chinese  people.  China  should  grasp  this  opportunity  to 
promote  its  own  sustainable  development  (Zhuang  and  Chen  2005).  After  the  US 
withdrew from the  Protocol in 2001, it provided the chance for China to criticise the 
industrial countries for failing to fulfil their reduction commitments ahead of developing 
countries. 
    When the Protocol came into effect in 2005, the then leader of the Chinese delegates 
in the COP11 to the Convention and the COP1 to the Protocol, deputy Minister Wang 
61The calculation of the reduction is based on the Business as Usual (BAU) scenario. According to 
Zhuang and Chen (2005: 279), the 60% reduction of energy consumption in per capita GDP from 1981 to 
1999 equals the reduction of 550 million tonnes of carbon dioxide. 
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from  NDRC,  addressed  China’s  positions:  (1)  to  insist  on  the  instruction  of  the 
Convention, especially the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’; (2) 
to take action under the framework of sustainable development; (3) to emphasise the 
importance of technology to tackle climate change; (4) to assure the balance between 
adaptation and mitigation; and (5) developed countries should fulfil their commitments 
of technological and financial transfers to developing countries, and more international 
cooperative mechanisms which integrate public and private sectors, such as the CDM, 
was needed (Zhang 2008: 84). It is apparent that the difficult task to bring the Protocol 
into  force  and  the  growing  international  pressures  on  China  has  made  it  start 
considering the post-2012 framework. To reaffirm the principles from the Convention, a 
negotiation tool for China to claim its autonomy in climate talks was needed. Since the 
conclusion  of  the  Bali  Roadmap in  2007,  the  dual-track  mechanism  including  all 
members of the Convention and the Protocol has gradually become the new framework 
for international climate negotiations. Under this dual-track mechanism, international 
pressures on big emitters including leading developing countries are growing. The Bali 
Roadmap requests developing countries to undertake Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 
Actions (NAMAs) and these NAMAs should be measurable, reportable and verifiable 
(MRV).  In  order  to  maintain  its  autonomy,  China  insists  that  the  NAMAs  in  the 
developing countries are essentially different from the legally-binding commitment with 
quantified  reduction  targets  of  developed  countries.  (NDRC  2009).  The  main 
differences are (1) the NAMAs in different countries are autonomously initiated. (2) 
NAMAs  include  multiple  policies  and  projects  which  is  different  from  quantified 
reduction targets. (3) NAMAs are in line with national circumstances and sustainable 
development strategies of different developing countries. It is apparent that to maintain 
the autonomy of NAMAs in developing countries,  this  should fit  with the principle 
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raised by the Convention. When President Hu addressed the UN before the Copenhagen 
Summit, China implied it was going to have a quantified target for the first time. It was 
merely the target to reduce carbon intensity based on the BAU: a 40%-45% reduction of 
carbon emission per capita GDP by 2020, compared to 2005 level. This has become 
another  clear  and  unchallengeable  principle  for  China  that  emphasises  a  voluntary 
action  by  a  developing  country.  This  target  has  been  established  and  China  has 
implemented it domestically making a stance to refuse the legally-binding commitment 
as in the Cancun Summit  in  2010 and the Durban Summit  in  2011 (China Climate 
Change Info-Net62). China is willing to establish clear and quantified targets to curb the 
growth  of  carbon  emissions,  but  the  action  must  be  voluntary  and  not  linked  to 
international binding commitments. 
    In summary, from 1990 to the present, China’s attitude towards the legally-binding 
commitment  to  reduce  GHGs  emissions  is  clear  and  insistent.  According  to  the 
historical responsibilities, industrialised countries have to fulfil their commitments first 
and to provide technological and financial transfers to developing countries. The spirit 
of  the  Convention which  pursues  ‘common but  different  responsibilities’ should  be 
respected  and  consolidated.  Developing  countries,  at  this  stage,  merely  have  the 
responsibilities  to  undertake  voluntary  actions.  Quantified  targets  may  be  set  up  in 
developing countries, but it has to be voluntary and has to match up the capacities and 
circumstances of different countries. 
(B) Financial and Technological Transfer
China stands firmly with the G-77 on emphasising the historical responsibility causing 
threats of climate change. As a result, the North-South framework has been formed and 
62China Climate Change Info-Net ( http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/cn/index.asp) is a website established by 
the NDRC. All important statements, laws, regulations, national communications and publications on 
climate change from China are sorted out and listed in this website.
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different obligations are required to different groups. Industrialised countries not only 
have the obligation to reduce GHGs emissions ahead of developing countries, but are 
also requested to transfer relevant technologies of mitigation and necessary financial 
resource to the South. This principle was accepted by the Convention and it has always 
been insisted on by developing countries including China. In 1999, two years after the 
Protocol was  concluded,  the  then  deputy  Minister  Liu  addressed  the  COP5  to  the 
Convention and restated that developed countries should follow the regulation of the 
Convention  to  provide  technological  transfer  and financial  aid,  in  order  to  enhance 
China’s capability to tackle climate change (Zhang 2008: 84). These are unavoidable 
obligations of developed countries, China insists. 
    This insistence lasted throughout international climate talks and in 2005, China made 
some supplements. In the COP11 to the Convention and the COP1 to the Protocol, the 
then deputy Minister Wang from NDRC emphasised the crucial roles of science and 
technology to tackle the challenge of climate change. Nevertheless, what was lacking 
was the mechanism to transfer and diffuse necessary technologies internationally. As a 
result,  China  made  two  suggestions:  (1)  to  establish  an  effective  mechanism  of 
technology diffusion based on market  laws. This  mechanism should promote global 
sustainable  development  and  lower  the  costs  of  applying  these  technologies  in 
developing countries. (2) To develop mutually beneficial cooperation on technology in 
order to make a breakthrough of many crucial energy technologies. Regarding financial 
aspects,  Wang  kept  emphasising  the  importance  that  developed  countries  provide 
financial  aid to developing countries.  However,  China also proposed to  establish an 
international  cooperative  mechanism in  which  public  and  private  sectors  participate 
together,  such as the CDM (Zhang 2008: 84). It  is  clear that while insisting on the 
obligation  of  industrialised  countries  to  transfer  technology  and  financial  support, 
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China’s  stance  has  become  more  flexible  as  it  started  considering  and  welcoming 
various types of international cooperation. Nevertheless, the core concerns remain the 
same as the North and the South stand in different structural positions with different 
responsibilities. The North cannot escape their  obligations but the technological and 
financial  transfers  can  be  achieved  through  various  ways.  A more  efficient  way  to 
diffuse technology and provide financial support to developing countries is also crucial 
in fulfilling sustainable development for developing countries. Since 2005, China has 
accepted  the  market  mechanism,  in  which  the  government  and  enterprises  work 
together, as an effective governmental tool to fulfil technology and financial transfer. 
This  perspective  was  affirmed  by  President  Hu  (2009).  Meanwhile,  taking  the 
divergences among developing countries into consideration, China has started exporting 
its technologies and financial supports to the LDCs and AOSIS through ‘South-South 
cooperation’, deputy Minister Xie from NDRC claimed at the Cancun Summit (Deng 
2010).   
(C) Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation  
The Programme of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) is 
a  measure  to  incorporate  the  protection  of  forests  into  the  battle  to  tackle  climate 
change. The idea is to provide financial compensation to those countries which reduce 
GHGs emissions from deforestation.63 In the COP11 to the Convention in 2005, Papua 
New Guinea, with other countries from the Coalition of Rainforest Nations, proposed 
this  compensation  mechanism and  this  proposal  was  formally  accepted  in  the  Bali  
Roadmap in 2007. The aim was to create incentives for developing countries to prevent 
63The simple fact is that “tropical forests cover about 15% of the world’s land surface and contain about 
25% of the carbon in the terrestrial biosphere……Roughly 13 million hectares……are converted to other 
land uses each year. This loss accounts for around a fifth of global carbon emissions.” (GCP 2009: 12). 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United States (FAO), the total number of 
forests in the world cover 31% of the world’s land surface (FAO 2010). 
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deforestation and forest  degradation.  The measures  to  enhance the conversation and 
sustainability  of  the  forest  were  accepted  as  the  REDD  plus  (REDD+)  at  the 
Copenhagen Summit in 2009. The Cancun Summit in 2010 determined the guidelines 
and scales of the REDD+ and agreed to establish a Green Climate Fund which would 
also finance the REDD+. After years of negotiation, the regulation and methodology of 
the REDD has gradually been established at UN level. It can also work as part of the 
global carbon market so that the certified emissions reductions (CERs) from the REDD 
can  be  traded  and  auctioned,  and  used  by  countries  and  companies  to  fulfil  their 
reduction targets under the cap-and-trade system (GCP 2009: 26). Nevertheless, how to 
allocate the allowances, to set up the baseline, to confirm the land rights and distribute 
the interest, to prevent damage to indigenous people and environment and to prevent 
carbon offsetting through the REDD remains controversial (FOEI 2008, 2010). 
    China  is  a  country  with  rich  forest  resources  and  China’s  State  Forestry 
Administration (SFA) estimates the forest ecosystems contribute 10 trillion RMB, or 
about one third of China's GDP (Watts 2010); nevertheless, since the main target of the 
REDD are countries with tropical forests, how China can benefit from the future REDD 
market  is  not  clear  yet.  Basically,  China  supports  the  establishment  of  the  REDD 
programme. In 2008, China proposed to the UNFCCC that it emphasised that role of 
conservation and sustainable management of forests and that the enhancement of forest 
carbon stocks in developing countries are as important as traditional REDD measures. 
In  other  words,  China  accepts  the  idea  of  REDD+.  The  REDD  should  promote 
sustainable development and poverty alleviation in developing countries. Meanwhile, 
China has restated the importance of adequate financial and technological support in 
order  to  implement  the  REDD  (UNFCCC  2008:  37-38).  Internationally,  from 
Copenhagen to Durban, China’s attitude toward the REDD+ remains the same as it 
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supports  the establishment of the REDD+ but  China keeps emphasising that having 
enough financial  support is  crucial  to the implementation of the REDD+, either  the 
financing is fund-based or market-based. China realises the importance of the carbon 
stock which is from LULUCF (Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry) as another 
crucial  tool  to  reduce  GHGs  emissions  when  direct  reduction  measures  through 
industrial sectors face their limits. Meanwhile, China warns that the REDD+ measures 
should  not  be used by developed countries  to  offset  their  reduction  targets  (NDRC 
2009b). In summary, although China has not become an active player in the REDD+ 
negotiations, it  has poured its resources into enhancing its capacities in the fields of 
carbon stocks including the REDD+. The SFA has promulgated the guidelines to tackle 
climate change through forestry in the 12th FYP (2011). Forestry is treated as a crucial 
strategic sector to tackle climate change in both mitigation and adaptation levels. On the 
one hand, China keeps  enlarging its  carbon stock through massive planting and the 
director of SFA has promised to plant 26 billion more trees in the next ten years (Zhao 
2012). On the other hand, the business of carbon stock is encouraged to attract financial 
investments through present CDM mechanisms (Zi and Wang 2011). China registered a 
CDM project on carbon sink and afforestation for the first time in 2010 (NDRC 2010). 
Meanwhile, domestic and voluntary trading is also encouraged and the first trading of 
forest carbon stock was dealt in Beijing in 2011. It is clear that China does not reject the 
market mechanism in the implementation of the REDD+. 
(D) Carbon Capture and Sequestration
The technology of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) is viewed as an effective 
way to tackle climate change without burdening too much cost on mitigation measures. 
It will capture the carbon dioxide before or after combustion of fossil fuels before the 
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carbon dioxide goes into the atmosphere, and then store the captured carbon dioxide 
deep underground. The CCS is not a prior topic in international climate negotiations at 
UN level, but China has developed many CCS schemes through bilateral efforts. The 
heavy reliance  on  coal  in  China’s  energy structure  and the  huge amount  of  carbon 
emissions  due  to  the  usage  of  coal  has  also  brought  the  incentive  for  the  Chinese 
government  to  approach  CCS.64 In  2005,  the  China-UK Near-Zero  Emissions  Coal 
(NZEC) agreement was accepted in order to deploy the CSS to demonstrate the near 
zero emissions coal technology in China (NZEC 2008). The NZEC initiative aims at 
constructing a demonstration plant with CSS technology in China by 2015. Meanwhile, 
China has also developed bilateral cooperation with the US on CCS technology. The 
American-based World Resource Institute (WRI) has built up the platform for the US-
China  collective  actions  to  research  and  develop  CCS  technology,  and  its  Chinese 
branch  is  working  with  the  Tsinghua  University  on  drafting  the  guidelines  and 
regulations of the deployment of the CCS in China. China’s biggest CCS experiment 
base in Wuhan city was built in 2011 as part of the scheme of China-US clean energy 
cooperation. 
    Since  China’s National Climate Change Programme (hereafter referred to as the 
Programme)  was  promulgated  in  2007,  China  has  determined  to  develop  CCS 
technology.  During  the  11th FYP  from  2006-2010,  China  constructed  many 
demonstration plants with CCS technology.  By the end of 2011, the Chinese power 
company which is also the biggest power company in the world, Huaneng, established 
the  GreenGen  plant  whereby  90% of  its  emissions  will  be  sequestrated  (Friedman 
2011). It is clear that despite the cost of CCS remaining high, the uncertainties of safety 
in the capture,  transportation and sequestration phases, the insufficiency of financial 
investment and the potential environmental damages, China is willing to develop the 
64From 2004 to 2011, 2.5 billion tonnes of CO2 was emitted from the coal plants in China (Friedman 
2011). 
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CSS technology through enhanced bilateral cooperation.
(E) MRV
From  the  Convention to  the  Protocol,  there  is  no  legally-binding  obligation  to 
developing  countries  to  implement  quantified  reduction  emissions  targets.  What 
developing countries need to do is to report and publish its National Communiqué and 
GHG  list,  and  to  raise  public  awareness.  As  discussed  in  part  (A),  the  growing 
international  pressures  on big emitters,  especially  those leading developing counties 
including China,  India and Brazil,  brought the discussion of NAMAs and the MRV 
principle to the Bali Summit in 2007. The Roadmap requested the developing countries 
to take mitigation actions under the framework of sustainable development. Meanwhile, 
these  actions  needed  to  meet  the  principle  of  MRV.  Initially  China,  with  other 
developing countries, agreed to keep discussing MRV and they were aware that this 
principle would bring pressures to developing countries (Li 2008). MRV is thought to 
be applied to developed countries as well  so that when heading to  the Copenhagen 
Summit, China argued that the financial and technological measures from developed 
countries  to  help  the  NAMAs in  developing countries  should  meet  the  principle  of 
MRV.  Nevertheless,  a  fierce  debate  on  MRV  erupted  in  the  last  few  days  of  the 
Copenhagen Summit  when the US agreed to  provide a 30-billion-US -dollar  ‘quick 
start’ aid to developing countries by 2012, it also strongly asked that China’s NAMAs 
should meet the principle of MRV internationally. China reacted fiercely to claim that it 
would not compete for financial aid and the financing should go to small island states 
first.  Meanwhile, China confirmed its position that it  opposed the MRV of domestic 
measures in developing countries (Hsu and Barnett 2009). Nevertheless, MRV became 
the principle  issue in the last  few days of negotiation due to  the pressure from US 
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Senator Kerry. In the end, after US President Obama arrived and met with the Chinese 
Premier Wen on the topic of ‘transparency’, these two great powers seemed to find a 
temporary compromise. According to the Copenhagen Accord, the MRV principle is 
split into international and domestic levels. International MRV will be applied to those 
mitigation  actions  in  developing  countries  which  are  supported  by  international 
mechanisms in terms of technology, finance and capacity building. Those unsupported 
and domestic measures will  be subject to domestic MRV only and the result  of the 
domestic MRV should be reported through national communications every two years 
with provisions for international consultations and analysis (ICA). It will operate with 
the condition that national sovereignty is respected (UNFCCC 2009). 
    From this review, it is clear that China is not entirely against the MRV principle. 
Instead,  after  accepting  the  Copenhagen  Accord,  China’s  stance  is  clear  that 
international MRV is applied to measures with foreign support. Although China still has 
to face pressure from the ICA, it is intolerable for China to accept international MRV on 
its domestic measures as it is treated as a challenge to the independence and autonomy 
of China’s sovereignty (Friedman 2009, Lee 2009).65 No matter how much its statistics 
techniques need to be improved on to calculate the emissions (Breslin 2007, Neefus 
2010), to entirely introduce MRV is treated as an offence to China’s sovereignty. In any 
case, no matter whether China expected it or not, MRV has become one of the core 
challenges for China in international climate negotiations since the Copenhagen Summit 
in  2009.  China  is  fully  aware  of  the  pressure  along  with  MRV  and  under  such 
international pressure; China’s rhetoric becomes more flexible on this issue. The deputy 
Minister  of  the  NDRC,  Xie,  expressed  before  the  Cancun  Summit  that  as  long  as 
sovereignty was not infringed, China had no problem with MRV and ICA (Meng 2010). 
65What is tricky is that China had claimed in the Copenhagen Summit that it did not expect any of the 
100-billion US dollars fund to go to China (Friedman 2009, Wong 2009). This implies that China may not 
have the need to face any MRV requirement. 
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Nevertheless, China also mentioned that (international) MRV is different form ICA and 
it is arguable, that domestic measures should be subject to international MRV. In short, 
while  MRV has  unavoidably  become  the  core  dispute  in  international  negotiations, 
China has drawn its baseline implying the priority of the integrity of sovereignty under 
the more flexible discourse. 
(G)CDM 
When the CDM appeared with JI and ETS in the Protocol, China was highly sceptical 
about these three flexible mechanisms. China criticised that it was unacceptable to use 
these  flexible  mechanisms  to  merely  transfer  responsibilities  to  other  (developing) 
countries.  Consequently,  China strongly requested limiting the scales  of the flexible 
mechanisms  (Yan  and  Xiao  2010a:  83).  China  was  also  concerned  about  tackling 
climate  change  through  measures  of  ‘low-hanging  fruit’ as  this  would  increase  the 
future cost of mitigation in China. However, this hesitant stance has had a dramatic shift 
since the  Protocol came into effect in  2005. China has become more confident and 
active  in  the  CDM  market  and  has  occupied  the  majority  of  the  market;  detailed 
discussions will be made in the next chapter. From the hard-line and obstinate stance to 
the  cooperative  attitudes  on  flexible  mechanisms,  China  has  brought  theoretical 
challenges to both neo-realist and neo-liberalist accounts. The change of the attitude not 
only implies the potential interests by adopting flexible mechanisms, but also represents 
the shift of governmental rationalities, this thesis argues. A detailed discussion of how 
China responds to the CDM in international and domestic levels is in the next chapter.
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4.3.2 International Climate Cooperation 
The continuities and changes of China’s attitudes toward crucial issues in international 
climate change negotiations are discussed in the last  part.  These issues and relevant 
disputes mostly happen at UN level. Besides this level, there still are other international 
interactions among China and other parties, bilaterally or multilaterally. As a result, this 
part  moves to  discuss  the  bilateral  and multilateral  cooperation China engages  with 
different parties. Leaving the controversial issues aside, China officially recognises the 
scientific evidence and the potential threats of climate change and is willing to develop 
cooperation at different levels in the international arena, as long as the cooperation does 
not impose or force China to take certain measures. This concern explains the conflicts 
and cooperation between China and the US at different levels. From the 1980s, China 
and the US had started to cooperate on climate science. In addition, these two countries 
also have many bilateral co-operations in various fields, including clean coal technology 
since 1994, energy efficiency and the technology of renewable energy since 1995, and 
clean air and clean energy since 1999. In 2002, just one year after the US withdrew 
from the Protocol, these two countries established a working group on climate change 
to cooperate on technologies. In 2006, the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
was  established  and  acts  as  the  highest  dialogue  mechanism  between  these  two 
countries  on  regional  and  global  security  and  economic  issues.  ‘Energy  and 
environment’ is one of the working groups within this framework. These two countries 
work together, according to the agreements from the Dialogue, to promote bio-fuel and 
renewable energy in order to reduce carbon emissions. The Beijing Olympics in 2008 
also  provided  a  chance  for  China  and  the  US  to  work  on  green  building,  smart 
transportation,  energy  efficiency,  air  quality,  weather  forecasting  and  clean  coal 
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technology (Zhang 2007).  In 2009,  Chinese President  Hu and US President  Obama 
agreed  to  enhance  mutual  cooperation  and  to  establish  a  US-China  Clean  Energy 
Research Center (CERC), which was officially launched in 2011. Besides the research 
on clean coal, clean vehicles and energy efficient buildings, the CERC has also built the 
biggest  CCS base  in  China,  as  discussed  earlier.66 Communication  and  cooperation 
between the NGOs and local governments in each country operate vigorously as well.67 
Both  countries  also  cooperate  at  a  multilateral  level,  especially  the  Asia-Pacific 
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), which was founded in 2005. 
Member states of the APP are from both developed and developing worlds, including 
Australia,  Canada,  China,  India,  Japan, South Korea and the US. Collectively,  these 
seven member states account for more than half of the world's economy, population and 
energy usage. The APP aims at introducing different initiatives to develop “less carbon 
intensive  technologies  instead  of  Kyoto’s  ‘cap  and trade’”  (Kasa  et  al. 2008:  121). 
There have already been over 100 projects  implemented in different member states 
since 2010. China actively participates in the APP, which is led by the US, as long as 
this multilateral mechanism does not challenge the framework of the  Convention and 
the Protocol.
    Apparently, a mode of multi-dimensional and multi-level cooperation has built up 
the different issues of climate science and climate policies between China and the US. 
Compared with the political disputes in the UN-led international negotiations, China 
and the US have more concrete achievements in the field of climate science and energy 
technology. Although the above co-operations go smoothly,  core divergences remain 
unfixed. Apart from the ‘moral’ or ‘equity’ concerns, which lie in the disputes around 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ and the North-South confrontation, the lack 
66Please see the CERC website: http://www.us-china-cerc.org/ .
67The Global Environmental Institute (GEI) has built up a strong relationship with the Ford Foundation in 
the US. They have also facilitated  cooperation between local governments from both countries, in which 
the Guangdong Province and the California State are involved.  
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of mutual trust also makes it difficult to develop further cooperation between these two 
countries.  While  these  two powers  have  not  reached any consensus  on  the  legally-
binding commitment of emissions reductions and the application of the MRV principle, 
China has quickly become the biggest investor in clean and renewable energy and the 
biggest  producer  of  wind turbines and solar  panels in  the world.  It  is  apparent  that 
another  new battleground  for  competition  has  emerged  between  these  two  powers. 
However, the phenomenon of competition and disputes between China and the US at 
UN-level negotiations should not neglect the fact that the cooperation between these 
two countries in many aspects is growing rapidly. 
    Despite the criticisms against China from Germany and the UK immediately after the 
failure of the Copenhagen Conference (Miliband 2009, Spiegel Online 2009), the EU 
and China have maintained close relations through multi-level cooperation. Both China 
and the EU insist that climate negotiations should be held under the multilateral UN 
framework which follow the rules and values of the Convention and the Protocol. The 
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ is supported by the EU and 
China.  As a result,  these two parties enhanced their  bilateral  cooperation so that,  in 
2005,  the  EU  and  China  announced  the  China-EU  Joint  Declaration  on  Climate  
Change.  They  agreed  to  build  up  the  China-EU partnership  in  the  field  of  climate 
change in order to tackle severe challenges together. The concrete working programmes 
include  clean  coal,  renewable  energy,  carbon  finance,  the  technology  of  the  CCS, 
climate  science  and  the  promotion  of  the  CDM.  After  the  ratification  of  the  Joint 
Declaration by each party, bilateral cooperation at different levels and issues has taken 
place since then and a regular ministerial dialogue mechanism was also established in 
2010.  The bilateral  cooperation  has  brought  various  achievements  in  China’s  CDM 
market and CCS projects (Romano 2010). It is apparent that the EU is eager to export 
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its own modes and experiences to China, and has opened levels of cooperation with 
China, in order to draw China onto the path of a low carbon future, as set up by the 
EU.68 China has learnt the concept of ‘low carbon development’ since 1999 through a 
cooperative project on renewable energy with the US Energy Foundation. Since the UK 
promulgated  its  energy  white  paper  in  2003,  China  has  learnt  much  more  through 
bilateral cooperation (Zhuang 2007).69
    Apparently, the less aggressive approach of the EU, which does not challenge China’s 
path to maintain the integrity of sovereignty and the goal of development while tackling 
climate change, is welcomed by China and, consequently, it is easier to keep China on 
track. However, the fierce reactions from Germany and the UK after the Copenhagen 
Summit have shown that this friendly relationship between China and the EU has its 
own limits. Can the EU keep accepting that China is exempt in having its own binding 
obligation, especially when China is only thought to care about its own interests? In 
other  words,  can  the  China-EU relation  keep  the  same  technological  level  without 
further political dialogue on the post-Kyoto regime and other sensitive issues? (Romano 
2010) Moreover, even back to the technological level, the emergence of China in the 
sector of clean energy has posed threats to the global leading role of the EU (Freeman 
and Hoslag 2009). Can the EU keep using its soft power to influence China’s decision 
in  international  climate  negotiations?  While  the  EU strongly  opposed  the  proposals 
from  the  US  to  establish  new  international  frameworks,  including  the  ‘long-term 
strategy’ of climate change which is aimed at abandoning the existing UN framework, 
China did not react as fiercely as the EU did, although China’s attitude is to maintain the 
Convention  and  Protocol frameworks.  China has  joined the APP in order  to  pursue 
68After the UK promulgated its energy white paper, Our Energy Future - Creating a Low Carbon 
Economy, in 2003 (Department of Trade and Industry, DTI), the concept of a ‘low carbon economy’ has 
become the buzzword around the world. It is not only a long-term grand energy strategy for the UK but 
also a pilot concept in global climate politics. 
69The UK is also eager to export this new concept and mode. In the British Embassy in China, a 
cooperation project focuses on promoting China’s transition to a low carbon economy. 
http://ukinchina.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/working-with-china/climate-change/uk-china-cooperation/ 
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technological transfer. Moreover, China did welcome some of the proposals from the 
US  about  a  ‘long-term  strategy’  if  these  proposals  could  bring  about  economic 
development  and technological  transfer.  This thesis  argues that  China’s  instrumental 
attitude is the key to grasping the interplay between China and the EU and that China is  
willing to maintain cooperation with the EU as long as this bilateral relationship does 
not post challenges to China’s path of development and threaten its sovereignty.
    Regarding China’s interaction with other developing countries, it is clear that from 
academia to government, China keeps claiming the need to maintain the solidarity of the 
developing  world.  The  acceptance  of  the  principle  of  ‘common  but  differentiated 
responsibilities’ in the Convention demonstrated the victory of the G-77 plus China, and 
this principle is treated as the highest guideline for developing countries in international 
negotiations. However, the fact is that the developing world is too big a unit and it is  
difficult to claim common interests for every member. The divergences between China 
and other developing countries, especially the AOSIS and LDCs, since the Copenhagen 
Summit include: (1) the target of curbing climate change. China accepts the mainstream 
target of 2 degrees centigrade with 450 parts per million (ppm), but the AOSIS and 
LDCs have proposed a more radical target of 1.5 degrees centigrade with 350 ppm. (2) 
In order to fulfil the radical target, the AOSIS and LDCs have argued that emerging 
economies, which are the leading developing countries, should be integrated into the 
legally-binding  framework.  (3)  The  distribution  of  financial  aids  from  developed 
countries (Yan and Xiao 2010b). It is true that industrialised countries never give up on 
disuniting the developing world,  from the pre-Kyoto to the post-Copenhagen stages. 
Nevertheless,  the fact  is  that,  objectively and materially,  it  is  essentially  difficult  to 
maintain the integrity of the developing world. Through Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4, the 
huge gap between China and other developing countries are clearly represented so that 
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it  becomes more  difficult  for  all  developing countries  to  take  common positions  in 
international climate change negotiations. The simple fact is that even by considering 
per capita emissions, China still has a higher number than other developing countries, 
not mentioning the total amount of GHG emissions. The South is a loose coalition and 
the gap will be widened. During the Copenhagen Conference, this trend was clear when 
most  LDCs could  only  express  their  anger  by leaving the  conference hall,  whereas 
China and other BASIC countries were invited to negotiate the Copenhagen Accord.
    At the same time, while China has built up levels of cooperation in terms of climate 
science,  technology  cooperation,  renewable  energy,  energy  efficiency  and  carbon 
market  and  carbon  finance  with  many  industrialised  countries,  what  have  other 
developing countries gained, either from developed countries or from China? What is 
the benefit to consolidate the solidarity of the South if most interests and technologies 
go to China? After the Copenhagen Summit, China was aware of the influence of the 
growing divergences  within  the developing world.  As a  result,  China  has  started to 
enhance  its  relationship  with  other  developing  countries  through  the  framework  of 
‘South-South Cooperation’ and the cooperation is set to move beyond the discursive 
level (NDRC 2009a, 2010).70 Besides cooperation in the fields of the energy sector and 
natural  resources  (AFP  2008,  Mouawad  2010),  China  is  willing  to  provide  more 
substantial support to other developing countries. Deputy Minister Xie from the NDRC 
mentioned four dimensions of supports: (1) the infrastructure of adaptation in terms of 
the enhancement of meteorology and relevant warning technologies; (2) the promotion 
of adaptation technologies; (3) the promotion and application of technologies of energy 
70Two contributions from China should be noticed. The first one is the proposal of ‘carbon emission 
rights’ meaning that developing countries should have the right to develop, instead of the responsibility to 
mitigate. While emission rights are taken into account, China promotes the per-capita base, which is 
advantageous to the developing world (Pan and Zheng 2009). The other contribution is the separation 
between luxury carbon emissions and necessary emissions for human development. This separation is still 
based on the framework of ‘emission rights’, but it elaborates more about the ‘contents of the emissions’, 
which also brings the question of offset emissions from international trade and the  globalisation of 
manufacture.
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saving,  energy  efficiency  and  renewable  energy  and  (4)  the  enhancement  of  the 
cooperation on the CDM in order to improve the acceptance rate of registered CDM 
projects from other developing countries. China will also train another 1,000 officials 
and technicians in the field of climate change for other developing countries in the next 
three years. Xie also addressed trained officials from the AOSIS and LDCs as China 
aided 98 climate change projects to other developing countries and trained more than 
2,400 personnel for them, from 2005-2010 (Zhao and Huang 2011). This is the first time 
that  China  officially  claimed  it  is  going  to  export  its  CDM  experiences  to  other 
developing countries. Although the concrete achievements remain unclear, it is apparent 
that  China  does  not  prefer  a  G-2  framework  consisting  of  the  US  and  China  in 
international climate change politics. Rather, to maintain the North-South framework is 
still the priority even though the BASIC group has become more influential. 
Figure 4-3 Per Capita CO2 Emissions of Major Countries in 2005
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Source: US Energy Information Administration 
(Adapted from China-Profile http://www.china-profile.com/index.htm )
Figure 4-4 Total Amounts of CO2 Emissions of Major Countries in 2005
                                               
Source: US Energy Information Administration 
(Adapted from China-Profile http://www.china-profile.com/index.htm )
4.4 Conclusion
The  analysis  of  four  governmental  rationalities  underpinning  China’s  politics  and 
governance of climate change in the last chapter has provided an effective framework 
for  grasping  China’s  strategic  concern,  self-identification,  discourse,  baselines  and 
mentalities in  international  climate change politics.  These rationalities  all  have their 
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international derivations as analysed; but they have all been translated and transformed 
through China’s needs at some particular historical moments. Different rationalities are 
imbedded  in  China’s  foreign  politics  in  different  ways  and  the  influence  has  been 
expanded to the field of climate change. By examining China’s continuities and changes 
toward  crucial  issues  and  China’s  interactions  with  different  actors  in  international 
climate change politics, how these four rationalities direct and format the ‘naturalness’ 
and ‘right disposition of things’ along with the new ‘arts of government’ becomes clear. 
Zhang once described the prospect of China’s stance on future negotiations as ‘the soft 
issues become softer while the hard ones become harder’ (2008: 93). Regarding hard-
line principles, Zhang explained that it refers to China’s insistence on the differentiated 
responsibilities  between  the  developed  and  developing  countries.  Besides  rejecting 
legally-binding commitments and emphasising the obligation of reducing emissions by 
developed countries ahead of developing countries, China’s fierce response to the theme 
of  ‘China’s  environmental  threat’ also  represents  this  hard-line stance (Zhang 2008: 
94).71 Minister  Ma  of  the  NDRC strongly  claimed  that  considering  per  capita  and 
historical  accumulated  emissions,  China  should  not  be  blamed  for  not  committing 
legally-binding agreements. Meanwhile, for China and other developing countries, to 
develop  along  with  carbon  emissions  is  necessary.  It  is  not  fair  to  limit  the 
industrialisation and modernisation of developing countries (Xinhua 2007). 
    Obviously, it is not difficult to sort out the core insistences and the hard-lines of 
China’s climate diplomacy since these discourses can be easily found in mass media, 
text books on international climate politics, official documents and in many research 
papers. Nevertheless, this does not help us understand why and how certain issues are 
71China’s environmental threat is a perspective emphasising total GHG emissions, instead of per capita 
emissions or the historical accumulations of China. This theme argues that as China grows rapidly, the 
lack of China’s measures on environmental protection has brought huge threats to the whole world. This 
theme appears in Chinese media from about 2006, and reaches its peak during the Copenhagen Summit in 
2009. 
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tougher than other, this thesis contends. What defines which issues should be hard or 
soft? As discussed earlier, to keep emphasising the separation between the developed 
and developing world represents the perspective based on the historical responsibilities. 
While differentiated responsibilities are clearly distributed to different parties, to stay in 
the  developing  world  is  the  most  effective,  if  not  the  best,  tactic  to  maintain  the 
autonomy  of  a  country  in  international  climate  change  politics.  All  these  hard-line 
insistences  have  represented  China’s  aspirations  to  maintain  its  autonomy within  it. 
However,  why  maintaining  autonomy  is  so  important  needs  to  be  understood 
genealogically in order to examine how China learnt, translated and consolidated the 
concepts,  practices  and  knowledge  of  sovereignty.  The  specific  historical  path  of 
Communist  China  concomitant  with  the  state/society/party  relationship  has 
strengthened this mentality in which China and its sovereignty is always under threat 
from the  outside  world.  This  mentality  can  be  found  even  in  officials  and  leading 
Chinese researchers on climate policy, as discussed in the last chapter. 
    Nevertheless, this thesis points out that besides the rationality of sovereignty, the 
rationality  of  development  has  become  another  pivotal  governmental  rationality  in 
China’s  foreign  politics  of  climate  change.  Historically,  these  two rationalities  have 
underpinned the desired goals from different parties in China in the last century, which 
are  to  fulfil  modernisation,  industrialisation  and  prosperity  in  an  independent  and 
autonomous state. The ideological foundation of Communist China has also enhanced 
the will and the need to develop; meanwhile, to maintain the integrity of sovereignty 
and the path of development have become two important foundations of the legitimacy 
of the CPC. Various contingencies have made these two rationalities overwhelming and 
dominant  in  China’s  politics  and  governance,  and  this  phenomenon  has  brought  a 
stubborn and selfish China into international climate change politics. After gaining more 
185
scientific  evidence  about  the  potential  threats  of  climate  change  to  China’s  fragile 
ecological  system;  developing  knowledge  in  which  different  scenarios  about  how 
China’s economic growth might be influenced are analysed; and being aware of how 
these  challenges  might  cause  a  legitimate  crisis  for  the CPC, those hard-line  issues 
indeed become harder while more flexibilities appear at the same time. 
    Nevertheless, the phenomenon that China expresses more flexibility in those ‘soft’ 
issues has to be grasped by examining the rationality of development, this thesis argues. 
As analysed in the last chapter, technicality is at the core of discourse on development. 
The technicality has defined and sought solutions through ‘technical and anti-political 
measures’ (Germond-Duret and Howe 2011). This explains why China has changed its 
attitude  toward  market  mechanisms  and  other  flexible  designs.  By  accepting  and 
engaging in those ‘technical’ issues actively not only provides the opportunity for China 
to fulfil the goals of development, but also creates a space for China to demonstrate its 
contributions in the apolitical spheres. As this thesis keeps emphasising, the ‘politics via 
market’ is  just  another  type  of  politics,  and this  is  more  apparent  in  China’s  case. 
Meanwhile, considering the history about how Communist China introduced the market 
mechanism  as  a  means  to  improving  productivity  in  the  past  three  decades, 
instrumentality  has been imbedded into the rationality  of market  in  China since the 
beginning of  the  economic  reform.  On the  one  hand,  China  still  worries  about  the 
‘peaceful evolution’ from the West through economic spheres and this has integrated the 
rationality  of  market  into  the  rationality  of  sovereignty.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
introduction of the market mechanism is treated as one of the crucial ways to fulfil 
China’s development goal. 
    The rationality of environment stands in a similar position to the rationality of market 
in  this  case.  To  govern  and  to  solve  environmental  problems/degradations  through 
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managerialism  based  on  technicality  brings  the  potential  of  development.  The 
environment itself is not a means of governance, but the historical contingencies under 
which the significance of the environment protection/management was introduced have 
turned  the  environment  into  manageable  objects.  This  objectification  makes  the 
rationality of environment more easily incorporated into the other three governmental 
rationalities  in  different  circumstances.  Climate  change  is  never  merely  an 
environmental problem for China and international climate politics is the battleground 
for China to strive for autonomy and development. 
    As a result, what underpins China’s attitudes toward various issues and parties in 
international climate change politics becomes clear. As discussed earlier, the rejection of 
legally-binding commitment along with the insistence on ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ is, and will be, the hard-line issue of China’s foreign politics of climate 
change.  Meanwhile,  concomitant  with  these  stances  is  the  constant  request  of 
technological and financial transfers from the developed to the developing world. The 
MRV dispute, along with the proposed funding to the developing countries, is treated by 
China as an attack on these hard-line principles. Nevertheless, China has learnt lessons 
and the proposals of International Consultation and Analysis (ICA) and NAMAs can be 
treated as flexible reactions to these hard-core disputes. By claiming that the newly built 
fund should go to LDCs and AOSIS first, China not only repairs its relation with these 
countries but also clearly points out the applicability of the MRV principle. International 
MRV  is  acceptable  only  because  it  is  related  to  international  support.  However, 
regarding domestic measures without international support, MRV is implemented into 
domestic  agencies.  What  is  more  important  is  that  sovereignty  should  be  respected 
while bringing domestic MRV for ICA. The message from China is clear: China has its 
own way to  tackle  climate  change in  which  economic  development  is  pursued and 
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maintained, and this circumstance should be respected without interference. This stance 
has  represented  the  influence  of  the  rationalities  of  sovereignty  and  development; 
meanwhile,  this  stance  can  be  guaranteed  by  the  differentiated  responsibilities  in 
international  climate  politics.  As  a  result,  it  is  obvious  that  China  will  not  make 
concessions on the issue of a legally-binding commitment and will keep emphasising 
the importance of maintaining a dual-track framework. Before reaching the medium 
development  stage which is  a  clear  national  goal  by China,  the NAMAs is  China’s 
baseline in terms of obligations of emissions reductions, this thesis argues. 
    Nevertheless, although the proposal of the NAMAs represents China’s insistence on 
autonomy and development, it has demonstrated China’s flexibility as well. A similar 
attitude can be found in China’s stance on financial and technological transfers. For 
China, it is an inescapable obligation for the developed world to transfer technology and 
financial  support  to  the  developing  world,  according  to  historical  responsibility. 
However, as discussed in the last section, since 2005, China has become more flexible 
on  this  issue  while  insisting  on  the  principle,  China  encourages  and  welcomes  the 
financial and technological transfers to be fulfilled through market and other flexible 
mechanisms. In this case, the instrumentality of the market appears again so that it is 
clear  for  China  what  the  core  insistences  are,  and  what  applicable  means  are.  To 
welcome  market  mechanisms  and  flexible  cooperation  does  not  post  a  substantial 
challenge to China’s hard-line goals. Meanwhile, more flexibilities from China appear 
in  the  fields  of  CDM,  CCS and  REDD+ which  are  treated  by  China  as  necessary 
technologies and means to tackle climate change (NDRC 2010).  The commonalities 
among these mechanisms are: (1) they can facilitate the emissions reductions; (2) they 
have  potential  profits  and  thus  can  stimulate  China’s  low  carbon  and  sustainable 
development to varying degrees; (3) they can bring positive effects to the environment; 
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and (4) the achievements from these mechanisms can demonstrate China’s willingness 
and contribution to tackle climate change at international levels; meanwhile, they also 
represent the good governance within China. The technicality within these mechanisms 
makes them more acceptable to China and this has shown another side of China, in 
which a more cooperative and positive image is represented. 
    The  growing flexibility  of  China  in  these  non-hardcore  issues  explains  China’s 
interactions with two major parties in international climate change politics, the US and 
the EU. Although the controversies among these great powers in UN-led negotiations 
never ceases, the prospect of the post-Kyoto framework seems dim, the bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation between China and the major industrialised parties are growing 
rapidly,  as  discussed  in  the  last  section.  Apparently,  those  ‘technological’  issues 
including clean energy, CCS, carbon stock, clean vehicles, energy efficiency, etc., are 
where  prominent  achievements  have  been  made.  The  market  mechanism  is  also 
welcomed as an efficient tool to attract technology and financing to China, and to fulfil 
various goals in China’s efforts to tackle climate change. While China and the US both 
keep  blaming  each  other  for  not  making  a  sufficient  contribution  to  reduce  GHGs 
emissions,  the  broad  cooperation  between  these  two  powers  have  been  developed 
massively. The broadening and widening of mutual cooperation does not mean that the 
core insistences can be left aside. Meanwhile, to enhance the relation with AOSIS and 
LDCs  through  exporting  mitigation  and  adaptation  technologies  and  the  CDM 
experiences  demonstrates  China’s  willingness  to  consolidate  the  solidarity  of  the 
developing world. To maintain the North-South framework supported by the principles 
raised  by  the  Convention  and  Protocol  is  important  to  China’s  engagement  in 
international climate change politics. As a result, although the BASIC group has been 
formed and China did not provide much substantial support to the AOSIS and LDCs in 
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terms of tackling climate change, the priority of China’s strategic concern in further 
climate negotiations will still be to keep emphasising the differentiated responsibilities 
between the North and the South. This insistence is directly linked to the rationalities of 
sovereignty and development in China and thus has almost no space for compromise. 
    In its 2010 annual report on policies and actions tackling climate change, China 
restated its basic principles for international climate negotiations: (1) to abide by the 
framework of the Convention and the Protocol and to strictly follow the authorisation 
from the  Bali  Roadmap.  From China’s  perspective,  the spirit  of  the  Roadmap is  to 
maintain the framework of the  Convention and the  Protocol in the post-Kyoto (post-
2012)  period.  (2)  To  insist  on  ‘common  but  differentiated  responsibilities’  that 
developing countries need reasonable GHGs emissions in order to fulfil development. 
The  obligations  of  developed  countries  to  reduce  emissions  first  and  to  transfer 
technologies and financial support to developing countries are restated. (3) To insist on 
the principle of sustainable development that the ‘right of development’ of developing 
countries  should  be  realised.  Economic  development  and  poverty  alleviation  are 
important targets for developing countries in the battle to tackle climate change. (4) 
Mitigation  and  adaptation  measures  are  equally  important.  Meanwhile,  support  for 
financing, technologies and capacity building from developed countries are crucial for 
developing countries to fulfil mitigation and adaptation (NDRC 2010). Clearly these 
principles have been restated by China again and again in the last two decades while 
more flexibility rapidly appears in different fields and issues. This thesis argues that the 
dynamics behind these insistences and compromises, continuities and changes and hard 
and soft stances can be grasped by the revised governmentality framework, as analysed 
through  Chapter  Three  to  this  chapter.  No matter  whether  taking  an  obstructive  or 
cooperative  stance,  it  seems  that  China  is  a  perfect  model  of  realist  account. 
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Nevertheless, what this thesis tries to research is to grasp why China has become such a 
realist in international climate change politics, and what this realist country really cares 
about  and  pursues  within  it  through  genealogically  examining  the  emergence  and 
influence of four governmental rationalities in China’s climate governance and politics. 
By doing so, this thesis argues that China will keep insisting on its autonomy to tackle 
climate change that more contributions from China’s NAMAs can be expected. More 
bilateral  and  multilateral  cooperation  in  various  fields  along  with  the  widening  of 
relevant market mechanisms can be expected as well,  while the negotiations for the 
post-Kyoto framework might remain in deadlock. 
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5. The Clean Development Mechanism in China 
The  Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005 after Russia’s ratification in 2004. In 
order  to  help facilitate  the  Annex I  countries  to  fulfill  their  reduction targets,  three 
flexible mechanisms were introduced, which are Joint Implementation (JI), Emissions 
Trading (ET) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM is the only 
mechanism that incorporates developing countries into the framework of the  Protocol 
and allows industrialised countries to invest in projects which reduce emissions in these 
developing  countries.  In  the  end,  the  reduction  of  GHGs  through  the  CDM  in 
developing countries  will  be  calculated as  the  achievement  of  investing  in  Annex I 
countries. Through this project-based and market-based design, the North and the South 
have built up a connection in global climate politics. 
    Although  opposing  the  introduction  of  a  market  mechanism during  the  Kyoto 
negotiations,  China’s  attitude  quickly  changed after  the  Protocol entered  into  force. 
China has become the biggest and the most important player in the CDM market in 
terms of the amount of approved projects and the Certificated Emissions Reductions 
(CERs)  it  had  gained.  From 2005 to  the  beginning of  2010,  China   registered  749 
projects with the CDM Executive Board (CDM EB), which accounts for 36.4% of the 
total 2,059 registered projects worldwide. It has also  achieved 47.6% of the total CERs 
(181 million tonnes out of 370 million tonnes). There is no doubt that China has become 
the most active and aggressive player in the global CDM market. The CDM has become 
an indispensable part of China’s climate politics and governance. 
    However, as discussed in the previous chapters, a naïve institutionalist understanding 
on  global  climate  politics  should  be  avoided  in  order  to  grasp  the  underpinning 
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structural forces and dynamics. From a Foucauldian perspective, the CDM cannot be 
just seen as a policy tool to reach certain climate targets. In addition to its market design 
in order to pursue the most efficient way to reduce emissions, the CDM is, indeed, also 
the realisation of certain governmental rationalities in global climate politics, which is a 
mixture of green governmentality and ecological modernisation. The establishment and 
the expansion of the global carbon market, in which the amount of carbon trading rose 
from 10.86 billion US dollars in 2005 to 126.35 billion US dollars in 2008 (World Bank 
2009), has not only created an international regime to tackle climate change but also 
installed a certain ‘conduct of conduct’, a certain mentality and a certain ‘rationality of 
government’ about how to govern and whom to govern. As the only mechanism linking 
the industrialised and developing worlds, the practices of the CDM provide empirical 
grounds of how neo-liberal governmentality is produced and reproduced in the arena of 
global  climate  change  politics.  Paterson  and  Stripple  argue  that  the  CDM  actually 
creates a mode to draw developing and developed countries together, in terms of the 
reterritorialised control of the South by the North (2007: 162). They cite Fogel that the 
emerging  culture  of  carbon  management  is  a  contribution  to  a  mechanistic  ‘global 
gaze’, which moves to standardise and enroll both people and the natural world into 
largely inaccessible global institutions (2007: 163). It is, therefore, an imperial universal 
control of  nature (Dalby 2002).
    The above arguments have figured out the structure and governmental rationality 
underlying  the  global  carbon  market.  However,  these  arguments  imply  a  unilateral 
dominance  by  the  industrialised  countries  that  neglect  the  context,  history  and  the 
(relative) autonomy of various types of ‘states’ in different areas of the world. In the last 
two  chapters,  it  is  clear  that  the  rationality  of  market  needs  to  be  interpreted  and 
transformed through certain circumstances and some historical contingencies in China’s 
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involvement in international climate politics. This chapter moves to the domestic level 
and keep asking the following questions: what is China’s understanding of a market 
mechanism in global climate politics? How does China use the CDM as a governing 
tool  to  tackle  climate  change?  How does  China  deal  with  the  encounter  of  market 
rationality with the rationalities of sovereignty, development and environment? What 
changes has the CDM brought to China and what are  the characteristics  of China’s 
CDM practice? This thesis argues that while tackling climate change at the domestic 
levels, the rationalities of sovereignty and development remain China’s core concerns. 
Chapter Three has provided a detailed review about the uneven relation among four 
governmental  rationalities.  The instrumentality  and technicality  are  imbedded in the 
rationality  of  market  in  China’s  case,  due  to  its  historical  paths.  Consequently,  the 
introduction of the market mechanism serves to fulfil the desires from other dominant 
rationalities. The burgeoning of the carbon market in China cannot be treated as simply 
the expansion of green governmentality or the triumph of climate capitalism globally. 
    As a result, the aim of this chapter is to examine the governmental rationality of 
market and its interplay with other rationalities in China’s politics and governance of 
climate change. Relevant knowledge and techniques based on the market rationality will 
be analysed.  The first  section reviews the developments  of  the CDM and of  global 
carbon markets. The aim of this section is to explore the force of marketisation in global 
climate politics. The second section examines the general critiques of the CDM. The 
contradiction between market and development rationalities will be critically analysed. 
The third section discusses the development of the carbon market in China.  Section 
three starts from the review of China’s environmental governance. Then, this section 
moves on to analyse the regulations, characteristics, and problems of the CDM in China. 
The fourth section critically examines the practices of the CDM in China in order to 
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explore  the  interplay  and  conflicts  among  different  governmental  rationalities.  The 
fruitful  outcomes  from  the  fieldwork  help  to  clarify  how  the  market  rationality  is 
confined and instrumentalised by the rationalities of sovereignty and development. 
5.1 Clean Development Mechanism in the Tide of the Global Carbon 
Market
As reviewed in the last chapter, the Kyoto Protocol brought three flexible mechanisms 
to  global  climate  politics.  The  importance  of  the  CDM  rests  not  only  on  the 
establishment  of  a  carbon  market  but  also  on  the  international  effort  to  draw  the 
developing  world  into  the  framework  of  the  Protocol.  The  detailed  rules  of  the 
operation of the CDM were concluded in the Marrakesh Accord in 2001. The first CDM 
project was approved in 2005 and there were already over 2,000 registered projects by 
2010. The operation of the CDM is supervised by the CDM Executive Board (CDM 
EB)  and  is  under  the  guidance  of  the  Conference  of  the  Parties  (COPs)  to  the 
Convention.  The  Designated  Operational  Entity  (DOE)  plays  a  crucial  role  in  the 
process of registration and a DOE can investigate the project and audit the amount of 
emission reduction by the project. In the host country, the establishment of a Designated 
National  Authority  (DNA) is  necessary  and  the  DNA is  the  national  authority  that 
approves the investments in CDM projects. 
    The  CDM  is  a  project-based  design  within  a  multilateral  framework  between 
developed and developing countries. It is designed to be a win-win mechanism that, on 
the one hand, enables developed countries to gain emission credits more economically 
from developing countries. On the other hand, developing countries have the chance to 
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achieve financial profit and technology transfer from the developed countries through 
the  CDM.  Meanwhile,  the  CDM should  bring  sustainable  development  to  the  host 
developing countries. In short, the CDM is designed for both emission reductions and 
sustainable  development.  In  Article  12.5  of  the  Protocol,  it  also  mentions  the 
operational criteria whereby the emission reductions through the CDM should be via 
voluntary participation with real, measurable and long-term benefits and additionality 
(UNFCCC 1997).  Meanwhile,  in  practice,  the  design  of  the  CDM  projects  should 
follow these two guidelines:
(A) Baselines: the CDM is a project-based design and this principle is a way to decide  
     how many credits each project will earn in terms of its emission reductions relative   
     to a ‘baseline’. In other words, a baseline is the business-as-usual scenario without  
     the CDM project and, undoubtedly, although many methodology experts were 
     involved in calculating the baseline, it is always a hypothesis. 
(B) Additionality: a CDM project could only gain credits if the emission reductions  
     would not have happened without the investment and implementation of this project. 
     The CDM activity should be additional. Again, the definition of additionality also  
     draws methodological concerns. 
    As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there have already been over 2,000 
registered CDM projects since 2005. According to the CDM Pipeline Overview (UNEP-
RISOE 2010), these projects are unevenly distributed among regions and countries with 
projects mainly concentrated in Asia and Latin America, which host over 90% of the 
CDM portfolio. African and Middle Eastern countries are much less competitive in the 
CDM market (Zhuang et al. 2011). This phenomenon also demonstrates the divergence 
of the developing world. 
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    Briefly speaking, like the other two flexible deigns, JI and ET, the materialisation of 
the CDM depends on the formation of a carbon market in which the least costly way to 
fulfill  the goals of emission reductions are taken into consideration.  Meanwhile,  the 
‘sustainable development’ principle is also emphasised in order to attract support from 
developing countries. As Chapter Four has reviewed, the Protocol represents a political 
compromise  by  countries  with  different  histories,  interests,  industrial  structures  and 
capabilities.  How  market  efficiency,  development  expectations,  environmental 
sustainability  and  the  mission  to  tackle  climate  change  can  possibly  coexist  has 
remained the core concern of the CDM from the very beginning. 
    At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that the CDM is not the only type of  
carbon market.  Instead,  its  realisation has witnessed the expansion of global  carbon 
trading or carbon transaction. There exist two types of carbon trading. The first one is 
based on carbon allowances or permits. The allowances are determined and created by a 
government in order for transactions in a cap-and-trade system. Both the Protocol and 
the EU have established their allowances.72 Another type of carbon trading is project-
based where the buyer can earn carbon credits through the CDM and JI.73 Besides these 
two carbon markets, there also exist voluntary carbon transactions in terms of carbon 
trade and offset around the world. These different carbon markets exist independently 
but they are also connected by the fact that different carbon credits can be used and 
traded in different markets. Although the carbon market is in its infancy, due to the fact 
that it did not appear until the 1990s after the Convention was concluded, it has grown 
rapidly. In 2009, the global carbon market grew to 144 billion US dollars, which was a 
6% growth from 2008 despite the global financial crisis (World Bank 2010). The EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), based on the cap-and-trade system, still operated 
72The Protocol has the assigned Amount Units (AAUs) and the EU has the European Union Allowances 
(EUAs) for the distribution of emission permits among members. 
73CERs are the carbon credits created in the CDM and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) in the JI. 
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as the ‘engine’ of the global carbon market. According to the World Bank (2010), the 
total value of the EU ETS reached 119 billion US dollars in 2009. Compared with the 
cap-and-trade market, the scale of the project-based CDM is very small, with only 2.7 
billion US dollars after the 59% decline in 2009. However,  it  also implies the huge 
potential of growth. Moreover, the political aspect of the CDM should not be neglected 
as  it  remains  the  framework  to  integrate  developing  countries  into  global  carbon 
governance. 
    Besides the EU ETS, there also exist other carbon trading systems around the world, 
including the UK ETS from 2002, the New Zealand Emission Trading Scheme from 
2007, the Keidanren Voluntary Action Plan in Japan from 1996, and  domestic carbon 
trading in Norway, Switzerland, Australia, Canada and the US. Alongside the growth of 
these carbon markets, the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) has played a crucial role in 
promoting  the  commodification  of  GHGs.  In  the  US,  the  CCX  has  developed  a 
voluntary  cap-and-trade  carbon  market.74 Meanwhile,  the  CCX  has  also  facilitated 
establishing  the  Europe  Climate  Exchange  (ECX),  the  Montreal  Climate  Exchange 
(MCX) and the Tianjin Climate Exchange (TCX). It is obvious that, although the US 
has withdrawn from the Protocol and it has made slow progress in its climate legislation 
on carbon trading, it has successfully promoted the market mechanism based on neo-
liberal governmentality in global climate change politics.75
    The burgeoning of carbon markets around the world has raised academic interest. 
Although many researchers have discussed the emergence of the global carbon market 
and relevant financial initiatives (Stowell 2005, Labatt and White 2007, Stewart et al.
74In 2010, the CCX was bought out by the InterContinental Exchange (ICE) which also bought out the 
ECX and Chicago Climate Futures Exchange (CCFE). Due to the laggard of the legislation on a national 
cap-and-trade system in the US, the CCX has ended its business of cap-and-trade at the end of 2010 and 
moves to the business of carbon offsetting. 
75The sluggish progress of the legislation of the Senator did not stop the local initiatives. California passed 
a legislation on carbon trading in 2010. California will cooperate with three Canadian Provinces: British 
Columbia, Quebec and Ontario through the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) to launch a cap-and-trade 
carbon market from 2012. 
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2009) and modes of CDM governances (Schroeder 2009, Newell 2009, Friberg 2009), 
Newell and Paterson (2010) firstly refer to these phenomena as ‘climate capitalism’. By 
examining different forms and agents of the carbon market and carbon finance, they 
claim that climate capitalism has emerged to “turn carbon into a commodity that can be 
traded” (Newell and Paterson 2010: 34). They clearly expose the ways the world tackles 
climate change through carbon trading, framed within ‘free-market capitalism’ (Newell 
and Paterson 2010: 9), which was strengthened and prevailed by neo-liberal practices 
across the Atlantic. The development of a capitalist economy in the last two centuries is 
deeply dependent on the usage of fossil fuels and has become a worldwide condition. As 
a result, it is unrealistic to radically request the world to abstain from this growth model. 
A new mode of ‘decarbonised economy’ is needed and a carbon market has emerged 
from this context as a new way to trade carbon and make a profit. Starting from the 
flexible  mechanisms in  the  Protocol,  the  global  carbon market  has  gradually  turned 
different units of carbon credits into concrete commodities. Ideally, and more efficiently, 
the carbon markets will not only facilitate states to fulfill their reduction targets but also 
create  incentives  to  attract  investors  into  the  industries  of  renewable  energy,  energy 
efficiency, land use, afforestation and infrastructure improvements.
    Regarding the equity target, which occupies the centre of North-South confrontation 
in  global  climate  politics,  Newell  and Paterson argue  that  the  ‘equity’ concern  was 
eliminated once emissions trading was integrated into the climate negotiations (2010: 
26).  ‘Efficiency’,  a  value  highly  praised  and  endorsed  by  neo-liberalism  since  the 
1980s, has replaced the ‘equity’ concern rooted in the Earth Summit in 1972. Newell 
and Paterson also point out that, due to this obsession with ‘efficiency’ and ‘market’,  
emissions trading has become more preferable than another financial tool, the carbon 
tax,  in  international  negotiations  (2010:  26).  Due  to  the  influences  from the  major 
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polluting companies, the US constantly supports the flexible market mechanisms and 
neo-liberal  ideology.  As  a  result,  cost-benefit  and  efficiency  concerns  were  spread 
around the world,  helping to make the carbon market and carbon trading a popular 
solution in global climate politics. In summary, although the international negotiations 
on the post-Kyoto framework have not made much progress, the burgeoning of various 
carbon markets  around the world has represented a  different  way to govern climate 
change.  Many  developing  countries  which  claim  the  importance  in  ‘equity’  in 
international  negotiations  have  participated  in  the  establishment  and  expansion  of 
carbon  markets.  This  thesis  argues  that  this  trend  of  ‘marketisation  of  climate 
governance’ fits  with the argument  of  ‘politics via  market’ in  which the neo-liberal 
governmentality operates in an apolitical way (Lipshutz with Rowe 2005). Nevertheless, 
this thesis also keeps emphasising that besides the expansion of market rationality, there 
also exist  different governmental  rationalities driving the politics and governance of 
climate  change  to  different  ways  at  both  international  and  domestic  levels.  The 
emergence of the carbon market and the introduction of the CDM in China have really 
brought the market rationality to China, this thesis agrees; nevertheless, this is just the 
beginning of the encounters and competition among different governmental rationalities 
in China’s climate governance. 
5.2 CDM in Question: Market V.S. Sustainable Development
After three flexible mechanisms were introduced to international climate change politics 
by the  Protocol,  lots  of research has undertaken critical  reflections on these market 
mechanisms. During the Kyoto negotiations in 1997, the Brazilian delegation proposed 
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a ‘Clean Development Fund’ that would collect fines from industrialised countries who 
failed to reach their reduction commitments and the fund would then be distributed to 
poor countries for clean energy projects. The US strongly objected to this proposal and 
proposed a ‘flexible mechanism’ instead, which eventually evolved into carbon trading 
schemes. Therefore, the CDM is a design with various, if not conflicting, purposes that 
expects  to  fulfill  sustainable  development,  international  cooperation  and  emissions 
reductions through market mechanism. As a result, it is unavoidable that the CDM will 
bring criticisms and concerns from different perspectives.
    From the business and commercial perspective, the main concerns are the financial 
risks (Streck 2004), informational uncertainties (Fischer 2005), and uncertainties about 
the value of CERs and the role of the CDM after 2012. In other words, since the CDM 
was established in order to fulfill the reduction obligations in the commitment period, 
2008-2012,  the  prospects  of  this  market  will  rely  on  the  outcomes  of  international 
climate  negotiations.  Meanwhile,  the  sceptics  of  the  carbon  market,  who  regard 
development rights and equity as primary concerns, criticise it as ‘carbon colonialism’ 
(Bachram  2004,  Lohmann  2006).  Essentially,  the  ‘destructive  consumption  ethic’ 
causing climate change is not questioned and challenged and the responsibility to reduce 
emissions  is  moved  to  the  people  in  the  South  through  carbon  offsetting  measures 
including the CDM (Bachram 2004, Böhm and Dabhi 2009). From this perspective, the 
concerns of ‘equity’, ‘environmental and climate justice' and ‘sustainable development’ 
for the host country and communities should not be sacrificed as the carbon market is 
adopted in global climate governance. 
    Meanwhile,  the role of the World Bank is  also questioned since it  is  the major 
financial facilitator in the global carbon market. The World Bank’s target for the carbon 
finance programme is to bring about “a global carbon market that supports sustainable 
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development,  reduces  transaction  costs  and  reaches  and  benefits  the  poorest 
communities of the developing world” (World Bank Group 2007). Therefore, the World 
Bank  has  established  three  funds,  with  an  estimated  total  value  of  352 million  US 
dollars, to tackle climate change through investment in the carbon market. These three 
funds are the Prototype Carbon Fund, the Community Development Carbon Fund and 
the Bio Carbon Fund. However, a report released by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
found that many CDM projects invested by the World Bank completely fail to promote 
sustainable  development.  The  additionality  principle  was  neglected  as  20%  of  the 
projects paid for through the CDM, and the emission reductions they generated, would 
have happened anyway without the additional financing (Schneider 2007). Redman thus 
called the World Bank a ‘Climate Profiteer’ (2008). She criticises that while the World 
Bank  sees  the  CDM as  a  way to  get  the  cheapest  emission  reductions,  the  dirtiest 
industries in the North see it as the chance to ‘outsource’ their reductions' commitments. 
Only  4%  out  of  the  World  Bank’s  entire  carbon  finance  portfolio  come  from  the 
renewable energy sectors and the HFC destruction projects account for 82% (Redman 
2008: 24, 31). Within the World Bank’s financed carbon projects, about 1 billion US 
dollars are invested into industrial,  chemical,  coal  mine,  landfill,  gas,  iron and steel 
factory projects, which are polluting, energy-intensive industries. The reason why these 
projects  are  preferred  is  because  they  are  able  to  generate  large,  cheap  and  quick 
reductions of GHGs with a relatively low financial risk in a short time (Redman 2008: 
29). As a result, for those CDM projects related to renewable energies, the competition 
is fierce and it is quite hard to survive in the market (Lohmann 2006). In the end, the 
dirty  industries  dominate  the  CDM market  and  lead  to  little  benefit  in  sustainable 
development and emissions' reductions. 
    The reason why the large number of HFC projects are severely criticised is that CDM 
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projects can be categorised into two main categories: one is to reduce emissions directly, 
the other one is to implement through other indirect measures. The direct projects focus 
on the reductions of GHGs,  CH4, HFCs, PFCs, SF6 and N2O. In the main, these gases 
are emitted during industrial processes. On the contrary, CO2 is the target of the indirect 
CDM projects,  which   aim to decrease  or  replace  the  usage  of  fuel-coal  energy or 
capture  CO2 in the air. The first category can be also treated as non-CO2 projects and 
the GHGs in this category have higher global warming potentials. Compared with the 
CO2  projects, the non-CO2  projects rarely bring about the fundamental reform of the 
existing industrial structures which cause climate change. By February 2009, HFC-23 
project represented 4% of the total registered projects but it gained 76% of total CERs 
(Zhuang et al. 2011). 
    From the research of International Rivers, an environmental NGO focusing on hydro 
power projects in terms of the CDM, the market mechanism provides a cheap solution 
for governments and companies in the North, who are failing to make real emission 
reductions, by buying carbon credits from developing countries. It is a ‘lose-lose’ design 
that while industrialised countries fail to reduce emissions, the local governments and 
communities  in  the  host  countries  do  not  gain  real  benefits  but  there  are  negative 
impacts on the society and the environment from those profit-oriented CDM projects 
(International Rivers 2008b).  The two principles of CDM methodology, the baseline 
and additionality, are difficult to  abide by as about three quarters of the projects were 
not really ‘additional’ (International Rivers 2008c). 
    It is clear that both the praise and the criticism of the CDM come from its market-
based design. According to CDM Watch, an international NGO aimed at monitoring 
CDM implementation,  most  industrialised  countries  and companies  merely  treat  the 
CDM as a design to reduce the costs of their reduction commitments. What they search 
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for are those projects with large volumes of cheap carbon credits. The most popular 
projects are those that capture or destroy gases with high global warming potential, like 
CH4, N2O and HFC, in existing facilities (Pearson 2004). Indeed, these projects cannot 
bring  substantial  emissions  reductions.  Meanwhile,  the  goals  of  bringing  about 
sustainable development benefits and improving the energy structure and energy usage 
are neglected (Pearson 2004). Through his survey, Shapiro (2010) also points out  how 
the CDM investment in China has encouraged the growing production of a harmful 
refrigerant, which was banned by the Montreal Protocol. 
    The CDM is a market design in which the participating industrialised countries and 
companies treat carbon emissions/reduction as a tradable commodity. After all, it is not 
a development fund, which the Brazilian delegates proposed in the Kyoto negotiations 
in 1997, nor is it a programme aimed at promoting renewable energy and the reform of 
the energy structure. It is clear that the aim of the CDM is to generate tradable carbon 
credits with the lowest cost in a short time. In other words, the CDM is operating well  
as a market mechanism, which is to attract investment to those projects that have the 
maximum volume of carbon credits and the minimum cost. Moreover, the project–based 
structure makes the CDM almost impossible to be applied to a broader sector. It is also 
difficult  for  a  host  country  to  deploy  a  national  plan  on  the  reform of  the  energy 
structure through the CDM. The dominance of  large non-CO2 projects  in the CDM 
market is inevitable because these projects could provide a relatively cheap and quick 
way to produce huge amounts of carbon credits. In contrast,  renewable energy projects 
and energy efficiency with low profitability are not favoured by the CDM investors. 
    In summary, the controversies of the implementation of the CDM come from the very 
beginning of its formation in that it tried to put too many, sometimes conflicting, targets 
into one basket. The CDM sceptics thus question the possibility of reconciling market 
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efficiency  with  sustainable  development.  This  dilemma  also  brings  challenges  to 
developing countries while they try to fulfill their goals of (sustainable) development 
through the introduction of the CDM. Even if the concern of sustainable development 
was  left  aside,  the  CDM  still  faces  a  fundamental  question  about  its  additionality 
methodology,  which  has  attracted  criticisms  on  the  real  reductions  the  CDM  has 
brought. 
5.3 The Carbon Market in China
Before discussing the development of the CDM in China, this section starts from the 
review of the burgeoning environmental governance in China. In Chapter Three, the 
governmental  rationality  of  the  environment  in  China,  which  focuses  on  the 
environment as the new object of governance and management, is reviewed. The first 
part  of  this  section  moves  on  to  examine  how  the  concepts  of  the  environment, 
environmental protection and sustainable development were learnt, interpreted, accepted 
and integrated into China’s political agenda. The rest of this section moves to review the 
development of China’s domestic climate governance, the introduction and regulation of 
the CDM in China and ‘Chinese characteristics’ of the CDM practices. 
5.3.1 Governing the Environment in China
After its tremendous economic growth in the last three decades, China has started to 
face the emerging environmental degradations which will challenge its social stability, 
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economic achievements, and public health. In China, there is a serious water problem 
including pollution, distribution and flooding. Air pollution is so severe that seven out 
of  ten  of  the  most  polluted  cities  in  the  world  are  in  China.  The  soil,  especially  
agricultural land, is suffering from huge erosion. In addition, there is a strong demand 
for energy, from oil to coal, which produces more carbon dioxide than methane and oil. 
Furthermore,  acerbated by the increases in population,  the problems of housing and 
food  supplies,  urban  pollution,  public  health  and  transportation  have  also  become 
challenges for the Chinese government and society (Cann, et al. 2005: 5-11). These are 
not  just  domestic  issues  that  China  has  to  tackle  alone.  One  feature  of  these 
environmental  problems  is  that  it  is  likely  to  have  severe  international  and  trans-
boundary consequences. The dust storms that blow across the national borders in East 
Asia (Ferris and Zhang 2005: 68) and the air pollution that crosses Guangdong province 
and Hong Kong due to the economic development of the Pearl River Delta (Hopkinson 
and  Stern  2003)  demonstrate  the  transnational  influences  of  China’s  environmental 
degradations. 
    Although many government agencies were involved in environmental issues (the 
Ministry of Agriculture,  Ministry of Science and Technology,  Ministry of Land and 
Resources,  National  Forestry Agency and the NDRC) it  was the State  Environment 
Protection  Administration  (SEPA)  that  was  in  charge  of  the  national  environmental 
protection  standards,  regulations  and  laws.  In  1998,   the  SEPA was  elevated  to 
ministerial  status  and  then  promoted  to  the  Ministry  of  Environmental  Protection 
(MOEP)  in  2008.  Nevertheless,   the  MOEP  still  shares  the  responsibilities  of 
environmental  protection  and  relevant  issues  with  the  other  central  governmental 
agencies mentioned above. Currently, there are now over 16,000 local environmental 
protection bureaus (EPBs) in the environmental protection system (Zusman and Turner 
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2005). Returning to the central government, the State Council, in which the bureaucratic 
conflicts are reconciled, sits at the top of the government. The Environmental Protection 
Commission was formed in 1993 as the advisory, instead of administrative, agency to 
the State Council. In 2002, the NDRC was established to merge the functions of the 
former  State  Development  Planning  Commission  and  the  State  Economic  Trade 
Commission (Zusman and Turner 2005: 123). One of the NDRC’s tasks is to establish a 
sustainable development strategy and the adaptation plan to climate change. The MOEP 
and  EPBs  were  guided  by  the  strategy  proposed  by  the  NDRC  in  pursuit  of 
environmental  and  developmental  goals.  Local  governments,  which  include  the 
provinces,  the  four  special  municipalities  and  the  autonomous  regions,  have  the 
authority for law-making and have their own EPBs but the central government still has 
the most power in environmental affairs. It is clear that the environmental governance 
never concerns environmental issues as a separate issue in China; instead, it has to be 
integrated into the overall development strategy.
    Besides building up and integrating environmental bureaucracies, China has also 
established its own environmental strategy based on ‘sustainable development’. After 
this concept was confirmed and  Agenda 21 was concluded in 1992 at the Earth Summit 
in Rio, China adopted sustainable development as its main environmental discourse and 
built up relevant strategies. In 1994, the State Council promulgated China’s Agenda 21: 
White  Paper  on  China's  Population,  Environment,  and  Development  in  the  21st  
Century.  This agenda elaborated on China's overall strategy, measures and programme 
of action for sustainable development. In 2003, the Program of Action for Sustainable  
Development in China in the Early 21st Century was promulgated by the NDRC and 
specified the objectives, principles, measures, and priority areas for China's sustainable 
development.  The CPC Central  Committee also announced China’s  Tenth Five-Year 
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Plan  (FYP) 2001-2005 for National Economic and Social Development, in which the 
sustainable development principle was also emphasised (China Development Gateway 
2001). The local governments were encouraged to pursue the sustainable development 
principle while executing the FYP. In The Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, one 
of the targets  is  to build a resource-conserving and environment-friendly society by 
adjusting industry structure and enhancing clean and sustainable development (NDRC 
2006). In the 11th FYP, two specific targets were made, which were to reduce the energy 
consumption  of  per  unit  GDP by  20% and  to  reduce  pollution  emissions  by  10% 
(NDRC 2006).76 Each FYP is ratified by the National People’s Congress (NPC), the 
highest legislative organisation in China, and will be the principal guideline for national 
policy in China. The State Council also promulgated the white papers of Environmental  
Protection in China (1996) and Environmental Protection in China: 1996-2005 (2006) 
to specify China’s environmental concerns. Briefly speaking, as a country with high-
speed economic growth, China suffers from many emerging environmental degradations 
and  related  social  problems,  so  much  so  that  China  has  to  seriously  tackle  these 
environmental  and  relevant  social  problems.  From  the  reform  of  environmental 
bureaucracies to the release of policy guidelines, the environmental issue has already 
been accepted on the political agenda and the environmental governance system has 
also been established and developed gradually (Carter and Mol 2006). However, the 
rationality of the environment has constituted the backbone of China’s environmental 
governance and needs to be contextually examined in order to explore the influences 
and dynamics of different governmental rationalities. 
76Regarding tackling climate change, the target of the 12th FYP is the 17% reduction of carbon intensity 
and 16% reduction of energy intensity by 2015 comparing to 2010 level (State Council 2011).
208
5.3.2 Facing the Threats of Climate Change and the Introduction of the CDM
China started to recognise the influences and potential threats of climate change in the 
1990s. In 1990, the National Climate Change Coordination Group was established by 
the State Council to coordinate and integrate climate change policies. In 1998, during 
the  period of  governmental  reform,  this  group was reorganised and renamed as  the 
National Coordination Committee on Climate Change (NCCCC) and it cooperated with 
the NDRC to address climate change policy.  The NCCCC was transformed into the 
National Leading Group on Climate Change (NLGCC) in 2007. This group is led by the 
Premier  and  consists  of  eighteen  ministers.  In  2002,  China  started  proposing  the 
National Assessment Report on Climate Change, led by the NDRC. Four years later, in 
2007,  China’s  National  Climate  Change  Programme (hereafter  referred  to  as  the 
Programme) was released under the auspices of the NDRC. The  Programme was the 
first  governmental document aimed at mitigating climate change problems in China. 
China was the first developing country to produce a comprehensive national climate 
change programme,  demonstrating a  positive and aggressive attitude toward climate 
change.  After  the Programme  was  promulgated  in  2007,  the  Chinese  government 
published its  annual  report  on climate change in  2008 (NDRC 2008,  2009a, 2010). 
These  reports  have  followed  the  basic  principles  and  strategies  set  up  by  the 
Programme.
    In general, as the primary guideline, the Programme has demonstrated China’s basic 
attitudes toward climate change. China does not challenge the scientific findings from 
the  IPCC, that  human activities  are  the  main  cause  of  global  warming and climate 
change and that, therefore, it  is necessary for human beings to cooperate together to 
tackle  the  threats  of  climate  change  (NDRC 2007:  4).  The  investigations  from the 
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Programme also  demonstrate  that  China  is  influenced  by  global  warming  and  that 
extreme climate  events  will  appear  in  China  more  frequently  and will  bring  severe 
national and social disasters to the fragile ecological environment. Climate change will 
also bring critical challenges for China’s current development pattern, coal-dominated 
energy structure,  energy technologies, agricultural sector and conservation of natural 
resources  (NDRC  2007:  19-22).  The  Programme clearly  points  out  China’s 
vulnerability  while  facing  the  threats  from global  climate  change.  As  a  result,  the 
Programme has listed basic principles to tackle climate change:
(1) To address climate change within the framework of sustainable development.
(2) To follow the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ of the 
Convention.
(3) To place equal emphasis on both mitigation and adaptation.
(4) To integrate climate policy and other interrelated policies. 
(5) To rely on the advancement and innovation of science and technology. 
(6) To  participate  in  international  cooperation  actively  and  extensively.  (NDRC 
2007: 24-49) 
    It is clear that although admitting climate change is a common threat to all human 
beings, it is the developed countries that should bear the obligation to reduce GHGs 
emissions ahead of developing countries, after the ‘historical responsibility’ is taken into 
account. On the other hand, the priority for developing countries is to pursue sustainable 
development, no matter how ambiguous the concept is. China’s strategic concern is that 
sustainable development is as important as emissions' reductions. As a result, China will 
“stick  to  its  sustainable  development  strategy”,  which  refers  to  energy  efficiency 
improvement,  energy  conservation,  the  development  of  renewable  energy  and 
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ecological preservation and construction (NDRC 2007: 58). President Hu restated this 
principle  that  “climate change is  an  environmental  problem,  but  it  is,  in  essence,  a 
development issue” at the G8 Summit in 2007 (Tian 2007c). Meanwhile, the challenge 
of climate change also provides an opportunity for China to adjust its energy structure, 
to transfer in advanced technologies from foreign investors, to adapt to the challenges 
smoothly and to  maintain social  stability  and ecological  sustainability.  The CDM is 
welcomed by the Programme, which also asks to make effective use of the CDM Fund 
(CDMF), established in October 2005, to support China’s measures on climate change. 
The encounters among governmental rationalities of sovereignty, development, market 
and environment started within China’s politics and governance of climate change as the 
CDM was introduced to China, this thesis argues. 
    China  is  not  unfamiliar  with  market-based  instruments  (MBIs)  to  tackle 
environmental degradations. Through the effort of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
the MBI implementation of emissions trading was encouraged in China from 2001. The 
Chinese  government  prefers  those  solutions  that  ‘incorporate  economic  and 
administrative  efficiency’  (Morgenstern  et  al. 2005:  152).  The  emissions  trading 
mechanism was introduced as a measure to solve environmental problems at a lower 
cost.  Research  has  shown  how  China  adopted  the  MBI  to  improve  air  quality  in 
Taiyuan, an industrial city (Morgenstern et al. 2005). China had started to pay attention 
to the CDM after the  Protocol was concluded in 1997 and after the  Protocol  entered 
into force in 2005, China immediately promulgated the  Measures for Operation and 
Management of Clean Development Mechanism Projects in China (NCCCC 2005), and 
it  was  amended in  2011 (NDRC 2011)  (hereafter  referred  to  as  the  Measures)  and 
established the CDM Fund (CDMF) in October 2005. The Measures recognise that the 
essence  of  the  CDM  is  to  allow  developed  country  Parties,  in  cooperation  with 
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developing country Parties, to acquire certified emission reductions (CERs) generated 
by  the  projects  implemented  in  developing  countries.  (NDRC  2011:  Article  2).  In 
Article 2, the Measures of the CDM in China should meet the requirements of China’s 
strategy of  sustainable development.  In  Article  6,  the  Measures emphasise that  the 
implementation of the CDM projects shall not introduce any new obligations for China 
other  than those under the  Convention and the  Protocol.  It  is  apparent  that  China’s 
strategic concern on sustainable development remains at the centre of its CDM policy. 
The Measures also points out the priority areas for CDM projects in China, which are 
those related to energy efficiency, the development and utilisation of new and renewable 
energy and methane recovery and utilisation. Meanwhile, through the CDM practices, 
China welcomes the transfer of ‘environmental friendly technology’ to China (NDRC 
2011: Article 4).
    The NDRC is China’s DNA for the CDM, according to the  Measures. Under the 
NDRC there is a National CDM Board, whose task it is to review and approve applied 
projects. In short, the operations of the CDM projects and the CDMF are under the lead 
of the NDRC and NCCCC, in which the director of the former is also the leader of the 
latter. The main targets of the CDMF are to enhance the capacity of research on climate 
change,  to  raise  public  awareness  and  strengthen  education  on  climate  change,  to 
promote energy efficiency, to encourage the employment and development of renewable 
energy  and to  enhance  the  adaptation  capacity  to  climate  change.  The  CDMF also 
engages in international cooperation. It aims to establish a platform for the buyers and 
sellers  of  CDM projects  in  order  to  lower  transaction  costs.  It  is  obvious  that  the 
deployment of the CDMF is not restricted to CDM-related activities. Rather, it plays an 
important role in fulfilling China’s sustainable development strategy. 
    As mentioned earlier, the CDM projects can be categorised into direct/non-CO2 and 
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indirect/CO2 ones.  In  China,  the  potential  indirect  CDM projects  include renewable 
energy, energy efficiency and afforestation. According to  research from the Institute for 
Global  Environmental  Strategies  (2010),  up  until  October  2010,  75% of  the  CDM 
projects in China are from renewable energy projects, in which  473 are hydro power 
projects and 259 are wind power projects out of a total of 970 registered projects. It is 
apparent  that  CO2 projects  constitute  the  majority  of  CDM  projects  in  China. 
Comparatively,  in India, another significant player in the CDM market,  the scene is 
different. According to the CDM Country Fact Sheet: India (2009), by May 2009, 133 
out of 420 (32%) registered projects were of biomass utilisation; 75 (18%) for wind 
power and 47 (11%) for energy efficiency. The regulations from  the Measures which 
direct the investments on different CDM projects will be discussed in the next part.
5.3.3 The CDM with Chinese Characteristics
This  part  is  not  just  to  demonstrate  ‘Chinese  Characteristics’;  indeed,  there  will  be 
endless  characteristics  from different  countries  with  different  contexts  and domestic 
conditions. The purpose of this survey is to explore the underpinning rationalities of 
China’s  CDM  practices  in  order  to  understand  why  China  embraces  the  CDM  so 
actively. 
(A) Revenue Distribution as Investment Incentives
In the previous section, the distribution of sectors in the CDM demonstrates that non-
CO2 projects  are  more  popular  than  renewable  energy  projects  due  to   cost 
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consideration. However, China’s current scenario shows that renewable energy projects 
are in the majority in its CDM market. How can this be achieved?  Article 36 of the 
Measures regulates that the revenue from the transfer of CERs shall be owned jointly by 
the  Government  of  China  and  the  project  owner  because  the  emissions'  reduction 
resource  is  owned  by  the  government  (NDRC 2011).  The  government’s  designated 
share of the CER revenues and other benefits under the Measures is: 
      (1) 65% from HFC projects.
      (2) 30% from N2O projects produced by hexanedioic acid. 
      (3) 20% from N2O projects produced by nitric acid.
      (4) 5% from PFC.
      (5) 2% from the other sectors.77
    As mentioned earlier, renewable energy projects occupy the majority of the registered 
CDM projects in China. Nevertheless, the situation is different when  CERs are taken 
into account. Although 75% of CDM projects are from the renewable energy sector, 
they only obtain 11% of CERs. Meanwhile, 3% of projects from the N2O decomposition 
and  HFC  reduction  has   issued  80%  of  CERs  in  China  (Institute  for  Global 
Environmental  Strategies  2010).  Although  non-CO2 projects  can  accumulate  huge 
profits with less cost, they cannot bring the benefits of sustainable development in terms 
of the adjustment of the energy structure and the substantial technology transfer (Guo et 
77 When the Measures was firstly promulgated in 2005, the regulations on revenue distribution were: (1) 
65% from HFC and PFC projects; (2) 30% from N2O projects, and (3) 2% from forestation projects and 
priority areas defined in Article 4, which are energy efficiency improvement, development and utilisation 
of new and renewable energy and methane recovery and utilisation. (NCCC 2005: Article 24). This 
regulation lasted until 2011 and the biggest change for the revenue was in the PFC sectors. Meanwhile, 
the new Measures in 2011 did not provide a detailed list of the last sector, although it still referred to 
those indirect CDM projects which were China’s prior concerns. The EU-China CDM Facilitation Project 
recommended in its Final Report that considering the much higher costs of the PFC projects than the CO2 
projects, the revenue sharing rate of PFC projects should be equal to or lower than CO2 projects (2010: 
20). Meanwhile, the Final Report also suggested that the N2O projects from nitric acid and adipic acid 
should be differentiated by considering the different costs (2010: 20-21).  
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al.). That is why China tries to direct the investment of the CDM projects through the 
financial  regulation  in  the  Measures.  Sustainable  development  is  still  an ambiguous 
concept but China tries to fulfill this goal with Chinese needs and interpretations.
    Besides the design in the Measures, China also promotes foreign investment in the 
renewable  energy  sector  through  other  regulations.  In  the  Revised  Catalogue  of  
Industries  for  Guiding  Foreign  Investment  Issued  (NDRC  and  the  Ministry  of 
Commerce  2007),  renewable  energy  is  one  of  the  sectors  to  be  ‘encouraged’.  This 
creates the legal and financial  incentives to  encourage foreign project developers to 
invest in the sector. Through these policy tools, China makes renewable energy projects 
more  attractive  than  other  countries. It  is  clear  that  the  energy  efficiency  and  the 
adjustment  of  energy  structure  are  the  core  concerns  of  China’s  grand  strategy  of 
sustainable development. Moreover, the regulation of  CDM revenue also demonstrates 
that  the  state  has  the  legitimate  right  to  ‘manage’ the  natural  resources  within  its 
territory. The property and the development rights alongside  the GHG emissions are 
incorporated into the governmental rationalities of sovereignty and development. 
(B) National Control of the CDM 
According to the User’s Guide to the Clean Development Mechanism (Pembina Institute 
2003), there are four different financing options of CDM investment:
      (1) Full or Partial Equity: a company finances all or part of a CDM project in order  
           to gain full or shared financial profits and CERs.
      (2) Financial Contribution: a company financially contributes towards some portions 
           of the cost of a CDM project in return for CERs.
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      (3) Loan: a company provides a loan in return for CERs.
      (4) Certified Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreement (CERPA): a company agrees 
            to buy CERs from the project directly (2003: 14-15). 
    Each option has different financial risks due to the uncertainty of the price and the 
amount of CERs expected at the end. The CERPA can be treated as ‘unilateral CDM’ 
where the CERs are purchased directly by the developed countries Parties without the 
involvements in the project design and investment in host countries. However, there will 
be fewer technological transfers to the host country in the unilateral CDM (Michaelowa 
2007). Considering the need for technology transfer through CDM practices, most CDM 
projects in China are bilateral or multilateral. Meanwhile, the  Measures has regulated 
the capital ownership of CDM projects in China.  Article 10 rules that Chinese funded 
or  Chinese-holding  enterprises  within  the  territory  of  China  are  eligible  to  conduct 
CDM  projects  with  foreign  partners  (NDRC  2011).  This  regulation  has  prevented 
foreign project developers from completely taking over CDM projects and profits in 
China.  Meanwhile,  this  regulation  provides  another  policy  tool  for  the  Chinese 
government  to  direct  the  foreign  investments  in  CDM  projects  regardless  of  what 
financing option is deployed. Again, Article 11 of the Measures represents the concern 
for state’s control and management, and the integrity of sovereignty in China’s CDM 
governance. 
(C) Domestic Equity 
While China claims its right to development, a further question should be asked: whose 
development  is  taken  into  account?  China  has  more  CDM projects  than  any  other 
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country  but  the  distribution  between  its  rural  and  urban  areas  remain  severely 
unbalanced. Among 2,732 projects  approved by the NDRC, 1,255 projects  are from 
western provinces. However, projects from the eastern provinces take the majority of 
the CERs. This domestic equity problem is not only happening in China. At the UN 
General  Assembly  debate  on  ‘Climate  Change  as  a  Global  Challenge’  in  2007, 
Makhdoom Faisal Saleh Hayat, the then environment minister of Pakistan, said that the 
CDM seemed to favour large commercial projects which can generate a huge amount of 
carbon  credits  but  have  less  impact  on  a  country’s  sustainable  development  (FON 
2007c). Unequal development problems could not be solved by the market alone or by 
these commercialised CDM projects. China’s western regions and rural areas are less 
developed than the eastern and urban regions. According to the  Programme, in 2005, 
the per capita GDP of the eastern areas of China was 2,877 US dollars whereas the 
western areas  was only  1,136 US dollars,  39.5% of  the former.  Severe  disparity  in 
economic  development  exists  throughout  China.  By  the  end  of  2005,  the  poverty-
stricken  people  in  China’s  rural  areas  numbered  23.65  million,  with  the  per  capita 
annual pure income less than 683 Chinese Yuan (about 102 US dollars) (NDRC 2007). 
The western and rural areas may contribute less to China’s overall emissions but these 
areas also have to bear the severe burdens of environmental degradations. The problem 
of  domestic  inequality  in  development  was mentioned in  the  Programme and  other 
official documents, such as the 11th FYP and the 12th FYP, but how China tackles this 
problem while  implementing the CDM is  not  clear  enough yet.78 By examining the 
definition and practices of sustainable development in China in the next section, it helps 
78It is not clear if the domestic equity plays a crucial role for the CDM in China. According to research by 
the EU-Chin CDM Facilitation Project (2010), most projects are from underdeveloped areas such as the 
Western provinces. Nevertheless, considering that the investments in China’s CDM are channelled to the 
fields of renewable energy and energy efficiency, it has become relatively natural that there are huge 
amounts of CDM projects in the Western or underdeveloped areas. These underdeveloped areas are where 
natural resources are least utilised, in other words, these areas have more potential to develop new energy 
and renewable energy projects. Meanwhile, the relatively few HFC and N2O projects in richer urban 
areas have created a ‘very large amount of CERs’ (EU-China CDM Facilitation Project 2010: 8).
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to clarify the essence of the CDM in China. 
5.3.4 Problems of the CDM in China
By examining the implementation of the CDM in China, many Chinese scholars have 
paid attention to the relevant problems. Wu & Wu (2010) mention that there are four 
types of risk when a Chinese company engages in the CDM. These risks are: (1) The 
risk of examination and approval. There are three stages of CDM application, the DNA, 
DOE and CDM EB. Each stage presents different risks to the project manager in order 
to gain approval. In early 2009, the Chinese DNA approved over 1,500 CDM projects. 
However, fewer than 360 projects were registered to the CDM EB. This phenomenon 
will definitely create uncertainties for the investor. (2) The political risk. It refers to the 
uncertainty about the future of the CDM in the post-2012 period, since the CDM market 
is the direct product of the  Protocol.  The result of international climate negotiations 
casts  a deep influence on the prospect  of the CDM market.  Meanwhile,  Wu & Wu 
(2010) also point out that China is likely to accept binding targets under international 
pressure, which means that China will need to achieve, or import, carbon credits as well. 
The  interactions  within  global  climate  politics  will  absolutely  affect  China’s  CDM 
market. (3) The economic risk. The financial risk that Wu & Wu (2010) refer to is the 
influence  brought  about  by  the  global  financial  crisis  in  2008,  which  decreased 
international investment in the CDM market. Meanwhile, the price of the global carbon 
market is determined by the Euro and the US dollar and fluctuations in the exchange 
rate will directly influence the profit of CDM projects. (4) The risk of the market. This 
risk comes from the fluctuating price of the CERs. After the financial crisis in 2008, the 
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price of the CERs declined dramatically. Within the European Market, the price went 
from 22 Euros per tonne in July 2008 to just  8 Euros per  tonne in  February 2009. 
Moreover, due to the lack of market information and pricing power, the values of the 
CDM projects in China have been underestimated. The review from Wu & Wu (2010) 
has clearly demonstrated the potential risks a Chinese company might face in the CDM 
market. Although the categorisation is simplified, it  still  points out that the CDM is 
essentially  an  artificial  market.  The  relevant  uncertainties  will  influence  the 
development of this market. Meanwhile, although China has become the most important 
player in the CDM market,  it  still  stays in a rather passive position. To achieve the 
power of pricing has become a strategic concern for China in the CDM market (Wu & 
Wu 2010). 
    Focusing on the institutional dimension of the CDM in China, Guo et al. (2009) argue 
that there are five main problems: (1) Centrality of CDM projects. The phenomenon that 
most CDM projects in China are in the renewable energy sector means that there is 
great potential to develop CDM projects in other sectors. (2) CERs are mainly from 
HFC-23, or the non-CO2 sector. The problem is that there is less technology transfer in 
this sector and it is not helpful for the sustainable development in China. (3) Domestic 
imbalance between the eastern and western areas of China. Although the western area 
had more CDM projects (42%), the CERs from this area are only about 14.1% by 2005 
(Guo  et al. 2009: 32). (4) The lack of participation in the formation of methodology. 
Most methodologies of the CDM are still  designed by the developed countries. The 
introduction of new methodology could influence the boundaries of CDM projects and 
the calculation of baseline scenarios. (5) The governance of the CDM in China is still 
insufficient. There is no clear criterion for sustainable development in the  Measures. 
Moreover,  the  regulations  of  capital  ownership  and  revenue  distribution  and  the 
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regulation of the price by the NDRC in the approval stage have hindered the input of 
foreign investments. According to Guo  et al. (2009), the reasons why China has had 
such  problems  when  implementing  the  CDM  are:  (1)  The  participation  from  the 
business community is insufficient. The lack of awareness, finance and relevant experts 
has  kept  the business  behind from active engagement.  (2) The lack of an incentive 
mechanism.  The  burden  of  the  cost  lies  mainly  on  the  business,  which  makes  the 
business less innovative. In the end, the types of CDM projects are highly centralised as 
the  latecomers  just  imitate  and  repeat  those  approved  projects.  (3)  The  lack  of 
governance. As the DNA in China, the NDRC cares about the examination and approval 
only,  rather  than  the  promotion  and  education  of  the  CDM.  The  CDMF  has  been 
founded in order  to  raise public  awareness.  However,  considering the source of  the 
CDMF, which  is  based  on the  revenues  of  the  CDM projects,  the  existence  of  the 
CDMF has actually influenced the willingness of the business community to invest in 
the CDM. In an unregulated market, CER sellers tend to attract buyers’ investment by 
reducing the price, which weakens China’s pricing power in the CDM market. (4) The 
increase  of  the  transaction  cost.  The  complicated  methodologies  and  the  approval 
process have increased the uncertainties for the CDM business. 
    Besides the domestic difficulties, China also faces the challenge from the CDM EB in 
the international arena. While China still occupies the majority of the registered projects 
and CERs,  more and more  Chinese projects,  mainly in  the  hydro-power sector,  are 
rejected or re-examined by the CDM EB (Zhuang et al. 2011). Most interviewees in this 
research had noticed this situation and treated it as a warning sign. The definition of 
baseline and additionality are the main disputes (Zeng  et al. 2010). This phenomenon 
will be discussed in the next section. It is clear that China still faces many problems 
while deploying the CDM as a governmental tool to tackle climate change. Both Wu & 
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Wu (2010) and Guo  et al. (2009) have clearly pointed out the problems and risks of 
implementing the CDM in China. However, a big difference between their observations 
and the criticisms in  Section Two is that the potential conflicts between the market 
mechanism and sustainable development are seriously neglected in Chinese research. 
Indeed, the concept of sustainable development almost does not appear in these two 
pieces  of  research.  Moreover,  both  Wu & Wu (2010)  and Guo  et  al.(2009) do  not 
question  if  real  reductions  can  be  reached  through  the  CDM.  The  problem  of 
additionality is just a problem of the methodology on an operational level, rather than a 
substantial challenge to the whole idea and design of ‘carbon offsetting’. Zhuang et al. 
(2011) also notice the phenomenon that Chinese CDM researchers have not produced a 
systemic analysis of the problem of additionality. As a result, the two main goals of the 
CDM, emission reductions and sustainable development, disappeared in this Chinese 
research. The actual needs of the local communities, where CDM projects are carried 
out, do not gain attention from the government and the researchers. In the end, critical 
voices  on  the  introduction  of  the  CDM  are  rarely  heard  in  China,  which  will  be 
discussed later. 
    From the economist’s perspective, it is understandable that Guo et al. (2009) ask for a 
deeper reform of the CDM in China in order to build up a more efficient market. Their 
suggestions are to remove the obstacles and to make the government and business more 
market-oriented. It is clear that the rationality of the market has been installed alongside 
the implementation of the CDM in China, no matter to what extent. However, according 
to  Wu  &  Wu's  research  (2010),  again  from  an  economist’s  point  of  view,  those 
uncertainties actually imply the artificiality of the carbon market in which the politics 
and the state(s) play crucial roles. The next section moves on to discuss the encounters 
and  interactions  between  the  economy  and  politics,  market  rationality  and  other 
221
governmental rationalities of the CDM in China.
5.4 Conflicting Rationalities? Practice and Mentality of the CDM in 
China
During the fieldwork for this thesis, almost every interviewee had a positive attitude 
towards the CDM in China. Yu Jie, head of the policy and research programme at the 
Climate  Group,  a  market-orientated  and UK-based NGO, claimed that  although the 
profits from the CDM might not be so high, the point is “how to diffuse and install a 
market mentality into Chinese society”. By 2009, almost every province has its own 
CDM centre in charge of attracting CDM investments. Moreover, there is at least one 
CDM consultancy in  every  province.  This  development  is  the  ‘invisible  benefit’ of 
implementing the CDM in China” (Yu, interviewed in 2009). “I anticipate that in the 
future, every company will have an office solely responsible for the affairs of the CDM, 
carbon market or green investments, in general terms”. Meanwhile, there is also  the 
strategic concern that “if there will be a global carbon market in the future, it will be 
better for China to participate in it as early as possible. The CDM practices would be a 
valuable experience on the way to a carbon market” (Yu interviewed in 2009). Yu’s 
argument had reflected the target of her organisation, which aims at promoting a ‘Clean 
Revolution’  through  market  mechanism  (The  Climate  Group 
http://www.theclimategroup.org/).  Meanwhile,  Yu’s  expectation  also  clearly 
demonstrated  that  the  introduction  of  a  market  mechanism  is  not  just  about  the 
establishment of relevant institutions but also about the installation of the ‘mentality’ of 
the  market,  which  believes  that  the  market  can  provide  a  more  efficient  way  for 
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governance.  Most  interviewees  also  agreed  that  the  introduction  of  the  CDM  can 
facilitate the governance on climate change in China. 
    This common mentality shared by the interviewees in this research seems to fit the 
neo-liberal governmentality, either it is represented as ‘politics via markets’ (Lipshutz 
with Rowe 2005),  commodification of the environment (Lohmann 2008),  ecological 
modernisation along with green governmentality (Bäkstrand & Lövebrand 2007), or the 
reterritorialised control of the South by the North’ in the CDM practices (Patterson and 
Stripple 2007). The core of this rationality is ‘let markets do it’, as discussed in Chapter 
Three. Nevertheless, while witnessing the global expansion of the carbon market and 
the  market  rationality,  this  thesis  keeps  arguing that  it  is  inappropriate  to  appeal  to 
‘bring politics back in’ (Lipshutz with Rowe 2005).  The introduction of the market 
mechanism may be viewed as the triumph of the market rationality to varying degrees; 
nevertheless, it is also possible that the politics and the state do not retreat while facing 
the global trend of marketisation. In China’s case in the CDM implementation, it is clear 
that  the market  rationality,  the  neo-liberal  governmentality,  is  not  the  only,  or  most 
dominant, governmental rationality underpinning China’s domestic climate governance. 
The rich observations from the interviewees, who were part of the CDM business, have 
helped  build  up  a  vivid  picture  of  the  interplay  of  market  rationality  and  other 
governmental rationalities.
    Karla Lieberg, who works for Climate Focus, a climate consultancy mainly working 
in the carbon market, has shared her experiences of doing CDM business in China in her 
interview. She is the chief representative of this transnational consultancy is based in the 
Netherlands.  She can speak fluent Mandarin and had resided in China for over two 
years  when  this  researcher  conducted  an  interview with  her.  The  interview was  in 
English but she clearly claimed: “it is the ‘guanxi’ (關係 ) that determines if a CDM 
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project can be approved by the NDRC or not”. ‘Guanxi’ is the Chinese translation of 
‘relationships’ and ‘connections’, which refers to the dynamics and social networks of 
Chinese society.  Moreover,  as mentioned earlier,  since 2008, Chinese CDM projects 
have started to face stricter examination by the CDM EB. According to Lieberg, “it is 
all  about  ‘politics’ in  the  CDM  EB”  (interviewed  in  2009).  She  did  not  give  her 
definition of ‘politics’ but it is clear that she has recognised the importance of non-
market/economy factors in the CDM practices in China. 
    Similar but more detailed observations appeared in another interview with Chen 
Cianlei. Chen used to work at the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
(MOFTEC)  and  had  been  sent  to  Europe  on  trade  and  investment  business.  After 
leaving the government, he started his own company, Alpha Business Systems Ltd., and 
started engaging in the business of environmental consultancy in China, including CDM 
projects. As discussed earlier, both Wu & Wu (2010) and Guo et al. (2009)  mentioned 
the  complexities  of  the  application  stage.  According  to  them,  the  difficulties  of 
application are due to the lack of regulation of the CDM in China. However, based on 
his own experiences, Chen claimed how non-legal factors influenced the final decision. 
As  Lieberg  had  pointed  out,  Chen  also  emphasised:  “guanxi is  very  important, 
especially at the local level”. “The relationship and the connection with the government 
at  different  levels  always  matters  while  operating  the  CDM  in  China.  Different 
governments have their preferred buyers and sellers and it is through guanxi that each 
party has the chance to build up a connection and develop the business.” In the end, “the 
commercial interests are not the main concerns, which meant it is questionable if the 
agreed price of the CDM project is reasonable or not.” “The transparency of approval 
and  pricing  is  extremely  insufficient  and  some  CDM  projects  even  prepared  two 
separate contracts for different investigations.” Fundamentally, “the market mechanism 
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is  incomplete  as  corruption  and  power  struggles  abounded”  (Chen,  interviewed  in 
2009). This thesis noticed the inner contradiction from Chen’s argument. On the one 
hand,  he criticised  the  inefficiency of  the  public  sector.  On the  other  hand,  he still 
recognised that it was necessary for the government to direct the environmental market. 
This mentality will be discussed later. In short, both Lieberg and Chen’s experiences 
have clearly pointed out the crucial role of non-economic factors in the implementation 
of the CDM in China. 
    It becomes apparent that market rationality is not as influential as other governmental 
rationalities in  China’s climate governance.  Most  interviewees and Chinese research 
recognise the incompleteness of the CDM market in which governmental power keeps 
appearing and interfering. However, just as Chen’s reaction has demonstrated, there is a 
mentality of accepting the coexistence of state power and the market force at the same 
time. Except for the argument from Guo et al. (2009), which requests the fundamental 
marketisation  of  the  CDM  in  China,  almost  all  of  the  interviewees  recognise  the 
existence and role of the state in this process. For them, it is not ‘politics via markets’. 
Rather,  they  all  notice  the  huge  influence  of  politics  on  the  carbon  market.  This 
understanding  kept  surfacing  while  the  issue  of  the  additionality  problem was  also 
discussed in the interview. 
    As this thesis has mentioned, the ‘problems’ of the CDM practices in the Chinese 
context  is  quite  different  from  the  Western  research  based  on  the  problem  of 
additionality,  which  was  discussed  earlier.  When   asked  about  the  problems  of 
additionality, most of the interviewees just recognised that it was a general problem but 
not the primary problem in China’s CDM practices. Many interviewees just claimed, 
ambiguously, that it is not easy to measure and define baseline and additionality. “What 
else (numbers) can we trust except those from the National Bureau of Statistics?” Ang 
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Li from the WWF asked me when the problem of calculating additionality in China was 
questioned in the interview (Ang, interviewed in 2009). The implication was that there 
would not have been the additionality problem if the NDRC had approved the CDM 
project. Yu, from the Climate Group said: “the concern of additionality is a  Western 
perspective”. “Considering the need for development in the South, it is necessary and 
unavoidable to  develop some industries,  such as renewable energy, whether there is 
foreign investment through the CDM or not” (Yu, interviewed in 2009). For Yu, the 
assumption of ‘pure’ additionality is problematic from the beginning. Considering her 
positive attitude to promoting the market mechanism in China, it is obvious that the real 
reduction is less important than the establishment of carbon markets. Chen, from Alpha 
Business  Systems,  also  argued  that  “the  additionality  concern  reflects  the  Western 
viewpoint”.  “China’s  need for  domestic  development  had to  be  taken into account” 
(Chen, interviewed in 2009). In the end, ‘additionality’ was not such a serious problem 
in China. On the one hand, the interviewees were aware of the influence of political 
power in the CDM practices, because, as a result, even if the applied projects really 
fulfilled the additionality requirement, it was not the deciding factor in gaining approval 
from the DNA. On the other hand, it is clear that if a real reduction can be reached 
through the CDM or not is not the primary concern for the interviewees of this research, 
including officials, NGO campaigners and the CDM consultants. This trend is strange 
because, in the negotiation stage, the reason why China and India opposed the proposal 
of flexible mechanisms was due to the concerns about real reduction from industrialised 
countries.  They were  worried  those  flexible  mechanisms would  become the  tool  of 
carbon  offsetting  and  that  industrialised  countries  would  use  these  mechanisms  to 
escape  from  their  historical  responsibilities.  The  introduction  of  the  additionality 
principle  indeed reflects  the  need to  pursue  real  reductions.  China  has  dramatically 
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changed its attitude to additionality in the CDM practices, though in a tacit way, and 
now focuses much more on the benefits to be gained from the CDM. However, this 
thesis likes to keep questioning, what are the benefits and who gets them? 
    Is it about sustainable development, another crucial goal of the CDM? Sustainable 
development is another controversial issue surrounding the CDM. Although there have 
already  been  many  standards  that  can  evaluate  the  performance  of  sustainable 
development in the CDM, including the South-South-North Matrix Tool, the Golden 
Standard  and  the  MATA-CDM  approach  (Lenzen  2007,  Olsen  2008),  a  common 
criterion  is  still  lacking  when  implementing  the  CDM.  In  the  Measures,  China 
emphasises the importance of pursuing sustainable development, however, there is no 
clear definition.79 Regarding the practical situation, Zhu from the China GEF Office 
claimed that the CDM certainly brought an increase in job opportunities and enhanced 
economic growth. Moreover, “the CDM practices also bring the benefit of ‘fairness’ in 
China since many projects in the renewable energy industries were in the less developed 
mid-western areas”. “Some CDM projects were supported by the Chinese government 
and  the  UNDP  with  Millennium  Development  Goals,  which  will  improve  local 
development”. (Zhu, interviewed in 2009) Nevertheless, according to Chen Hongbo, a 
CDM expert at the CASS, the creation of job opportunities was not the main benefit of 
the CDM practices. Instead, Chen argued, “when considering sustainable development 
in  broader  terms,  the  CDM  can  bring  some  real  benefits”.  Chen  pointed  out  four 
dimensions  of  sustainable  development:  (1)  to  enhance  the  emission  reductions 
domestically  through  the  application  of  renewable  energy.  (2)  From  the  economic 
perspective,  those expected profits  could attract public,  mainly business, attention to 
renewable energy, which helped the transition of the energy structure in China. (3) The 
79The Measures only points out the primary fields of the CDM, which are energy efficiency, new energy 
and renewable energy and the recycling of methane and gas (NDRC 2011). 
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environmental conditions can be improved.80 (4) From a macro perspective, the CDM 
did  increase  some  job  opportunities  (Chen,  interviewed  in  2009).  However,  the 
implication is that the creation of jobs may not happen in  local areas where those CDM 
projects  are  implemented.  Rather,  the  introduction  of  the  CDM may  increase   jobs 
mainly  in  fields  such as  carbon finance  and consultancy.  In  short,  the  definition  of 
sustainable development remains ambiguous but, again, it was not a serious problem for 
most of the interviewees. 
    Meanwhile,  the  public  participation  was  severely  dismissed,  although  it  is  a 
requirement  when  writing  a  Project  Design  Document  (PDD).  Chen  from  Alpha 
Business Systems said that during the preparation stage there needed to be a stakeholder 
meeting, including local environmental groups, local citizens and other relevant bodies, 
in  order  to  evaluate  the  environmental  and  societal  impacts  of  the  potential  CDM 
project(s).  However,  ‘basically  it  is  just  superficial’,  said Chen. “Politics and power 
relations behind these meetings were far more important” (Chen, interviewed in 2009). 
The CDM practices may bring some real benefits but the distribution of those benefits 
remains unclear. 
    Regarding the economic benefits, is it  what China wants to achieve through the 
CDM? According to the latest estimation by the deputy director of the CDMF in China, 
the scale of this fund will be about 10 billion RMB dollars (estimated at 150 million US 
dollars) by 2012 (Yu 2010).81 This accounts for only 0.14% of the national income in 
2009 (estimated 6847.7 billion RMB dollars). Considering the increasing rejection of 
Chinese CDM projects in the CDM EB and the uncertainties of the prospect of the 
CDM in the post-2012 period, people should not be too optimistic about the economic 
benefits  from  the  CDM  in  China.  Nevertheless,  although  the  central  government 
80Chen did not give a detailed explanation of it. The implication is that if most Chinese CDM projects 
were in the renewable energy sector there should be less damage to the environment. 
81It is the scale of the CDMF, not the entire carbon market in China. There has not been an official 
number of the actual scale of carbon market in China. 
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remains cautious about building up a national carbon market (An 2010), the carbon 
experimental scheme for regional trading will be officially launched in seven provinces 
and  cities  including  Beijing,  Tianjin,  Shanghai,  Chongqing,  Shenzhen,  Guandong 
province and Hubei province in 2013.82 The experiment is preparation for a national 
carbon market which is expected to be launched in 2015, according to deputy Minister 
Xie from the NDRC (Xinhua 2012). Meanwhile, trading centres for carbon emissions 
and pollution rights have been established in several Chinese cities, including Tianjin, 
Beijing,  Shanghai,  Wuhan,  Hangzhou,  Kunming  and  Chengdu.  Taking  Shanghai 
Environment Energy Exchange (SEEX) which was established in 2008, as an example, 
it has 7 branches in China and 34 offices abroad. The aims of the SEEX are not only to 
facilitate  domestic  carbon trading,  but  also  to  enhance  the  South-South  cooperation 
through establishing a multilateral  trading system of the environment and energy in 
China, the UNDP and other developing countries. By doing so, the SEEX expects to 
enhance the capability of other developing countries to tackle climate change through 
the market mechanism (Li 2012). It is clear that the market mechanism is deployed as 
an effective governmental tool to solve environmental problems in China (State Council 
2011). Nevertheless, besides potential  economic profits, what does China really care 
and expect to gain from deploying a market mechanism in its environment and climate 
governance? 
    Through the review in Chapter Three and this chapter, instrumentality is embedded in 
the  rationality  of  market  in  China  since  the  market  mechanism  was  introduced  to 
Communist China in the late 1970s. The gradual path of economic reform in the last 
three decades and the constant worry of ‘peaceful evolution’ from the West through 
non-political  spheres  have  made  China  cautious  of  the  deployment  of  market 
mechanisms. Consequently,  the introduction of a non-political  or apolitical sphere is 
82Prior to 2013, the exchange centres in Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin have had their trading business for 
years. 
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essentially a political affair, or under political monitoring from the beginning. Almost all 
the interviewees from the CDM business agreed that the power of the governments and 
the politics are a crucial part of CDM practices in China. While facing overwhelming 
CPC  over  Chinese  state  and  society,  the  rationality  of  market  is  unavoidably 
instrumentalised and it has to be operated in order to enhance the legitimacy of the CPC. 
The  embedded  instrumentality  has  also  easily  incorporated  market  rationality  into 
various governances in China, including environmental and climate governance. 
    From previous reviews, it is apparent that the protection, preservation, management 
and  governance  of  the  environment  are  foreign  and  brand  new  concepts  to  the 
Communist  China.  China  does  have  a  fragile  ecological  system  and  has  serious 
environmental degradations;  nevertheless,  the environmental problems are never just 
environmental in China. Rather, environmental governance is integrated into China’s 
overall  strategic concern with the concept of sustainable development,  as this thesis 
reviews. From the SEPA to the MOEP, the governmental agencies for the environmental 
issues are always under the direction of the developmental and planning organisation, 
the NDRC and its predecessor. It is apparent that environmental governance in China 
serves various ends beyond environmental concerns.  The rationalities of sovereignty 
and  development  have  a  dominant  influence  on  the  perspectives  about  which 
environmental  problems need to  be  managed,  which  goals  need to  be  fulfilled  and 
through which means. Environmental goals can be realised through administrative or 
authoritarian measures, such as the case of completing the goal of carbon intensity in 
the 11th FYP; but they can also be fulfilled through non-political measures, such as a 
proposed  carbon  market  in  the  12th FYP.  Although  many  Chinese  researchers  have 
argued that a good environmental governance is the mode in which the government, the 
business and the public participate (Zhu 2007, Zhuang et al. 2009), this thesis contends 
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that  it  is  not  so crucial  if  the public  and private  sectors can be incorporated in  the 
process  of  governance in  China’s  case.  What  matters  is  to  explore what  frames the 
scales and imaginations of environmental governance, and under what circumstances 
what  means  are  viewed  as  feasible.  The  ambiguity  of  the  definition  of  sustainable 
development  in  China  has  created  the  space  for  the  constant  interpretation  and 
reinterpretation  that  this  concept  can  be  widely  referred  to  almost  every  goal  of 
development, from energy efficiency, readjustment of industrial structure, land use and 
afforestation  to  job  creation;  as  long  as  these  goals  fit  the  national  circumstances 
(Zhuang  et al. 2009: 266). To maintain the right of development is the core concern, 
meanwhile,  the  autonomy  to  categorise  the  ends  and  means  of  environmental 
governance is the key to grasp the role of the sovereignty rationality. 
    This framework can be used to examine the CDM in China as well. Initially, the 
CDM was designed to serve for the environment’s good so that through this flexible 
mechanism, the total GHGs emission were expected to decrease. Nevertheless, partly 
because of the mix of goals that the CDM brings to the sustainable development in 
concern, and partly because the environmental issues are constantly intertwined with 
other considerations in China; the CDM has been integrated into different governmental 
concerns sine it was introduced in China. This explains why China uses the regulations 
of  the  Measures to  direct  the  investments  into  those  fields  with  characteristics  of 
sustainable  development.  In  other  words,  those  preferred  CDM  projects,  including 
energy efficiency, the readjustment of industrial and energy structures and renewable 
energy, are what China thinks necessary for its economy to keep growing. As a result, 
that explains why many interviewees treated the additionality disputes of China’s CDM 
as a ‘Western perspective’. China has its own needs to fulfil these goals and weather 
they are financed by the CDM or not, China will keep investing in these projects. The 
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disputes  can  be  solved  by better  skills  of  writing  PDD and  applications,  and  clear 
regulation from the state (Zhuang et al. 2011). In other words, China’s failure to meet 
the additionality requirement is not the essential problem. While China has claimed the 
significance of adjusting the industrial structure, energy saving, developing low carbon 
energies  and increasing  carbon stocks  (State  Council  2011),  these  goals  have  to  be 
pursued and fulfilled anyway. The CDM is just  one of various ways to reach these 
goals, whether it is additional or not. The instrumentality of market rationality appears 
again  in  the  CDM case  and  it  clearly  demonstrates  that  the  deployment  of  market 
mechanism  is  a  governing  tool  to  serve  the  rationality  of  development  in  China’s 
climate  governance.  Meanwhile,  the  attitude  to  treat  the  additionality  dispute  as  a 
‘Western perspective’ from many interviewees represents the mentality of sovereignty. 
It is apparent that this attitude implies that it is China’s right of development and China 
will maintain its path of development whether it meets the additionality requirements or 
not. 
    As a result, this thesis argues that neither profitability nor substantial reductions of 
GHGs emissions are the prior concerns of the CDM in China. Instead, this thesis argues 
that what China seeks through the CDM is: (1) technology transfer. This is one of the 
reasons why China encourages CDM investment in the sectors of energy efficiency and 
renewable energy because the advanced technologies in these sectors are what China 
needs for its grand strategy, which is pursuing the transition of the energy structure. 
Meanwhile, the CDM projects related to the REDD+ and land use also bring advanced 
technologies which China expects. This goal can be achieved through the regulation of 
the ownership of the CDM in China (EU-China CDM Facilitation Project 2010: 12-13), 
as  discussed  earlier.  China’s  aggressive  expectation  to  acquire  technology  transfer 
through  the  CDM  has  caused  serious  problems  including  subsidy  policies  and 
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protectionism, protecting intellectual property rights and domestic regulations between 
China and the EU, the main buyer in the Chinese CDM market (Romano 2010: 15-16). 
Romano points out that the EU and China share different understandings of technology 
cooperation which are different from China’s ‘centrally-planned’ approach, and the EU 
prefers to diffuse and transfer technology through decentralised market mechanisms. 
Nevertheless,  this  situation  has  brought  the  severe  complaints  from  Chinese 
stakeholders  as  they  claimed  “the  excessive  protection  of  technology  holders  from 
developed countries is preventing them from learning how to use these technologies and 
making their use widespread” (Romano 2010: 15).83 It is apparent that the introduction 
of the CDM in China has its own strategic concerns and that the CDM is treated as a 
mechanism which facilitates technology transfer. This goal is different from what the 
EU  pursues  in  that  for  the  EU,  the  CDM  is  not  driven  by  facilitating  technology 
transfers, but “by calculations and revenues from CERs” (EU-China CDM Facilitation 
Project 2010: 11). In summary, although the CDM is a market mechanism, it is apparent 
that China deploys it as one of the policy tools to pursue technology transfer in those 
strategic fields. 
    (2)  To fulfil  China’s  goals  of  development.  As discussed,  China’s  definition  of 
sustainable development remains ambiguous. Meanwhile, what this thesis has found is 
that Chinese CDM research rarely discusses the dilemma between market efficiency and 
the fulfilment of sustainable development which has raised fruitful research, as analysed 
in  Section  5.2.  The  additionality  principle  and  the  integration  of  the  concern  of 
sustainable development were required by the developing countries in order to prevent 
the CDM from becoming a carbon-offsetting mechanism for the developed countries. 
As a result, the relative lack of China’s attention to these two problems from officials, 
83The EU also criticises China’s protectionism in the wind-farm projects stating that project owners are 
not allowed to import more than 30% of the required technology (EU-China CDM Facilitation Project 
2009a:16). 
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researchers, and NGO campaigners to CDM practitioners has demonstrated that behind 
the obscured categorisation of sustainable development, what China really seeks is its 
(economic) development, sustainable or not. The Final Report by the EU-China CDM 
Facilitation Project emphasises that many CDM projects in China do not achieve the 
objective of sustainable development. It is firstly because project owners care about the 
maximisation of profits without taking social and environmental impacts into account. It 
is also because in China, different perspectives on sustainable development exist that 
are often viewed as economic development or environmental protection (2010: 16-17). 
This thesis argues that these controversies come from the ambiguity of the definition of 
sustainable  development  in  China  as  long  as  the  policies  meet  the  requirements  of 
China’s grand strategy, and they are assumed to fulfil sustainable development. As a 
result,  what  is  crucial  is  examining  China’s  primary  concern  which  is  to  maintain 
economic growth and development while tackling the threats of climate change and 
relevant international pressures. Global climate change and the relevant politics have 
created a framework in which the energy structure, or in other words, the reliance on 
fossil fuels, need to be reconsidered. China cannot maintain its path of development 
without  reforming  and  readjusting  its  energy  structure.  As  a  result,  the  goal  of 
development in China must be the goal of sustainable development, since it is related to 
the  energy  conservation,  energy  efficiency,  new  and  renewable  energy,  and  the 
readjustment of the energy structure. Again, the goal of development, sustainable or not, 
is pursued via both administrative measures such as subsidies,84 or market mechanisms 
such as the CDM. Should China care about the economic profits only, there would be no 
regulations on the revenue sharing rate of CDM projects since the non-CO2 projects can 
bring much higher profits. 
    (3) To enhance market mechanisms as a governing tool, or in other words, to bring 
84China’s subsidies on renewable energy has caused trading disputes between the US and China. Please 
see the coverage from Chan (2010) and Bradsher (2011).
234
the  specific  arts  of  government  to  China.  This  thesis  keeps  emphasising  that 
instrumentality has been embedded in the market rationality in China’s practice since 
the  beginning  of  the  economic  reform  in  the  late  1970s.  As  a  result,  a  market 
mechanism can be deployed to fulfil various governing ends and this is applied to the 
CDM in China as well. Based on the practices and experiences of implementing the 
CDM since 2005, China is willing to gradually establish its domestic carbon market in 
the 12th FYP and to improve its carbon financing system. Domestically, the CDM and 
other types of carbon markets can stimulate participation from the enterprises, attract 
financial investments and improve technologies. In other words, the introduction of the 
market mechanism does relieve direct pressure on the Chinese government in domestic 
climate  governance.  The  apolitical  and  non-political  areas  are  encouraged  to  make 
contributions  in  different  fields  including  emissions  reductions  and  strategies  of 
sustainable  development.  Apparently  this  process  is  directed  and  monitored  by  the 
political  power,  but  this  has  created  a  mode  of  good  governance  in  China’s 
environmental and climate governance in which the non-political agents and spheres are 
called  to  participate.  In  Chapter  Three,  this  thesis  argues  that  the  governmentality 
approach should grasp the dynamics between the state and society, instead of focusing 
on  society  only.  As  a  result,  it  is  more  important  to  examine  the  role  of  the  CPC 
government in the process of establishing and expansion of the carbon market in China, 
or in other words, to examine the interplays among different governmental rationalities 
historically  and  contextually.  Meanwhile,  the  improvement  of  the  infrastructure  of 
domestic  carbon  market  and carbon  finance  helps  to  enhance  China’s  capability  in 
international  negotiations  on  the  prospects  of  the  global  carbon  markets.  The more 
familiar China is with the rules and regulations of the global carbon markets, the more 
likely China is able to challenge the discursive and pricing power in the market, which 
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is currently monopolised by the developed countries (People’s Daily 2010a).85 In other 
words, instead of providing cheap CERs to the industrialised countries, China expects to 
engage in the formation of the rules and regulations of the global carbon market in the 
post-Kyoto period.  Again,  the embedded instrumentality of the market rationality in 
China has made it  fit  to serve various governing ends.  China’s embracement of the 
carbon market  in its  climate governance,  domestically  and internationally,  has to be 
grasped through this framework. 
    In summary, through the reviews of the regulations of China’s CDM market and the 
critical examination of the practices through the observations from fieldwork, this thesis 
argues that while there exists a global trend to govern climate change through the global 
carbon market, China’s case has demonstrated that it is not a one-dimensional process in 
that China can only helplessly adopt the market mechanism in its climate governance. 
Rather,  the  specific  historical  path  has  brought  uneven  relations  among  different 
governmental rationalities, in which the rationalities of sovereignty and development 
occupy  dominant  positions.  Meanwhile,  the  history  of  how  Communist  China 
encounters  the  rationality  of  market  has  demonstrated  that  the  CPC government  is 
always  cautious  about  the  role  of  the  market  in  its  governance.  As  a  result, 
instrumentality  was  embedded  in  the  market  rationality  from  the  beginning  of  the 
economic  reform.  This  instrumentality  has  created  a  huge  space  for  the  market 
mechanism to be deployed in various fields, as long as the goals are set up by China and 
for China’s development needs. The rationality of environment plays a bit different role 
in China’s climate governance. To govern for the environment has its own legitimacy in 
China, since China does have serious environmental degradations. Nevertheless, as a 
85 Yang Zhi, a leading expert on China’s environmental economics, emphasised that what is crucial in the 
global carbon market is the power to set up the standards which are discursive and the pricing power. The 
past experiences from the CDM in China demonstrate that it is the buyer who has the pricing power. To 
establish China’s own carbon market is the first step in the struggle for pricing power in the global carbon 
market. Her perspective on pricing power is widely accepted in Chinese media and research. 
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late-coming governmental rationality in China, the environmental rationality is soon be 
integrated into China’s overall strategy concern in the name of sustainable development 
which tends to maintain China’s development while tackling environmental problems 
and climate change at the same time. The goals of environmental governance may or 
may not be fulfilled by the market mechanism. This phenomenon just demonstrates that 
the  governmentality  of  China’s  climate  governance  needs  to  be  discovered  in  the 
interplay among different governmental rationalities, instead of being discovered ‘in’ 
the market, the non-political sphere.  
5.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to research the development of the CDM in China 
in  order  to  examine  how  China  reacts  to  the  expansion  of  the  market 
mechanism/rationality  in  global  climate  change politics.  This  chapter  started  with  a 
review of the emergence of flexible mechanisms in the tide of the global carbon market 
along with the expansion of global climate capitalism. The disputes around the practices 
of the CDM were discussed. Then it moved on to China’s domestic level in order to 
review the development of environmental and climate governance in China. After the 
historical review, this chapter discussed how China introduced and deployed the CDM 
through its  Measures.  This chapter also discussed the problems of implementing the 
CDM in China. Finally, this chapter used the findings from the fieldwork to examine the 
conflicts, competition and interplay among four governmental rationalities in China’s 
CDM practices. Much criticism has been made: the rising hegemony of the capitalist 
market is the driven force behind the present global climate politics. The neo-liberal 
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governmentality also creates the phenomenon of ‘politics via markets’. However, this 
thesis  keeps arguing that if  the field of ‘politics’ really withers should be examined 
critically and contextually. In some cases, the ‘politics’ just readjusts itself under the 
guise  of  market/private  governance.  It  is  not  ‘governmentality  without  politics’,  as 
Lipshutz with Rowe argue (2005). The concept of governmentality has always implied 
the existence of power and politics in different forms, and the dynamics between the 
state and society and between politics and the market need to be grasped historically, 
this thesis argues. Within different historical contexts, there might exist different modes 
to conduct power, to direct ‘the conduct of conduct’, to influence the ‘right disposition 
of  things’ via  different  ‘arts  of  government’.  China’s  reactions,  deployments  and 
expectations toward the CDM have demonstrated a mixture of different governmental 
rationalities and its own specific arts of government, as analysed in this chapter. 
    As a result,  this thesis claims it is important to examine that whether or not the 
introduction of the CDM in the global climate politics represents the “reterritorialized 
control of the South by the North”, “the ‘global gaze’ that moves to standardize and 
enroll  both  people  and  the  natural  world”  and  thus  the  “global  culture  of  carbon 
management putting the world’s entire biosphere under one type of rule” (Paterson and 
Stripple 2007).  This thesis  agrees with what  Paterson and Stripple worry about:  the 
emergence of an ‘epistemological empire’, is a serious problem in the research of global 
climate politics. However, in China’s case it is clear that the South is not a concrete bloc 
where huge diversities with different historical and national circumstances exist.  The 
(re)territorialised control in China’s climate governance in terms of the national control 
of carbon sinks and carbon stocks indeed serves various, not just one, universal orders. 
The spatiality and territoriality along with the concern of sovereignty behind global 
climate  change  is  the  universal  order  that  Paterson  and  Stripple  argues  (2007). 
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Nevertheless, the will and desires to develop, and the belief in the market mechanism to 
efficiently manage the atmosphere represent two different universal orders, or in this 
thesis’ terms, two different  mentalities.  Meanwhile,  in  facing these universal orders, 
such as China’s encounters with different governmental rationalities which all derived 
from the outside world, the historical contexts and the relations among the state, society 
and market will influence the understanding, interpretation and transformation of these 
universal  orders.  This  chapter  has  clearly  demonstrated  how  China  interacts  with 
different governmental rationalities by examining its deployments of the CDM in its 
climate governance. 
    Nevertheless,  this  thesis  also  reminds  the  readers  that  although  the  concept  of 
‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ is the crystallisation of China’s experiences on 
how it has managed the non-political sphere to serve its particular need of development, 
it  is  China’s  case  after  all.  These  four  governmental  rationalities  appear  in  China 
through  historical  contingencies;  as  a  result,  it  is  difficult  to  duplicate  this  analytic 
framework to other contexts. Meanwhile, this revised governmentality framework may 
be useful in grasping the dynamics underpinning China’s politics and governance of 
climate  change  at  present  at  both  international  and  domestic  levels.  However,  it  is 
difficult  to forecast the conditions of the potential  changes which will  influence the 
dynamics among four governmental rationalities. The insufficiencies of this framework 
will be discussed in the concluding chapter. 
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6. Conclusion
This  thesis  started  with  a  simple  question:  what  constitutes  China’s  politics  and 
governance  of  climate  change  at  both  the  international  and  domestic  levels?  This 
question stems from the acknowledgement of the significance of China in international 
climate  change  politics.  In  order  to  grasp  China’s  mentalities  and  strategies  in 
international  climate  change  negotiations,  it  has  been  necessary  to  examine  the 
development, progress, coordination and conflict in the international politics of climate 
change.  As  a  newly  emerging  issue  within  the  IR  discipline,  climate  change  has 
attracted much research. However, this thesis has questioned whether the IR discipline 
has  properly  tackled  the  theoretical  challenges  posed  by  the  phenomena  of  climate 
change. Can existing approaches provide a sound and comprehensive understanding of 
the politics and governance of global climate change? While a theoretical framework 
provides a certain perspective in order to understand, interpret, narrate, and even predict 
a certain phenomenon, what has been excluded and why? Where is the limitation of the 
framework and how is the boundary mapped? In this research, climate change is not 
merely  a  scientific  phenomenon  which  happens  in  the  natural  world.  Instead,  the 
existence of climate change has to be understood through a systemic knowledge which 
also frames the ‘right’ attitudes and responses. In other words, while the environment, 
and  the  natural  world,  encounter  human  society,  there  is  always  a  struggle  over 
meaning. As a result, this thesis started by exploring the underpinning forces, structures, 
and governmental rationalities of global climate change politics at present. The aim was 
firstly  to  disclose  the  fundamental  forces  which  frame  the  imagination  and 
understanding of climate change and relevant politics and governance. This thesis then 
went  on  to  analyse  those  forces  and  rationalities  framing  China’s  politics  and 
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governance of climate change. 
    Through comprehensive theoretical review, this thesis has critically engaged with 
existing IR approaches. The neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist approaches have 
occupied the mainstream position of international climate politics in varying degrees. 
The  assumptions  of  state-centrism,  international  anarchy  and  power  politics  by  the 
realists  has  demonstrated  the  difficulty  of  reaching  international  agreement  through 
cooperation. This approach also proves to be valid when climate change and relevant 
energy  issues  are  integrated  into  the  concerns  about  national  security.  However,  its 
ahistorical  ontology prevents  it  from grasping the dynamics  of  international  climate 
change politics. The notions of ‘state’, ‘state system’, ‘national interest’ and ‘power’ 
should not  be treated as  predetermined and fixed.  Rather,  these  concepts  should be 
examined  historically,  contextually  and  genealogically.  China  may  present  a  state-
centric and self-interested image in international climate negotiations, but why? Why is 
the  concept  of  transnational  and international  cooperation  accepted  by  some states? 
Does every state have the same perception of what sovereignty is  and what  a  state 
system should be? These dynamic pictures are sorely lacking in the realist account.
    As  another  mainstream IR approach,  neo-liberal  institutionalism focuses  on the 
positive side of international politics and claims that international cooperation and good 
governance  can  be  achieved  through  the  design  and  introduction  of  international 
regimes and institutions in different levels. While international environmental politics is 
defined as a realm of collective action for pursuing the ‘public good’, it is potentially 
useful to apply this approach in examining how collective action is operated, and under 
which  conditions.  What  is  interesting  is  that  given  the  uncertain  vicissitudes  of 
international negotiations, either the realist or liberalist account has validity at any one 
time. However, the neo-liberalist approach also faces similar problems to those of the 
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neo-realist.  If  cooperation  is  based  on  a  rational  calculation,  then  the  notions  of 
‘interest’ and ‘rationality’ should  also  be  critically  examined.  Moreover,  the  benign 
assumption of institutions, rules, norms and regulations has limited the liberalist account 
to  addressing  international  climate  change politics.  Why are  certain  institutions  and 
norms accepted and established whereas others are excluded? Who benefits and who 
suffers while certain rules are built up? What knowledge and techniques are needed to 
establish certain norms and institutions? More fundamentally, while both neo-realist and 
neo-liberalist  accounts  occupy  the  mainstream  discourse  of  international  climate 
politics, this thesis questioned what the criterion is for evaluating ‘success’ or ‘failure’ 
in the frameworks of both approaches. The discourse of the mainstream approaches has 
demonstrated the fixed and static assumption of state-centrism, which fails to grasp the 
dynamic structural forces in global climate change politics. 
    Social constructivism emerges in the debate between positivism and post-positivism 
in the IR discipline and has focused research on the ontological and epistemological 
dimensions.  It  has  also  brought  the  non-material  elements  into  the  IR  research, 
including ideas, norms, cultures and identity. The dynamic and mutually constitutive 
interaction  between  agents  and  structures  has  also  challenged  the  fixed  and  static 
assumptions of mainstream approaches. Social constructivism helps depict the dynamic 
process of how certain norms and rules are formed and established in global climate 
change politics. Nevertheless, this thesis also argues that the lack of internal coherency 
has limited constructivist approach of providing a solid analytic framework. Not only 
the construction of certain norms but also the agent itself, the state need to be critically 
analysed. However, this thesis agrees that the strong version of constructivism has the 
potential to work with other critical IR approaches in order to bring more fundamental 
challenges through discourse analysis. 
242
    Critical IPE tradition has nurtured different critical approaches to IR, including neo-
Gramscianism. These approaches either bring the structural dimension into analysis or 
challenge those concepts which are taken for granted, such as the state and national 
interest. By arguing that mainstream approaches focus only on the ‘problem-solving’ 
dimension,  the  critical  approaches  move  the  focus  to  the  structural  causes  through 
historical  and  material  analysis.  The  social  relation  and  mode  of  production  of 
capitalism is claimed to be responsible for the present environmental degradation. Neo-
liberalism has become a hegemonic approach to tackling climate change, through the 
establishment  and  expansion  of  global  carbon  markets.  Within  carbon  markets,  the 
atmosphere and carbon emissions have been transformed into manageable and tradable 
commodities where the accumulation of profit is the core concern. Consequently, it is 
meaningless to argue as to whether international climate change politics succeed or fail. 
Moving the focus to the carbon market, it is argued that climate change has successfully 
been  incorporated  into  global  capitalism.  Neo-Gramscian  and  other  critical  IPE 
approaches have explored the structural forces of capitalism in global climate politics. 
    The Foucauldian approach provides another critical perspective in the IR discipline. 
By  taking  discourse  analysis  and  the  governmentality  approach  into  account,  the 
knowledge, discipline, techniques, and art and mentality of government have become 
the objectives of research in order to examine the ‘conduct of conduct’ in governance. 
From the Foucauldian approach, the research on governance should move away from 
the institutional dimension to the multi-faceted sites where power/knowledge appears 
and operates. As a result, environmental or climate change politics fundamentally refers 
to the argumentative struggle where the notions of ‘environment’, ‘nature’ and ‘climate 
change’ are contested and contestable.  This approach has led to the critique of neo-
liberal governmentality which operates as ‘politics via market’. The contribution of this 
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approach  is  to  disclose  and  explore  the  power  relations  and  the  self-regulated 
governance through liberal subjects and liberal social settings. The burgeoning of global 
carbon markets is thus treated as the emerging of green governmentality, which works 
with ecological modernisation to infuse and spread the ‘right’ way to govern climate 
change. 
    This  thesis  agreed  that  these  critical  approaches  have  provided  an  insightful 
explanation of the forces and structures  of global climate change politics.  However, 
when China is taken into account, the limitations of these approaches emerge as well. 
Within the critical IPE and neo-Gramscian approaches, capitalism is recognised by most 
researchers as the determinant structural force, and the introduction and growth of the 
CDM market in China seems to confirm this theory. Nevertheless, by examining the 
practices of the CDM and the mentalities of relevant practitioners, this thesis argued that 
the market rationality alone cannot provide a comprehensive understanding of China’s 
climate change politics. Capitalism and the expansion of the market mechanism is a 
powerful  structural  force;  however,  it  is  risky  to  treat  capitalism  as  the  universal 
determined  force,  this  thesis  argued.  It  is  also  risky  to  pose  the  framework  of  a 
hegemony/counter-hegemony dichotomy. This thesis further argued that  structural and 
historical analysis has to be applied to different fields of human society, such as the state 
and  environment  as  well.  The  Foucauldian  approach  has  developed  an  alternative 
research agenda which emphasises different modes of governance, relevant knowledge 
and techniques. Nevertheless, this thesis also pointed out that the development of the 
concept of governmentality was based on the history of the Western European states and 
societies. As a result, although the governmentality approach has provided a powerful 
critique  of  neo-liberalism,  this  thesis  has  questioned  whether  this  approach  can  be 
applied  to  different  contexts  uncritically.  Taking  the  authoritarian  state  into 
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consideration, how can the liberal art of government be implemented or even  needed in 
such a society? Again, this raises the risk of generalising and universalising conditions 
from different contexts when applying the governmentality approach. While recognising 
governance  as  the  ‘art  of  government’  or  ‘rationality  of  government’,  as  the 
governmentality  approach  proposes,  it  is  necessary  to  explore  how knowledge  and 
techniques  are  integrated  into  governing  and  how  governance  is  implemented  on 
different levels. As a result, this thesis has applied a revised governmentality approach 
whereby  multi  governmental  rationalities  are  analysed  when  researching  China’s 
politics and governance of climate change in both international and domestic levels. 
While examining different rationalities, this thesis did not build up arguments based on 
the governmentality/  counter-governmentality dichotomy. It is crucial  to dynamically 
examine  the  relations  among  different  rationalities,  and  to  conduct  the  research 
contextually and historically. As a result, this thesis has taken an analytic framework 
examining the  rationalities  of  sovereignty,  development,  market  and environment  in 
China’s politics and governance of climate change. 
    In this revised governmentality approach, this thesis focuses more on the ‘rationality 
of  government’  and  argues  that  it  has  to  be  understood  through  the  historical 
examination of the relation between state and society in China. By doing so, it provides 
an understanding of the necessary knowledge, techniques and ‘arts of government’ for 
China’s  climate  politics  and  governance.  These  four  governmental  rationalities 
underpinning China’s politics and governance of climate change did not appear from a 
vacuum. Rather, this thesis has genealogically examined the encounters, confrontations, 
interpretations and transformations between China and these governmental rationalities. 
All  these  rationalities  have  international  derivations;  however,  the  historical 
contingencies they encountered with China has brought the uneven relationship between 
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these four rationalities. To pursue and maintain the autonomy of the state has always 
been  the  primary  concern  for  Chinese  ruling  groups  since  China  encountered  the 
Western concept of sovereignty, both in theory and in practice. Meanwhile, the will and 
desire to develop and to become a modernised country has brought the rationality of 
development  into  a  dominant  position  as  the  rationality  of  sovereignty.  These  two 
rationalities have constituted the obstinate, self-interested and realist image of China in 
international  climate change politics.  Nevertheless,  the embedded technicality of the 
discourse  of  development  has  also  opened  up  space  for  cooperation  regarding 
technological  issues.  This  explains  the  cooperative  and  active  side  of  China  in 
international climate change negotiations in various fields.  The rationality of market 
does not have autonomy in socialist China; instead, it is always under the surveillance 
of the state, where it is instrumentalised as a governing tool to fulfil China’s goals of 
development.  Market mechanism can be used in China’s environmental  governance, 
along  with  other  administrative  measures.  Meanwhile,  the  improvement  of 
environmental governance in which public and private actors are assumed to take part 
helps consolidate the legitimacy of the CPC without bringing fundamental challenges to 
the ruling group. 
    Based on this multi-rationalities framework, this thesis has examined China’s politics 
and governance at international and domestic levels. Starting at the international level, 
this thesis argued that although there is a marketisation trend in global climate change 
politics,  China’s  foreign  politics  are  driven  by  the  rationalities  of  sovereignty  and 
development. From Chapter Three, this thesis has conducted a historical review on the 
introduction  of  the  concept  of  sovereignty  to  China.  China  was  forced  to  learn  the 
concept  and practice of  ‘sovereignty’,  and to  enter  the modern  international  system 
consisting  of  sovereign  states  from  the  mid  19th century.  Accompanying  imperial 
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invasions  from the  West  and  Japan,  the  collective  humiliated  memory  involved  an 
obsession  with  sovereignty.  To  establish  a  modern  state  with  integrated  territories 
became the  primary  political  task  for  Chinese  leaders,  in  contemporary  Communist 
China.  The  anti-Imperialism  and  anti-Hegemonism  struggles,  no  matter  for  what 
political reasons, have strengthened the mentality that Chinese sovereignty is constantly 
threatened and needs  to  be consolidated.  As  a  result,  the  rationality  of  sovereignty, 
together  with  the  principles  of  non-interference,  mutual  respect,  independence  and 
autonomy, has become the guiding principle of China’s foreign policy. Meanwhile, this 
history also demonstrates the need to pursue ‘modernisation’ in China, which brings the 
rationality  of  development  into  account.  The  need  to  prove  the  superiority  of 
Communist  China in terms of productivity has also strengthened the obsession with 
development.  Deng’s  economic  reform  since  the  late  1970s  has  brought  economic 
development to be the primary task for the CPC. The fast and lasting economic booms 
in  the  last  three  decades  have  infused  the  rationality  of  development  into  China’s 
political agenda. In other words, the performance of economic development has become 
one of  the most  important  foundations  of  legitimacy for  the CPC. As a  result,  any 
(foreign) proposal which might impinge upon the integrity of China’s sovereignty and 
China’s path of economic development will be viewed negatively. 
    Examining the significance of these two rationalities underpinning China’s politics of 
climate  change  at  the  international  level  helps  to  provide  an  understanding  of  the 
changes  and  continuities,  flexibilities  and  intransigence  of  China’s  stance.  In  other 
words, why hard issues become harder while soft issues become softer, and what is the 
criterion  to  categorise  the  hard  and soft  issues  can  be grasped through this  revised 
governmentality approach. By examining China’s changes and continuities of attitudes 
towards different crucial issues in international climate change negotiations, it is clear 
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the rationalities of sovereignty and development play pivotal role underpinning China’s 
stances  and attitudes  within  international  negotiations.  The proposal  of  international 
MRV  is  fiercely  opposed  by  China  because  it  will  bring  foreign  monitoring  into 
domestic affairs. Nevertheless, China claims that the MRV principle can be applied to 
those domestic projects with foreign sponsors. In the end, what China really opposes is 
interference  in  its  autonomy and independence.  The legally-binding  commitment  to 
reduce  GHG  emissions  is  unacceptable,  because  it  may  endanger  economic 
development  in  the  developing world,  especially  China’s  own path  to  development. 
Meanwhile, based on the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, it is 
the industrialised world that needs to lead the responsibility for emissions' reduction. 
While  the  industrialised  world  tries  to  transfer  the  burden to  the  developing  world 
without substantial mitigation efforts, it is unavoidable for China to treat international 
climate  change  politics  as  a  ‘Western  plot’.  As  this  thesis  has  claimed,  it  is  not 
impossible for China to propose a quantified target of emissions' reduction, as long as 
the target is voluntarily proposed by China itself, instead of being forced upon China by 
foreign  bodies.  This  also  explains  why  China  welcomes  and  encourages  other 
developing  countries  to  deploy  NAMAs.  Meanwhile,  aside  from  these  main 
controversies, China becomes more flexible and active in other areas as long as they 
bring benefits of technological and financial transfers without challenging the integrity 
of China’s sovereignty and its own developmental path. The dominance of rationalities 
of sovereignty and development also explains China’s relations and interactions with 
other major actors in international climate change politics, including the US, the EU and 
the developing world. This thesis argues that it is not correct to treat China and the US 
only as rivals. These two countries have developed levels of cooperation in the field of 
climate science, renewable energy, and relevant mitigation and adaptation technologies. 
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While  each  country  blames  the  other  fiercely  for  the  slow progress  in  the  UN-led 
negotiations, this intensive cooperation and interactions between these two powers tell 
another story. Again, as long as its sovereignty is not challenged, China is willing to 
build up intensive cooperation with the US in international climate change politics. This 
is also the reason why the EU maintains a good relationship with China in this field. 
The prior aim of the EU is not to force China and other emerging developing countries 
to accept a legally-binding commitment; instead, what the EU tries to do is to export its 
mode  of  ‘low  carbon  economy’  to  China.  Through  technological  and  financial 
cooperation, both the EU and China can have economic gains and can start restructuring 
into a low carbon future; although competition between both sides have emerged, in the 
market of so-called ‘green technology’. 
    Regarding  China  and  the  developing  world,  this  thesis  has  also  provided  an 
alternative explanation. China stays allied to the developing world in order to claim the 
importance of historical responsibilities. The discourse used by the developing world 
has become a useful negotiation tool.  Most of the time, China simply discusses the 
emissions on a per capita basis, which draws it closer to other developing countries. 
However, the fast growth of its carbon emissions, along with the economic boom has 
placed China in a different category to the majority of the developing countries. This 
thesis  thus argued that the emergence of the BASIC group has been inevitable,  and 
China accepts this. Nevertheless, China is also aware of the importance of consolidating 
the developing world in international climate change negotiations. As a result, besides 
the  discursive  levels,  China  has  started  to  develop  better  cooperation  with  other 
developing  countries,  especially  the  LDCs  and  AOSIS.  More  substantial  support 
regarding the infrastructure of adaptation, relevant technologies and the experiences of 
the CDM are exported to the LDCs and AOSIS from China. Obviously, China prefers to 
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maintain the North-South framework rather than the US-China G-2 one, as the former 
helps  China  to  fulfil  its  goals  underpinned  by  the  rationalities  of  sovereignty  and 
development. 
    In  Chapter  Five,  this  thesis  moved  on  to  examine  the  domestic  politics  and 
governance  of  climate  change  in  China.  The  implementation  of  the  CDM  has 
demonstrated  the  encounters  of  the  market  rationality  with  other  governmental 
rationalities.  This  thesis  has  discussed  the  changes  of  China’s  attitudes  towards  the 
introduction of the CDM to the Protocol. During the negotiation stage, China opposed 
the proposal because the offsetting mechanism could exempt the industrialised countries 
from  their  responsibilities  to  reduce  their  emissions.  The  implication  is  that  this 
mechanism should guarantee that the substantial reduction is not compromised. In other 
words, the additionality principle should be strictly abided by. Nevertheless, this thesis 
has discovered that additionality is rarely a problem for China’s CDM practices. This is 
counter-intuitive,  because  many  critiques  have  been  made  from  civic  groups  or 
grassroots environmentalists and one of the problems of the CDM is the failure of the 
additionality  principle.  Besides,  these  general  critiques  also  contend  that  the  CDM 
brings little in the way of sustainable development to host countries and communities. 
As a result, the CDM is criticised as a market design for profit-seekers only. What is 
interesting is that these general critiques rarely appear in China,  either by academic 
researchers or from the interviews for this thesis. What most Chinese practitioners care 
about are the complicated procedures to get the CDM projects  approved. Moreover, 
whether or not the CDM can bring sustainable development or public participation is 
not a key concern, not to mention the fact that the definition of sustainable development 
remains ambiguous in China. This thesis thus argued that China’s active performance in 
the  CDM market  cannot  be treated simply  as  the expansion and victory of  climate 
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capitalism in China. 
    By examining the practices and the Measures, and China’s guideline for governing 
the  CDM, it  becomes  clear  what  the  priorities  are  as  China  introduces  this  market 
mechanism  to  tackle  climate  change.  The  eligibility  regulation  has  prevented  the 
possibility of foreign investors taking control of CDM projects in China. The regulation 
of  revenue distribution has  intentionally  directed  investors  to  renewable  energy and 
other priority areas. Meanwhile, this regulation also implicitly reaffirms the monopoly 
of the state over natural resources, including GHGs emissions. It becomes apparent that 
China has set up clear priorities for conducting the CDM. This thesis argues that to 
pursue  technology  transfer,  to  fulfil  China’s  goals  of  development  and  to  enhance 
market mechanism as a governing tool in China’s environmental governance are the 
primary targets and are the reasons that China conducts the CDM. Meanwhile, through 
these practices,  the relations among four  governmental  rationalities  become clear  as 
well. The rationality of sovereignty represents the concern for the national control of the 
CDM projects. At the same time, primary areas are encouraged due to China’s strategic 
concerns  to  maintain  its  path  of  development.  It  is  obvious  that  rationalities  of 
sovereignty  and  development,  instead  of  the  rationality  of  market,  constitute  the 
mentalities  of  the  CDM in  China.  Meanwhile,  the  good  environmental  governance 
which demonstrates the rationality of environment has enhanced the legitimacy of the 
CPC, which has taken over focus on sovereignty and development throughout Chinese 
state and society. It seems that the introduction of the CDM and other proposals for the 
carbon market, the encouragement of business investments into sectors of renewable 
energy, and the active performance of Chinese environmental NGOs in China’s climate 
politics can be treated as the emergence of ‘good’ environmental governance in China. 
Nevertheless, by examining the CDM practices in China and the interactions between 
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Chinese state and civil society, it is apparent that the state and the politics do not wither 
away or operate via markets, they stay where they are and people are aware of this. 
    This  thesis  has  also  discovered  the  importance  of  the  guanxi,  the  complicated 
relations,  in  China’s  CDM  governance.  Although  it  was  designed  as  a  win-win 
mechanism (that emissions' reduction and sustainable development can be fulfilled at 
the same time), the CDM in China has proved that the market is merely treated as an 
apolitical tool to facilitate China’s governance of climate change. The market rationality 
has  been  instrumentalised  and  the  concerns  of  sustainable  development  and  public 
participation have been neglected. The burgeoning of environmental or climate trading 
centres in China can be treated as the expansion of market rationality; however, the 
scale and the direction of these environmental and carbon markets are strictly monitored 
by the state and they exist to serve China’s development. 
    As  a  result,  the  main  contribution  of  this  thesis  is  to  provide  a  dynamic  and 
contextual understanding of China’s politics and governance of climate change at both 
international and domestic levels, which other approaches can partly do. It argues that 
the  notions  of  ‘state’,  ‘governance’,  ‘society’,  ‘environment’,  ‘nature’,  ‘market’, 
‘climate  change’,  and  ‘development’ need  to  be  genealogically  grasped  in  order  to 
examine the formation and operation of different governmental rationalities in China. 
Through this framework, it is clear why some issues such as the MRV proposal and the 
legally-binding  commitment  have  always  raised  fierce  objections  from  China. 
Meanwhile, it also helps understand why China welcomes other cooperative measures 
in terms of technological and financial transfer, and market mechanism. Both of China’s 
flexibilities  and  rigidness  in  global  climate  change  politics  need  to  be  understood 
through this framework. The arguments from this thesis can be applied to international 
negotiations  in  the  future.  This  framework  also  has  moved  beyond  the  dichotomy 
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between hegemony and counter-hegemony. This thesis argued that even if a neo-liberal 
hegemonic project exists and expands in global climate change politics, how hegemony 
is  understood,  adopted,  transformed,  and  interpreted  still  needs  to  be  analysed 
contextually and historically. The specific conditions in different states need to be dealt 
with seriously. 
    This research also has broader implications for different fields. First, with regards to 
the Foucauldian approach to IR, this thesis has demonstrated a means of applying and 
broadening  Foucault’s  concepts  into  concrete  analysis.  But  it  has  raised  further 
questions with regards to the origins, ruptures and evolvements of these Foucauldian 
concepts. Does the governmentality approach necessarily lead to the critique of neo-
liberal governance? Besides the micro and individual levels, can power embody itself in 
different ways while the context shows different state/society relations and different 
understanding of subject/subjectification? Is the effort to explore different governmental 
rationalities not closer to the research aim of the Foucauldian approach? This thesis 
accepted the assumption from the governmentality approach that it is crucial to examine 
the knowledge, the norm, the discipline, and the rationality of government. However, 
this thesis also argues that these concepts and categories have their own contexts which 
need  to  be  taken  into  consideration  seriously.  Otherwise,  it  becomes  difficult  to 
understand why governing ‘in the name or by the reason of the state’ is so important in 
China’s politics and governance of climate change. The Foucauldian approach should 
always bear in mind the risk of universalisation. 
    Second, for researchers on climate change, this thesis has explored the limitations of 
different IR approaches. It claims that the researcher in this field should transcend a 
superficial  institutional  understanding  of  global  politics  and  governance  of  climate 
change. Structural forces need to be taken into account and those concepts taken for 
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granted need to be problematised. This thesis has critically engaged with neo-Gramscian 
and Foucauldian approaches and this thesis claims that an inter-disciplinary framework 
is necessary to conduct research on global climate change politics. What is crucial is to 
critically  examine  the  assumptions  and  limitations  of  the  approaches  being  used; 
researchers should not allow themselves to be hijacked by the theoretical tool. 
    Third, in terms of the policy of climate change, this thesis argues that the strategies 
from  different  countries  need  to  be  analysed  contextually.  Only  by  examining  the 
political rationalities in different countries can the researcher correctly accommodate the 
core  concerns  surrounding  climate  change  politics.  In  other  words,  it  is  crucial  to 
examine the strategic importance of tackling climate change in different countries and 
contexts. The separation between the domestic and the international, the society and the 
state should be critically examined in order to grasp the dynamics at   domestic and 
society levels. Meanwhile, how the knowledge of climate change is constructed, and 
what  are  the relevant  norms and rules  based on this  knowledge should be analysed 
contextually  as  well.  Fourth,  for  policy  research  in  China,  this  thesis  has  also 
established a useful framework. The concern with governmental rationalities will help 
the  researcher  to  grasp  the  dynamics  beyond  the  institutional  level.  However,  it  is 
crucial to bear in mind that while dealing with different cases, different governmental 
rationalities may appear. For instance, in the research on China’s military expansion, the 
rationality of sovereignty may still play an important role, but the rationality of security 
needs to be taken into account as well. This thesis has applied a flexible framework 
which  can  be  deployed in  many different  fields.  The point  is  how to  contextualise 
different  governmental  rationalities  and  to  examine  the  deployments  of  these 
rationalities. 
    Nevertheless, the fourth implication brings a further concern: can this framework be 
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applied to different cases in global climate politics? This thesis argues it is feasible in 
varying degrees. What is crucial is not to duplicate this framework since the essential 
concern of this framework is to contextually and historically examine the influences of 
different governmental rationalities. As a result, this framework can be applied to other 
developing countries where the development rationality plays a crucial role in climate 
governance. However, the knowledge of development in different countries may have 
entirely different contents and norms in order to fulfil different governmental needs. The 
different societal settings which refer to the relations between the state and society also 
need to be analysed contextually. In order to fundamentally explore the dynamics of 
politics and governance of climate change in different countries, this framework can 
help disentangle different governmental rationalities. 
    Nevertheless,  this  research  also  has  some  limitations.  As  argued  earlier,  the 
framework this  thesis  has  applied  is  a  flexible  one,  which  implies  the  difficulty  of 
providing a general and cohesive framework for future research. Different governmental 
rationalities have to be taken into consideration in different cases; however, a lack of 
criteria on the selection of rationalities will make it harder to develop the research in the 
initial stage. Moreover, even if certain governmental rationalities are selected, it  will 
still be difficult to examine the emergence and influence of these rationalities. A huge 
scale of surveys and interviews over a long period will be needed for further research, in 
order to examine the pervasiveness of certain rationalities and mentalities in a society. 
Specifically, a variety of topics can be explored in the future based on this framework. 
They  include  (1)  the  interplay  between  major  countries  in  global  politics  and 
governance of climate change. The changes of the mode of the interactions and the 
strategies and discourses being used by different parties can be grasped through this 
multi-rationalities  framework.  (2)  The  prospective  of  the  carbon  market  and  other 
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market  mechanisms in China’s  governance  of  climate  change and in  other  areas  of 
environmental  governance  as  well.  It  is  to  examine  the  interplay  between  market 
rationality and other governmental rationalities. This topic can move further to examine 
how the  expansion of  the  carbon  market  and market  rationality  encounter  different 
governmentalities  from  different  contexts.  (3)  The  formation  of  environmental  or 
climate knowledge in different contexts.  Based on this  exploration,  the research can 
move on to analyse how the environmental and climate governance are established and 
what governmental rationalities are involved. In the end, this thesis argues that it  is 
necessary to keep exploring the governmental rationalities in different cases in order to 
grasp the dynamics of the present governances. 
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